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Preface 
The hospitality industry in Michigan is a dynamic one that brings jobs and good will to our 
state and contributes to economic growth. Holding a license to sell alcoholic beverages is 
often considered an important component of being competitive and profitable within the 
industry. 
Local units of government - cities, townships and villages - and the Michigan Liquor 
Control Commission (MLCC) work together in both the licensing process and in the 
enforcement of the state's liquor laws. Whether you are a city or village council member, a 
township board member or a local law enforcement official or officer, this guide is 
designed to help you understand how the licensing process works and your role in granting 
specific liquor licenses and permits. Additionally, when a local governmental unit is 
considering adopting a resolution objecting to the renewal of a license or requesting the 
MLCC to revoke a license, the unit should be aware of the documentation that must be 
submitted with the resolution. Finally, this guide explains the Commission's position on the 
responsibilities that local governments have for the enforcement of liquor laws. Obviously, 
the local government's attorney should be consulted about these matters. 
We also provide Questions and Answers to show how the laws and rules are applied in 
real situations. It may be useful for you to refer to more complete language of the statute or 
court cases, so references have been provided. MCl refers to the Michigan Compiled 
Laws; MAC refers to the Michigan Administrative Code which contains the administrative 
rules promulgated by the MLCC. 
The Commission believes that when local officials have a better understanding of their 
rights and responsibilities under the Liquor Control Code, our working relationship will be 
improved with you as well as with applicants and licensees. We must caution however, 
that this Guide is not intended to be a substitute for the Liquor Control Code and 
Administrative Rules, or for competent legal counsel. 
We welcome your comments and suggestions for future editions of this Guide. Send them 
to the Commission's Lansing office at the address printed in the back cover. You are also 
invited to attend our semi annual public hearings where we receive comments from the 
public on the administration of the Liquor Control Code. The meeting dates are published 
on our web site at _ 
The Michigan Liquor Control Commission 
November 2000 
-1-
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Licensing 
This chapter, directed primarily to members of local government legislative bodies, provides 
information designed to answer the most commonly asked questions about the on-premises 
licensing process including types of licenses and the quota system for licenses to sell alcoholic 
beverages. It also describes the role of the local legislative body and local law enforcement 
officials in the licensing process. 
On-premises Licenses 
These licenses are issued to allow alcoholic beverages to be sold, served and consumed on the 
premises of the licensed business: 
! Class C 
! Club 
! B Hotel 
! A Hotel 
! Tavern 
! Brewpub 
! Micro 
Brewer 
!Wine 
Maker 
! Special 
License 
! Resorts 
This license allows the business to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drink for 
consumption on the premises. MCl 436.1107(2) 
This license enables a private club to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drink 
to bona fide members only. MCl 436.1107(3) 
This license permits a hotel to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drink for 
consumption on the premises and in the rooms of bona fide guests. 
MCl 436.1107(9) 
This license allows a hotel to sell only beer and wine for consumption on the 
premises and in the rooms of bona fide guests. MCl436.1107(8) 
This license enables a business to sell only beer and wine for consumption on the 
premises. MCl 436.1113(1) 
This license is issued in conjunction with an on-premises license and authorizes 
the licensee to manufacture and sell beer for consumption on the premises or for 
take-out. MCl436.1105(11) 
This manufacturing license allows a business to sell beer produced on 
the premises to consumers for consumption on the premises or for take-out. MCl 
436.1109(2) 
This manufacturing license allows a business to sell wine produced on 
the premises in a restaurant for consumption on or off the premises. 
This license (often called a "24-hour license") allows a non-profit 
organization to sell beer, wine and/or liquor for consumption on the premises 
for a limited period of time. This includes wine auctions for charities. 
MCl436.1111(10) 
In the years permitted by law, the Commission can issue a limited number of 
Resort licenses for any of the on-premises classifications except Club and Special 
licenses, in addition to the quota established by law for these licenses. MCl 
436.1531 
U 1 
An on-premises licensee often holds a Specially Designated Merchant (SDM) license to sell beer and wine 
for consumption off the premises, in conjunction with the on-premises license. 
Summary of On-premises License Information 
On-premises Sell Sell Sell Licensed to sell to: Population 
License Type: Beer? Wine? Liquor Quota Applies? 
? 
Class C Yes Yes Yes General Public Yes 
Resort Class C Yes Yes Yes General Public No 
Club Yes Yes Yes Club Members No 
B-Hotel Yes Yes Yes General Public and in guest Yes 
rooms 
Resort B-Hotel Yes Yes Yes General Public and in guest No 
rooms 
A-Hotel Yes Yes No General Public and in guest Yes 
rooms 
Resort A-Hotel Yes Yes No General Public and in guest No 
rooms 
Tavern Yes Yes No General Public Yes 
Resort Tavern Yes Yes No General Public No 
Special License Yes Yes Yes Generlal Public No 
Transferability of Escrowed Licenses 
On-premises escrowed licenses issued under MCl 436.1531 are available subject to local 
legislative approval under section 501 (2) to an applicant whose proposed operation is located 
within any local governmental unit in a county with a population of under 500,000 or a county with 
a population of over 700,000 in which the escrowed licehse was located. If the local 
governmental unit within which the former licensee's premises were located spans more than 1 
county, an escrowed license is available subject to local approval to an applicant whose 
proposed operation is located within any local governmental unit in either county. 
If an escrowed license is activated within a local governmental unit other than that local 
governmental unit within which the escrowed license was originally issued, the Commission 
shall count that activated license against the local governmental unit originally issuing the 
license. The upgrading of a license resulting from a request under MCl 436.1531 (1) involving 
the transfer of an escrowed license, shall be approved by the local governmental unit having 
jurisdiction. 
2 
The Quota System 
A quota system exists for retail licenses in order to control the growth of licensed businesses 
selling alcohol beverages in the state. Simply put, quotas have been established by the 
legislature based on a ratio of licenses to population. Pi change in the demographics of a 
municipality, whether an increase or decrease, can change the number of licenses available. 
There are no quota restrictions for Specially Designated Merchants (SDMs). 
The population ratios the Commission uses are different for on-premises and off-premises 
licenses. For on-premises licenses, one license is granted for each 1,500 of population or major 
fraction thereof. For off-premises licenses (SOD), one liCense is granted for every 3,000 in 
population or any fraction thereof. Examples of the ratios are: 
On-premises ! Off-premises 
Population #of Population # of 
licenses licenses 
1- 2,250 1 1-3,000 1 
2,251- 3,750 2 3,001- 6,000 2 
3,751- 5,250 3 6,001- 9,000 3 
5,251 4 etc. 9,001-12,000 4 etc. 
local units of government have an important role to play:in the issuing of quota licenses. For 
example, in the case of an on-premises license, approval is required from a local governmental 
unit with a population of less than 750,000. In the case of off-premises licenses, local approval 
is not required but the Commission requires license applicants to meet all appropriate local 
ordinances, including zoning requirements. There are exceptions to quotas when issuing certain 
types of licenses. For more detailed information see MCl 436.1531 and MCl 436.1533. 
Any of the conditions below can change the number of licenses available within a local unit of 
government. The MLCC will notify the clerk of the legislative body if: 
1. A special or regular census, or annexation, makes additional licenses available. 
2. A canceled or revoked license creates an opening ;in the number of licenses available. 
3. An applicant who is approved by the MLCC does n'ot subsequently submit required documents and 
the license is not issued. 
4. An approved applicant does not subsequently opern the licensed business within one year of 
approval and fails to obtain required extensions. 
5. The number of unissued but available licenses declines because the population decreases. 
Filling Quota Openings 
The legislative body of the local governmental unit has the responsibility of determining whether 
to fill the quota opening for on-premises licenses. If yes, ~nd there are a number of applicants 
for the available Iicense(s), then you must send the Commission a resolution as to which 
person was approved "above all others" for the available Iicense(s). Refer to the sample 
resolution at the end of this section. 
The Liquor Control Commission cannot approve an application for an on-premises license 
subject to the quota, without an approval resolution from the local legislative body. However, 
there is no statutory requirement that a local unit of government must approve any application or 
3 
authorize issuing all or available under the:quota. 
The applicants approved by the local legislative body will also go through the MLCC investigation 
process prior to consideration by the Commission for a license. This investigation is thorough 
and concentrates on the applicant's (including partnerships and corporations) qualifications for 
the license requested. 
Waiving the SDD Quota 
The Commission may waive the quota requirement if it has been filled and there is no existing 
SOD license issued within two miles of the proposed location measured along the nearest traffic 
route. MCl 436.1533 
The Commission can also waive the quota requirement if all of the following conditions are met: 
A. the city, township, or village has a population of less than 3,000 and 
8. the only existing SOD license is held in comjunction with an on-premises A-Hotel or 8-
Hotel license, and 
C. no other waivers have been granted in the local governmental unit. MAC R 436.1135(6) 
On-premises Licenses Exempt from Quota Restrictions 
Development District Authorities 
A "development district" is any of the following (MCl 436.1521 (9)) : 
1. An authority district established under the tax increment finance authority act, 1980 PA 450, MCl 
125.1801 to 125.1830. 
2. An authority district established under the local development financing act, 1986 PA 281, MCl 
125.2151 to 125.2174. 
3. A downtown district established under 1975 PA 197, MCl 125.1651 to 125.1681. 
4. A principal shopping district established under 1961 PA 120, MCl 125.981 to 125.987, before 
January 1, 1996. 
Under MCl 436.1521 the Commission may issue up to 50 tavern or Class C licenses in addition 
to the number of licenses provided by quota, to persons or businesses that meet the following 
requirements: 
A) The business is a full service restaurant, is open to the public, and prepares food on the premises. 
8) The business is open for food service not less than 10 hours per day, 5 days a week. 
C) At least 50% of the gross receipts of the business are derived from the sale of food for consumption 
on the premises. Food does not include beer or wine sales. 
D) The business has dining facilities to seat not less than 25 persons. 
E) The business is located in a development district with a population of not more than 50,000 in 
which the authority, after a public hearing, has found that the issuance of the license would prevent 
further deterioration within the development district and promote economic growth within the 
development district. The commission will not issu,e a license as outlined in section 521 unless the 
local unit of government within which the authority is located, after holding a public hearing, passes 
a resolution concurring on the findings of the authority. 
Also, the Commission will not issue a license under section 521 if the local governmental unit 
within which the development district is located has not issued all appropriate on-premises 
licenses available under quota or if an appropriate on-premises escrowed license is readily 
available in any local unit of government in which the development district is located. The 
Commission shall not issue more than 2 licenses authorized under section 521 in any city or 
municipality with a population greater than 50,000. If an applicant's proposed location is within 
more than 1 development district, the applicant shall obtain the approval of both or all of the 
4 
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applicable local units of ent or development districts. 
Resort Licenses 
Resort licenses may be issued for Class C, Tavern, B-Hotel and A-Hotel classifications without 
regard to the quota only when it is deemed to be econornically desirable and beneficial to the 
tourist industry. Resort licenses are subject to approval by the local legislative body and must 
meet the qualifications for both the type of regular license requested and as a Resort. 
There are several types of on-premises resort licenses authorized under MCl 436.1531 : 
A. 550 on-premises resort licenses which are transferrable to any location in Michigan. All of these 
licenses have currently been issued, but their ownership and location is transferrable. 
B. The Commission may issue not more than 10 additional licenses in years designated by statute to 
establishments whose business and operation is designed to attract and accommodate tourists 
and visitors to the resort area, whose primary purpose is not the sale of alcoholic liquor and whose 
capital investment in the licensed premises is at least $75,000. These licenses may be transferred 
from one owner to another but cannot be moved (location). 
C. In addition to A and B above, up to 20 additional licenses for resort economic development may be 
issued to applicants who demonstrate that they meet the criteria above and have a minimum 
investment of $1,500,000. These licenses may be transferred from one owner to another but 
cannot be moved (location). 
Other Licenses Not Subject to Quota 
Public and County-owned airports, municipal civic centers or civic auditoriums, private, 
non-profit clubs and municipal golf courses are not subject to quota restrictions. A 
limited number of speCial purpose licenses are also available to well established non-
profit organizations with university affiliation wheril the event is held on campus (art 
expos, outdoor festivals) and to National or Interrlational sporting events hosted by a city. 
Publicly Owned Airports 
An on-premises license may be issued by the Commission to the owner and/or lessee of 
buildings within a passenger terminal complex of:a publicly-owned airport. The airport 
must be served by regularly scheduled commercial passenger airlines certified by the 
Federal Aviation Agency or the Civil Aeronautics ~oard to enplane and deplane 
passengers. These licenses are not transferrable. MCl436.1507 
County Airports 
An on-prernises license may be issued by the Commission to an establishment situated 
on property where there is an airport that is owned by the county or in which the county 
has an interest. MCl 436.1531 (1 0) 
Municipally Owned Golf Courses 
An on-premises license may be issued by the Commission to a golf course open to the 
public and owned by a county, city, township or village situated in a county with a 
population of 1 ,000,000 or more. These licenses are not transferrable. MCl 436.1515 
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Municipal Civic Center or c Auditorium 
Club 
On-premises licenses may be issued by the Commission to the governing or operating 
body of a municipal civic center or civic auditorium and/or one or more of its 
concessionaires for the service of alcoholic beverages at scheduled events. In order to 
obtain this type of license, the civic center or auditorium must be located within a city or 
township having a population of at least 9,500. The facility must be owned and operated 
as a municipal enterprise. Additionally, the local legislative body must authorize the 
governing body or its concessionaire to apply to the Commission for a license. These 
licenses may not be issued to an educational institution or a facility operated in 
connection with an educational institution and are not transferrable. MCl436.1509 
A Club license enables a private club to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drinks to 
bona fide members only. MCl436.1537(d) 
National or International Sporting Event Licenses 
A maximum of 40 licenses may be issued for a period of not more than 30 days. The 
premises to be licensed must be in the central business district of a city having a 
population of 70,000 or more and the city must be the official host of the national or 
international sporting event. The governing bodyof the city must recommend the number 
of licenses to be issued in the theme area(s) and must provide a list of the applicants 
and locations with certification that premises to be licensed meet applicable state and 
local building, safety, and health laws and ordinances. MCl436.1517 
College/University (with Hospitality Program) Hotel and Conference Center Licenses 
An on-premises license may be issued by the Commission to the governing board of a 
college or university operating a conference center for the sale of alcoholic beverages at 
regularly scheduled conference center activities only. The conference center, with 
certain exceptions, must have meeting rooms, banquet areas, social halls, overnight 
accommodations and related facilities for special activities scheduled by the college or 
university. MCl 436.1513 
Permits 
Banquet Facility Permits 
Banquet Facility Permits are extensions of on-premises licenses for the purpose of 
serving alcoholic beverages at a facility used only for scheduled functions and events. 
This permit does not affect the quota for on-premises licenses even if issued in a 
governmental unit other than that in which the license is issued. Approval of the local 
legislative body in which the facility is located is required. MCl 436.1522 
Special Activity Permits 
The information on the following pages describes special activity permits which can be issued 
with the different types of retail liquor licenses. These activities may not be allowed on a 
licensed premises without having the appropriate special activity permit. 
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PERMIT ISSUED TO 
TYPE 
Sunday On-Premises: Class C, Club 
Sales S-Hotel 
Off-Premises: SOD 
Resorts : Class C, B-Hotel, 
SOD 
Uving On-Premises: Class C, 
Quarters Tavern 
Off-Premises: SOD, SoM 
Resorts: Class C, Tavern, 
SOD, SOM 
Direct All types of retail licenses 
Connection 
Authorization 
After Hours All On-Premises licenses 
Food IncludIng resorts 
Dance All On-Premises licenses 
Including Resorts 
En tertainment All On-Premises licenses 
Including Resorts 
DESCRIPTION I ACTIVITY 
Allows Sunday sales of spirits between the hours of 12 
noon and 12 midnight. Subject 10 these restrictions : 
I Sunday sales must be legal in the local unit of 
government. 
, Gross sales of spirits must be less than 50% of the 
gross sales of the entire business, Including beer anI 
wine. 
Allows living quarters to be direclly connected to the 
licensed premises. 
ReqUired to connect the licensed business with any 
unlicensed area not under the direct control of the 
licensee. 
Allows the business to stay open for the sale of food 
between 2:30 a.m. and 7 a.m. Monday through 
Saturday or between 2:30 a.m. and noon on Sunday. 
The business must operate a full service kitchen . Th ~ 
licensee must specify the hours requested . Sales or 
consumption of any alcoholic beverages are not allov ed 
during these hours. 
Approval of local law enforcement Is required. 
Allows dancing by patrons. The dance floor must be a t 
d least 100 feet square, well defined, clearly marked, a 
un-obstructed when customer dancing is permitted. 
Approval of local police and teglslative body is requir d 
In all other areas. 
Activities allowed by this permit may only be conduct! d 
during the legal hours for sale and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. 
Allows dancing by employees or contract entertainer 
or for monologues, dialogues, motion pictures, still 
slides, closed circuit television, contests, or other 
performances for public viewing. Does not allow dane ng 
by patrons. 
Not required for orchestra playing, piano playing, or 
playing of other musical instruments, or for the showi 9 
of publicly broadcast television . 
Police and local legislative body approval is requ ired 
except in Detroit where only police approval is requir« d . 
Activities allowed by this permit may only be conduclE d 
during the legal hours for sale and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. 
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PERMIT ISSUED TO DESCRIPTION I ACTIVITY 
TYPE 
Topless All On-Premises licenses Allows entertainment or work related activity performl d 
Activity including Resorts on the licensed premises in which the female breast 
area is exposed by any means Including see-through 
clothing or body stockings. 
Except in Detroit, this permit must be approved by bo h 
the local law enforcement agency and governmental 
unit. 
Golf All On-Premises licenses Allows the licensed premises to be occupied for 
including Resorts registering golfers before the legal hour of 7:00 a.m. p n 
weekdays and between 2:30 a.m. and noon on Sund y 
Alcoholic beverages cannot be sold or consumed on h e 
premises during this period . licensed premises mus 
be adjacent to the golf course . Local police investiga 0 n 
and approval Is also required . 
Additional Bar Class C, B-Hotel, Class C Required for each bar over one on the licensed 
Resort, B-Hotel Resort premises at which customers may purchase alcohol ic 
beverages . : 
Local law enforcement investigation and approval is I so 
requ ired . Additional Bar Permits are not required for iA 
Hote ls , Clubs and Tave rns . 
Bowling Bowling alleys with any On- Allows bowling on the licensed premises before or afie l 
Premises license the legal hours. The licensee must specify the hours 0 
operation . Alcoholic beverages may not be sold or 
consumed during these hours. Local law enforcemen 
Investigation and approval is also required 
Outdoor All On-Premises Licensees Allows the sale and consumption of alcoholic bevera( e s 
Service including Resorts in a well-defined and marked area adjacent to the 
licensed premises . Local law enforcement invesligati( n 
and approval is also required . 
Ski All On-Premises licensees Allows the licensed premises to be occupied for the 
including Resorts registration of skiers before or after the legal hours. 
Alcoholic beverages may not be sold or consumed 01 
the premises during the period of the permit. 
Miscellaneous Specific purpose permits may be issued for other types of un ique circumstan ces (i. 
tennis or ra cquetball) which require the p~emises to be occupied at other than the Ie gal 
hour. These requests are considered on an individual basis. 
Local Approval 
Legislative Body and Law Enforcement 
In local governmental units with a population of less than 750,000, approval of the local legislative 
body is required for ali on-premises licenses (both new and transfers) except Club and Special 
licenses. Approval of the local legislative body is also required for Dance, Entertainment, 
Topless Activity and Banquet Facility permits issued to licensees authorizing certain activities on 
the licensed premises. Approval and recommendation of the chief local law enforcement officer 
having jurisdiction is also part of the licensing process for all licenses and permits where only 
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police approval is required. 436.1501 and 1916, and MAC R436.1 
The chart below shows which types of on-premises licenses and permits require local 
legislative body approval, and which require only local law enforcement investigation. 
Summary of Local Approvals Required for On-premises Licenses and Permits: 
Type of On-premises License: Local Legislative Approval? Local Law Enforcement 
Investigation Required? 
Class C & Resort Class C 
Club 
B-Hotel and Resort B-Hotel 
A-Hotel and Resort A-Hotel 
Tavern and Resort Tavern 
Special (24-hour) 
Type of On-premises Permit 
Specific Purpose Permit 
Food, Golf, Bowling, Ski3 
Yes - except Detroit1 
N02 
Yes - except Detroit1 
Yes - except Detroit 1 
Yes - except Detroit1 
No - except on state military bases 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Type of On-premises Permit Local Legislative Approval? Local Law Enforcement 
Investigation Required? 
Dance 
Entertain ment 
Topless Activity 
Banquet Facility Permit 
Additional Bar 
Outdoor Service 
Living Quarters 
No 
Direct Connection to Unlicenseft:lo 
premises 
Yes 2 - except in Detroit1 
Yes 2 - except in Detroit1 
Yes2 - except in Detroit1 
Yes - except in Detroit1 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Sunday Sales Legal hours of sale on Sundays are from 1Q:00 noon until 2:00 a.m. of the next day, unless 
locally prohibited. 4 Individual governmental units may prohibit the sale of alcoholic liquor on 
Sundays by resolution or ordinance, but local approval is not needed specifically for a 
Sunday Sales permit. By state law, beer and wine may be sold after 12:00 noon on 
Sunday without special authorization however, sales may be prohibited locally by 
referendum. 
1- Because of the number of licensed establishments in the city of Detroit, it has a specialized liquor investigation 
process which includes technical approvals for zoning and ordinance investigation. Therefore, the local 
legislative approval requirement has been waived for Detroit by MCl 436.1501. 
2 - Although Club licenses do not require legislative body approval,local approval is needed for Dance, 
Entertainment and Topless Activity permits issued to Clubs. Clubs must meet all local zoning and code 
requirements. MCl 436.1916 and MAC R436.11 05(3) 
3 -Restaurants and similar establishments may receive permission from the MlCC to operate for a specific 
purpose (such as registering golfers) at other hours as long as all alcoholic beverages are sold Q.Q)y,during legal 
hours. MAC R436.1437 
4 - Any questions on local referenda for liquor sales should be referred to the Commission because of the 
complexity of the laws and relevant court cases. 
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legislative Body 
When legislative body approval is required, contact the MLCC to obtain the necessary forms. 
Sample of Approval Resolution: 
The local legislative body must take action before the license application can be submitted to the 
Commission for consideration. All applications for transfer of ownership or new permits, 
in particular, should receive immediate consideration by the local government so that 
the transaction is not unduly delayed. 
NOTE: The MLCC will not accept conditional approvals except for the case where a local 
legislative body is waiting for final approvals from building or health inspectors. If the local 
government has no other objections to the application then approval can be accomplished by 
having the local law enforcement approval made subject to final inspection(s). The MLCC can 
also make its approval subject to final inspection by local law enforcement officials, thereby 
avoiding delay of the licensing process caused by the local legislative body having to pass a 
second, unconditional approval resolution prior to the issuance of the liquor license. 
Club Licenses 
As a courtesy to local governmental units, the Commission will contact you when an application 
for a new club license is received. Public notice of the intent of the Commission to issue the 
club license must be given by the club through publication in a newspaper of general circulation 
within the local governmental unit jurisdiction at least 10 days before the license is issued. The 
courts have ruled that this public notice is required in lieu of approval of the local legislative body. 
If you object to a club license 
application, you must notify 
the Commission of the reason 
for your objection within 15 
business days after receiving 
our notice. The reasons must 
be based upon the 
Commission's licensing 
qualification rules or based on 
violation of building codes, health 
codes or zoning ordinances 
(Refer to MAC R436.11 05). 
Copies of relevant local codes or 
ordinances (and of violations and 
convictions) should also be sent 
to the MLCC with your objection. 
Ordinance Prohibiting Retail 
Sale of Alcoholic Beverages 
MCl 436.2109 
In addition to the previously 
mentioned local and county 
options that may be exercised 
relative to the sale of alcoholic 
beverages, a city, township or 
village may adopt an ordinance 
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that prohibits all retail sales of holic beverages within their borders. ordinance may 
only be adopted if there are no existing licenses issued within the local governmental 
unit for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. This includes licenses for the retail sale of 
alcoholic beverages for consumption both on and off the premises. 
This ordinance must be submitted to the electorate at the next general or special election that is 
held. However, the election may not be less than 45 days after the adoption of the ordinance. 
In the event the electorate affirms the ordinance, the Commission is prohibited from issuing a 
license for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages within that local governmental unit. 
local Liquor law Enforcement Mel 436.1543 
Local units of government - cities, townships and villages - which have a full-time police 
department or a fUll-time ordinance enforcement department, receive 55% of all retail liquor 
license and renewal fees for each retail liquor license located in the boundaries of the local 
governmental unit. 
Townships and villages who contract for local law enforcement sometimes use the returnable 
license fees as partial payment for the contracted county services. The treasurer of the local unit 
of government is required to sign an affidavit, provided by the Commission, certifying that the 
funds are used for liquor law enforcement activities before the Commission can send the fees to 
the local unit. 
The law enforcement agency is also responsible for completing the LC 1800 (applicant 
investigation) form, fingerprinting the license applicants, collecting the State Police fingerprinting 
fee and forwarding the form, card and fee to the MLCC for processing through the Michigan 
State Police. The State Police records are checked for Michigan criminal history. Local units of 
government may charge a separate fee for taking the fingerprints. 
TEST YOURSELF: On-premises Retail Licenses 
Q. There is an opening in the on-premises quota for our township. We have heard that a large 
restaurant is interested in a piece of prime property. Must we approve one of the 
applicants we currently have on file for the available license? 
A No. The local governmental unit can decide when and if it wants to approve issuance of 
the available license. If you prefer to wait until a later time, you may. 
Q. Part of our township was annexed to the neighboring city. A liquor license was contained 
within the geographical boundary of what was annexed. Do we now have an opening in our 
quota? 
A It depends on whether your township retained a sufficient population base to continue at 
the same quota. If your township was at its maximum number of licenses prior to the 
annexation, and if you have retained a sufficient number of people under the census to 
continue at the same number of licenses, then your township will have one additional 
license that can be issued. Additionally, the license that was in the geographical boundary 
annexed to the city will be counted as part of that city's quota licenses. If they were 
already at their quota, the license will still be counted for that local unit of government. 
The Commission cannot require that the number of licenses in that unit be reduced. 
Q. Do on-premises Taverns and A-Hotels (beer and wine) count as part of our city's quota? 
A. Yes. Even though these licensees may not sell spirits, by law they do count towards the 
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quota. However, Club licenses in your city do NOT count toward the pOIPUIatIC:>n-Oa!;eCl 
quota of licensees. 
Q. Our township board is willing to approve an applicant above all others for a new on-
premises license upon the condition that the applicant plant trees on the property. This 
condition will be added to the approval resolution being submitted to the Commission. Will 
the resolution be accepted? 
A. No. Conditions on local approvals are private contractual agreements between the local 
governmental unit and the applicant. The recommendation by the community to the 
MLCC must be unqualified (except in the case of meeting health code or zoning/building 
requirements). 
Q. A proposed licensed location is within 500 feet of a church. Should our village consider the 
proximity of the church to the proposed licensed premises? 
A. It is the sole responsibility of the MLCC to make a determination regarding proximity to 
churches and schools. When it appears that a licensed location may be within the SOO-foot 
limitation, Commission investigators will measure the distance. If the proposed location is 
within 500 feet of a church or school, the church or school will be notified (by certified 
mail) of their right to have a hearing to object to the proposed license location. If an 
objection is filed, a hearing will be held by the MLCC and the local governmental unit will 
be notified of the hearing date and location. If the church or school does not object to the 
proposed location, the Commission will proceed with the application process. The 500-
foot rule does not apply to SDM (beer and wine) off-premises licensed businesses unless it 
is to be held in conjunction with an on-premises license. 
Licensing 
Like the previous chapter, this section is directed primarily to members of local government 
legislative bodies and answers the most commonly asked questions about licensing - only now 
the focus is on off-premises licenses. This chapter will explain the types of off-premises 
licenses, the quota system, and the role of the local legislative body and the local law 
enforcement officials. 
Off-premises Licenses 
These licenses are issued for businesses such as party stores, supermarkets, convenience 
stores, and drug stores where alcoholic beverages are sold for consumption off the premises. 
SOD Specially Designated Distributor. This license enables the licensee to sell 
packaged liquor (distilled spirits and mixed spirit drink only) for consumption off 
the licensed premises. MCl 436.1111 (11) 
SDM Specially Designated Merchant. This license enables the licensee to sell only 
beer and wine for consumption off the licensed premises and is not subject to 
quota restrictions. MCl 436.1111 (12) 
SOD Resort In the years permitted by statute, the Commission can also issue a limited 
number of off-premises SOD resort licenses in governmental units where the 
population is 50,000 or less, and where there are no SOD licenses available 
under the quota. MCl 436.1531 (5) 
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Off-premises -Alcoholic beverage sold- Licensed to sell to Quota 
Licenses Type Beer? Wine? Liquor? Applies 
SOD No No Yes General Public Yes 
SDD Resort No No Yes General Public No 
SDM Yes Yes No General Public No 
Note: Off-premises licensees may also sell up to 9 liters of spirits per month to an On-premises licensee if 
the proper permit has been obtained from BATF. 
Local Approval 
Ordinance and Zoning Compliance 
Off-premises licenses (SOM and SOD) do not require approval of the local governing body. 
Because the Commission's rules require that licensed locations be in compliance with all 
appropriate state and local building, plumbing, zoning, fire, sanitation and health laws and 
ordinances, the Commission will notify you of any applications for a new license or a transfer of 
an existing license or location that are received. 
The local governing body, or your designee (such as a building inspector or police agency), has 
15 days to notify the Commission of any instances of non-compliance. These must be outlined 
in detail indicating the specific laws or ordinances, and a copy of the applicable law or ordinance 
must be attached. If the Commission does not receive notification within 15 days, it will assume 
that the location complies with local laws and ordinances. MAC R436.11 05 (3) 
The chart below indicates local responsibility for investigation of off-premises licensed locations: 
Summary of Local Approvals Required for Off-premises Licenses & Permits: 
Type of Off-premises License: Local Legislative Approval? Local Law Enforcement 
Investigation Required? 
SOD & SOD Resort 
SOM 
Type of Off-premises Permit: 
Sunday Sales - SOD 
Direct Connection 
Living Quarters 
Off-premises Storage 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
The county board of commissioners must have authorized the sale of 
liquor (distilled spirits) after 12:00 noon on Sunday. Beer and wine may be 
sold after noon on Sunday without special authorization from the MLCC -
unless prohibited by local ordinances. * 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
* Any questions regarding local referenda on liquor issues should be referred to the Commission because of 
the complexity of the laws and relevant court decisions. 
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Ordinance Prohibiting Sale of Alcoholic Beverages 
In addition to the previously mentioned local and county options that may be exercised relative to 
the sale of alcoholic beverages, a city, township or village may adopt an ordinance which 
prohibits.illl retail sales of alcoholic beverages within their borders. This ordinance may only 
be adopted if there are no existing licenses issued within the local governmental unit 
for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. This includes licenses for the retail sale of 
alcoholic beverages for consumption both on and off the premises. 
This ordinance must be submitted to the electorate at the next general or special election that is 
held after the ordinance is adopted. However, the election may not be less than 45 days after 
the adoption of the ordinance. 
In the event that the electorate affirms the ordinance, the Commission is prohibited from issuing 
a license for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages within that local governmental unit. 
Revocation of the ordinance by the electorate is effective on the date of the certification of the 
election results. The commission may then issue retail licenses for the sale of alcoholic 
beverages within the local governmental unit. MCl436.2109 
TEST YOURSELF: Off-premises Retail Licenses 
Q. We believe our city has increased in population since the last federal Census. Can we 
conduct a special population count to determine if we are entitled to an additional SOD 
license within the quota? 
A Yes. Under provisions of Act 279 of P.A. of 1909, as amended (Section 117.6 of the 
Michigan Compiled laws) or under Section7 of Act 245 of P.A. of 1975 (MCl 
141.907) the local unit of government may, by resolution, request a special state 
census of the unit. For more information, call the Bureau of Elections, Special 
Census unit at the Secretary of State (517) 373-2540. 
Q. Our full-time charter township police department has neither the time, the funding, nor the 
expertise to conduct a local investigation for a liquor license that involves researching 
zoning ordinances, local health codes, and the other regulations that a licensee must 
comply with. How can we avoid doing this? 
A You cannot. If your township treasurer signs the affidavit providing your 
township with 55% of the liquor licensing fees for each retail licensee located in 
the township, you must assume responsibility for enforcement of the liquor laws 
including local investigations. 
This requirement is for the benefit of the township, not the Liquor Control 
Commission. In order to ease the demand on your police department, your 
township may want to set up a system to handle liquor matters. Most 
governmental units have a zoning and code enforcement team. You can have 
the premises inspected by the person responsible for these inspections, such as 
the building inspector or fire department. 
Some smaller townships contract with the county sheriff for local law 
enforcement. If the township signed the required affidavit to receive the 
returnable license fees, then the Commission would mail the payment to the 
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township. , the township would then use the fu to help pay the 
county contract. You should be aware, however, that these fund expenditures 
are audited. 
Q. Our city council has approved a transfer of a license and conducted a local investigation. 
Does the Commission also conduct a separate investigation? 
A Yes. The MLCC investigators conduct an extensive investigation of the 
applicant. Our investigation focuses on the applicant's background and financial 
status. Commission investigators also examine the proposed location to 
determine if it meets the legal requirements for a specific license. This could 
mean that even though a person has been approved at the local level, the 
application could be denied by the MLCC. However, the local governmental body 
should not conclude that this means that an applicant has something undesirable 
in his or her background: there are many reasons that a person may not meet 
licensing qualification standards. 
In fact, local legislative approval is not required to transfer an off-premises 
license. You can make a recommendation and the Commission will consider it; 
however, the Commission is not bound to act according to a local 
recommendation as it is with on-premises license transfers. 
Q. Our village council has been advised that an applicant for a liquor license wants to turn a 
former laundromat into a take-out party store and obtain both an SDM and SOD license. 
Although we have no objection to licenses being issued to the applicant, we feel there 
may be some problems with the location. There is a pin-ball/electronic game shop next 
door that is frequented by teenagers. The concern of people in the community is that 
sales to minors will occur. Can we object to the license being issued? 
A There are two issues involved in this question. 
First, can the village council legally object to the license being issued? 
Second, if the license is granted, are there automatically going to be problems 
with sales to minors? 
Although the purpose of the local review is to determine whether there are any 
zoning or ordinance problems with the proposed licensed location, the Liquor 
Control Commission (under Rule 436.1105(2)(d)) may also consider the opinions 
of the local residents, local legislative body, or local law enforcement agency with 
regard to the proposed business. Therefore, the village council could choose to 
advise the MLCC of local concerns even though there are no violations of local 
ordinances or codes. The village can strengthen its objection by being as 
detailed as possible. 
A local unit of government should not assume that a licensee will sell alcoholic 
beverages to minors simply because a nearby business caters to teenagers. 
However, if it appears that the licensee is violating the law, your local law 
enforcement agency should investigate the licensee. 
As shown in the next chapter, your village may request revocation of a license if 
the licensee is determined to be responsible for violating the Liquor Control 
Code or the MLCC Rules on three occasions within one year. In addition to 
Commission action, the licensee may be subject to criminal action and also to 
possible civil action under Dram Shop statutes. 
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local units of governrnent have the right to object to the renewal of an on-premises license, 
and also rnay request that the MlCC revoke an on-premises license. local governments 
may request that the MlCC revoke an off-premises license, but may not object to renewal 
of an off-premises license. These rights are accompanied by specific requirements that have 
evolved based on court decisions. 
What licenses are subject to these actions? 
Because local units of government are required to approve public on-premises licenses, they 
may also object to renewal or request revocation of Class C, A-Hotel, B-Hotel, Tavern, Class C 
Resort, A-Hotel Resort, B-Hotel Resort, Tavern Resort, and Micro Brewer licenses. 
local governments may also request revocation of off-premises SOD and SOM licenses in their 
jurisdiction when: (1) the Commission has determined that the licensee has violated the Liquor 
Control Code by selling or furnishing alcohol to a person under 21 years of age on at least three 
occasions within a calendar year, and (2) those violations did not involve the use of false or 
fraudulent identification by the person under 21 years of age MCl 436.1501 (3). 
If a local unit of government objects to renewal or requests revocation of an on-premises retail 
license, and the licensee also has an off-premises SOM license, the Commission will also hold 
a "show cause" hearing to determine if there is any reason that the SOM license should not be 
renewed or revoked at the same time because the business no longer meets the licensing 
qualification requirements. 
local governments may also request revocation of any permit held in conjunction with an on-
premises license but must follow the rules of due process as outlined below. 
Due Process 
Regardless of whether the local unit of government wishes to object to a renewal or request 
revocation of a license or permit, the licensee is entitled to due process. In Bundo v City of 
Walled Lake (395 Michigan 679 [1976]), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the liquor 
licensee has a property interest in the license and, therefore, is entitled to due process 
protection. 
The procedural safeguards that the courts deemed necessary regarding a decision by the local 
body to object to renewal of a license consist of "rudimentary due process." Courts have said 
this includes notice to the licensee of the proposed action and the reasons for the action, a 
hearing at which the licensee may present evidence, testify, and confront adverse witnesses, 
and a written statement of the findings. In Roseland Inn, Inc. v Robert D. McClain and 
Township of Blackman and Liquor Control Commission (118 Michigan App [1982]), the 
Court of Appeals held that a lack of standards and fair notification of the standards violates a 
licensee's right to due process. Therefore, local units of government should consider the 
following guidelines and standards when pursuing an objection to renewal or a request for 
revocation of a liquor license: 
Guidelines and Standards 
A Guidelines- The local governmental unit must establish standards or guidelines stating 
what conditions will constitute a basis for requesting non-renewal or revocation of a license. 
16 
B. Notification of Guidelines - The local governmental unit must notify licensees of the 
guidelines and any subsequent changes. 
C. Notification of Hearing - If the local governmental unit is objecting to renewal or 
requesting revocation of license, it must give the licensee timely written notice of the 
hearing, including: 
1. Date and location of the hearing. 
2. The proposed action that the local legislative body is considering taking. 
3. The detailed reasons for the proposed action (i.e., citing specific standards or guidelines the 
licensee has not complied with). 
4. The licensee's rights at the hearing, including the opportunity to defend by confronting adverse 
witnesses and by being allowed to present witnesses, evidence, and arguments. 
5. The licensee's right to be represented by an attorney. 
D. Hearing - At the local legislative body hearing, the licensee must be given an effective 
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses, evidence, and arguments. 
E. Resolution and Statement of Findings - After the hearing, the local legislative body 
must make a written statement of findings and adopt a resolution indicating the specific 
action requested. 
Required Documentation 
The local unit of government must send the following documents to the MLCC before the 
Commission can take any action regarding objection to renewal or revocation of a 
license: 
A. A copy of the standards or guidelines, or a description of the guidelines established by 
the local governmental unit as to what would constitute a basis for objecting to renewal or 
to revoke the license. Please include the date of adoption and, when publishing in a 
newspaper, the name of the paper and date of publication. 
B. A certified copy of the notice sent to the licensee. 
C. A copy of the proof of service of the notice sent to the licensee in order to counter any 
questions as to whether the notice was indeed sent to the licensee by the local 
governmental unit. 
D. A certified copy of the resolution adopted by the local governing body objecting to the 
renewal of the license or requesting that the license be revoked. If a separate statement of 
findings is made, then a certified copy of that document must also be included. The 
resolution should not include both an objection to renewal of the license and a request that 
the license be revoked. If such a resolution is received, the Commission will proceed with 
the objection to renewal only. 
Because all retail licenses expire on April 30, if your legislative body is objecting to renewal of a 
license, the request and all substantiating documents (as outlined above) must be received by 
the MLCC no later than March 31 to be in compliance with the law. 
Differences between Objecting to Renewal and License Revocation 
! Objecting to Renewal- When the proper documentation is received, the MLCC will stop 
renewal of the license. The existing license expires on April 30, preventing the licensee from 
legally selling alcoholic beverages after that date. The license will remain in escrow for one 
year, and cannot be placed in operation or transferred to another person or corporation unless the 
local legislative body adopts a resolution approving the renewal. 
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After one year, the lic e may request an extension - but the mayor may not be 
approved by the Commission. If the extension is denied and the licensee does not request a 
hearing regarding the denial, the license is permanently canceled. If an extension is granted, the 
license remains in escrow for another year but cannot be placed in operation or transferred to 
another person unless the local legislative body adopts a resolution approving renewal. 
There is no immediate effect on the local license quota as a result of objecting to renewal as long 
as the on-premises liquor license is held in escrow. It still counts toward the limited number of 
licenses available in the city, township or village. However, the local unit will not receive the 55% 
share of the licensing fee that it normally would have received had the license remained active. 
Local legislative bodies may adopt a resolution approving the license renewal at any time. The 
licensee may then renew the license and resume operation. 
! Revocation of a License - A resolution requesting revocation of a retail liquor license may 
be submitted at any time during the year. When proper documentation is received, the Commission 
is required by law to hold a hearing to consider the resolution. The local legislative body will be 
notified of the hearing, and a representative of the body or its legal counsel should attend. The sole 
purpose of this hearing is to determine if the licensee was afforded "rudimentary due process" as 
required by the courts. If it is found that due process was given the licensee, the license is 
immediately revoked by the MLCC. Revocation is a permanent action, and means that the 
licensee loses all ownership rights to the license. 
The former licensee cannot transfer the revoked license. Also, the former licensee cannot apply 
for another liquor license for at least two years. 
License revocation can also have an effect on the number of licenses available under the quota in 
the local governmental unit. If the city, township, or village is over the license quota (due to 
shrinkage in population), then revocation of a license means that one less license is available. 
As long as the city is at quota or below, a new license becomes available when one is revoked. 
TEST YOURSELF: Objection to Renewal or Revocation of a License 
Q. Our city council wants to object to the renewal of a license for a bar because of non-payment of 
taxes. Can we do that? 
A. If your city council has developed standards or guidelines that state that non-payment of 
taxes is a reason that will be considered for objecting to renewal of a license, and if the 
other requirements of due process are followed, then your legislative body has complied 
with the requirements as far as the Liquor Control Commission is concerned. Remember 
that the city council must pass a resolution and have all of the required documents on file 
with the Commission no later than March 31. Following a review of the documents the 
Commission will determine whether or not it is appropriate to renew the license. 
Q. What kinds of standards should be in the guidelines? 
A. While the Commission does not presume to tell local governmental units what should be 
in their guidelines, some local units of government have inserted articles into their 
guidelines dealing with non-payment of taxes and other bills to the local governmental 
unit and articles dealing with excessive police calls, citizen complaints, and other 
nuisance-type problems. Others have incorporated certain violations of state laws into 
their guidelines. 
Q. Our township board is reluctant to get involved in objecting to a renewal or requesting revocation of 
licenses. Are we required to pass guidelines and act on them? 
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A. No. The objection to and revocation of license pro st for those units of 
government that want to use them. You may find, however, that it is worthwhile to adopt 
guidelines now so that you do not have to react in a manner that could be construed as 
arbitrary or capricious should a problem develop in the future (retroactive application of 
your guidelines would not be legally binding). 
Q. Our city council has decided to pass a resolution and we have followed a/l of the provisions outlined. Our 
problem is that we are unsure whether to object to the renewal of a license or go so far as to request a 
license revocation. What should we do? 
A. The Commission does not advise local governmental units of the action they should take. The due 
process requirements for the licensee are the same regardless of whether the local government 
legislative body chooses to object to renewal of the license or decides to request revocation of the 
license. Remember that revocation is final, while objecting to renewal can be reversed if the 
licensee remedies the problem that prompted the action. 
Q. Our charter township board has followed all of the guidelines shown here and requested a revocation of a 
Class C license. Can we assume that this will end our involvement? 
A. No. In most instances, licensees will begin court actions against both the local unit of government 
and the Liquor Control Commission to enjoin the Commission from acting on the local legislative 
body's resolution, and to challenge the action of the local government. The Commission's role in 
the procedure is to determine whether the licensee was given "rudimentary due process" by the 
local unit of government. The Commission does not - and cannot - consider whether or not the 
reasons for the actions of the local governmental body are justifiable. This is up to the courts to 
decide. 
The Commission strongly recommends that if your local government is considering objecting to 
renewal or requesting revocation of a license, you consult your attorney before beginning the 
action. The local governmental unit should recognize that there may be substantial legal costs 
involved in requesting that the Commission not renew or revoke a license because litigation may 
take months or years to complete. 
Q. Our township board objected to the renewal of a Class C license for non-payment of local property taxes. All 
of our actions were reviewed by the Commission and the license was not renewed. Yesterday the licensee 
paid the taxes. What should we do now? 
A. If you no longer object to renewal your local governing body must adopt a resolution approving 
the renewal before the license will be issued by the Commission. 
Q. We have had problems with complaints about noise and crowds around a bar which sponsors Friday and 
Saturday dance contests. Our city council has considered asking the MLCC to revoke the dance and 
entertainment permits granted to the establishment. Is this possible to do without reVOking their license? 
A. Yes. Local Legislative actions may be limited to permits. Your city council can take action to ask 
the Commission to revoke specific permits granted to a licensee, but the same recommendations 
regarding due process and careful consideration of costs involved should be followed. 
Enforcement of Michigan Liquor Laws 
This section is directed more specifically to local law enforcement officials who work with the Liquor 
Control Commission to ensure that the provisions of the Liquor Control Code are enforced. Because 
there are other publications which more thoroughly cover the Code and the Administrative Rules of the 
Commission, this section of the guide focuses on those areas where local law enforcement officials and 
private citizens have concerns about enforcement and jurisdiction. 
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Local Responsibility for ment Mel 436.1201 (4) 
The primary responsibility for enforcement of Michigan's liquor laws lies with local law enforcement 
agencies. This means that the local law enforcement officials who have jurisdiction within the township, 
village, city and county boundaries are responsible for primary enforcement of the liquor laws. 
Funding for Local Enforcement MCl 436.1543 
The Liquor Control Commission returns to local units of government 55% of the retail licensing fees 
received during the fiscal quarter. Each local unit of government is required to certify to the MlCC (using 
a form provided for that purpose) that the fees are being used for the enforcement of Michigan's liquor 
laws. 
Failure to use the returnable license fees in the manner prescribed by the law - or failure to return the 
certification form - can result in the MLCC withholding the funds. The Michigan Treasury Department, 
Local Government Audit Division, may review how these funds are spent. 
Liquor Control Commission Enforcement Investigators MCl 436.1201 (4) 
The Liquor Control Commission's investigators have concurrent responsibility for enforcement of the 
liquor laws. However, this authority is limited to actions against liquor licensees. Investigators spend the 
majority of their time reviewing applicants for liquor licenses and doing routine inspections. However, 
they also do undercover surveillance work throughout the state. Because they are not armed, and are 
not vested with the power of arrest, MLCC investigators will always request local or state police 
support when laws are being broken by someone other than a licensee or in cases where the 
potential for violence exists. 
Upon request, the Commission will also provide technical investigative assistance to local law 
enforcement agencies to help with unusual or complex investigations of suspected liquor law violations. 
State Police MCl 436.1201 (4) 
The State Police have concurrent jurisdiction for enforcement of all of the state's liquor laws. 
Right to Inspect Licensed Premises MCl 436.1217 
Liquor licensees are required to make their licensed premises available for inspection and search by a 
Commission investigator or local law enforcement officer at any time during its regular business hours, 
or when the licensed premises are occupied by a licensee or an employee. 
MLCC Jurisdiction MCl436.1217 
Because the Liquor Control Commission's jurisdiction is limited to MLCC Licensees, violations 
involving non-licensees are the responsibility of the county prosecutor and the local police agency. For 
example, the MLCC cannot take action at private parties unless minors are observed buying alcoholic 
beverages from a licensee. Action by the MLCC can be taken only against the licensee - not the 
unlicensed hosts or guests. 
In cases involving illegal drug sales on the licensed premises, local, state and federal agents can seize 
the licensed premises and sell the property under the forfeiture proceedings of state and federal laws. 
Citizen Complaints 
Local law enforcement officials and the MLCC frequently receive complaints from citizens regarding 
suspected violations of the liquor laws. These complaints typically involve: 
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A. Sales to min 
B. Sales to into persons. 
C. Violations of restrictions on the days and hours of operation. 
D. Various illegal activities on the licensed premises such as gambling, drug dealing and prostitutic 
E. Private parties for minors where alcoholic beverages are being furnished at non-licensed locatic 
(not MLCC jurisdiction). 
F. Sales of alcoholic beverages to non-members in a licensed club. 
Citizen complaints should be treated seriously. It is the experience of commission investigators that a 
good job of enforcement of the state's liquor laws serves to minimize a multitude of other social 
problems. 
Semi-Annual Public Hearings 
The Liquor Control Commission holds public hearings twice each calendar year for the purpose of taking 
complaints and receiving the views of the public regarding administration of the Liquor Control Code. 
Mel436.1215 
Responsibility for Licensing Activities 
Investigation 
As mentioned in the previous licensing chapters, the local law enforcement agency is also responsible for: 
A. Conducting investigations of applicants in order to determine whether to recommend that the license (rE 
and wholesale) be granted. 
B. Fingerprinting the applicant and collecting the State Police processing fee (currently $15). 
C. Providing information regarding whether the proposed business location meets local codes and ordinan 
This function may be conducted by various inspectors employed by the governmental unit or the county 
their reports being included in the law enforcement investigation report. 
The Liquor Law Violation Administrative Process 
The Violation Report 
When law enforcement officers believe that a violation of Michigan's Liquor Code has occurred, they are 
authorized to write a Violation Report using the LC 600 form (forms provided by MLCC Enforcement). 
Violation Reports are sent to the MLCC where they are reviewed by an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) 
to determine whether the facts, as presented, indicate a violation of the Liquor Control Code or the 
Administrative Rules of the Commission. 
If the AAG determines that there is insufficient evidence to support the charge, MLCC staff will request 
additional information from the concerned parties. If, based on the report (and subsequent information), 
the AAG still cannot find evidence that a specific section of the Code or Rules was violated, no further 
action will be taken. 
If you write a Violation Report, you should be as specific as possible and try to answer any questions that 
you think may come up during the review by the AAG. Remember, the licensee will receive a copy of 
the Violation Report and all attachments that are with it. 
Violation Complaint 
If the AAG finds sufficient evidence to show a violation has occurred, a formal Violation Complaint is 
issued. It is common practice for the AAG to file a separate charge for each section of the Liquor Control 
Code and Administrative Rules which was allegedly violated. 
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For example, if a lawe t officer observes a bartender sel holic beverage to someone 
under 21 and the person observed consuming the beverage, will cite (1) a violation of 
the Liquor Code for the sale of the alcoholic beverage, and (2) a violation for allowing the person under 21 
to consume. 
Formal Hearings 
The licensee is given the choice of acknowledging the complaint by mail and receiving a penalty from the 
MlCC without a hearing, or contesting the allegation by requesting a formal hearing to present evidence 
and testimony regarding the alleged violation. The licensee may be represented by an attorney. If the 
complaint was filed by a law enforcement official, the officer will receive a notice of the hearing and, as 
the complaining witness, must appear at the hearing. 
Possible Actions Against Licensees under the Liquor Control Code 
Admin istrative 
After an acknowledgment or finding of a violation at a hearing, the Hearing Commissioner may suspend 
or revoke a license, assess a fine on some or all of the charges, order a transfer (forced sale) of the 
business ownership, or some combination of these penalties. 
In those cases where the MlCC finds a licensee responsible for violations of selling or providing 
alcoholic beverages to minors or intoxicated persons on three occasions within any 24 month period, the 
MlCC is required to hold a hearing to suspend or revoke the license. This penalty is in addition to any 
imposed as the result of the individual hearings. MCl436.1903 
Criminal 
The Liquor Control Code provides that licensees who violate that statute may also be charged with 
misdemeanors for those same violations. MCl436.1909 
Civil 
Under Michigan law, a licensee may also be held liable in civil suits when the sale or furnishing of 
alcoholic beverages to a minor or intoxicated person is found to be the proximate cause of damage, 
injury or death of an innocent party. MCl436.1801 
Independent Criminal Complaint 
At the same time as a liquor law violation is being pursued through the Liquor Control Commission 
administrative process, the law enforcement officer can obtain authorization for a complaint and warrant 
through the local prosecuting attomey for any criminal violations by a licensee or other individual. 
Any prosecution on criminal charges is independent of MlCC actions. A finding of guilt or innocence in 
the criminal matter does not necessarily affect the MlCC's violation proceedings. 
Training in Liquor Law 
Training Classes 
The MlCC works closely with community colleges, universities, police training academies, and in-
service programs to provide training on Michigan's liquor laws. As time permits, the MlCC is willing to 
conduct special training sessions. 
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For more information on 
call the MlCC Enforcement 
Other MlCC Publications 
ng sessions are available, or to req 
nat (517) 322-1370. 
special training session, 
A. The Michigan Liquor Control Code, Rules, and Related Laws Governing the Sale and Manufacture of 
Alcoholic Beverages. This publication contains the statutory language for the laws and rules governing 
alcoholic beverages. Due to its size, a printing cost of $5 is required. It is also available for download fr 
the MLCC website at "-'-'-'-~,="~~-"-==-'-'= 
B. Michigan's Liquor Laws and Rules- A Guide for Retail Licensees. This guidebook, written in 
conversational style, covers the laws and MLCC rules that historically have caused the most problems f 
retail licensees. 
C. Law Enforcement Officers' Field Guide on the Liquor Control Code and Administrative Rules of the 
Commission. This pocket-sized reference manual provides excerpts from, and information on, Michigar, 
liquor laws and rules, along with other material such as how to complete and file a Violation report. Thi~ 
booklet is designed specifically for use by law enforcement personnel in day-to-day activities. It is also 
available for download from the MLCC website. 
Contact a MlCC Enforcement District Office (see last page) for information on obtaining a copy of any of 
these publications. 
Law Enforcement Official Prohibited from Holding a Liquor License 
Law enforcement officials are prohibited from having a direct or indirect interest in a liquor license in their 
jurisdiction. This means that if you are responsible in any way for the enforcement of criminal laws, you 
cannot rent, own a licensed establishment, or lease a building to a liquor licensee. Court cases have 
also extended this prohibition to local elected officials who may be responsible for law enforcement. If 
the Commission has any questions as to the individual's responsibility for law enforcement, the local 
govemmental charter is used to determine eligibility. MCl 436.1523 
Test Yourself: Enforcement of Michigan Liquor Laws 
O. I am a vii/age constable. Am I responsible for enforcement of the liquor laws? 
A That depends on your responsibilities under the village charter. If you are authorized to 
bear arms and make arrests, then you are also responsible for enforcement of the liquor 
laws. If your position is more of an honorary position, then the township police or county 
sheriff will have the responsibility. 
O. As city officials, we sometimes receive letters or telephone complaints about local bars or night 
clubs. What should we do with citizen inquiries? 
A It is advisable to pass these complaints or reports on to your local law enforcement 
agency for investigation. You may also report the information you receive to the MlCC 
for investigation by the Commission's enforcement staff. 
O. Is training on the liquor laws available for our village police? 
A Yes. Contact the MlCC Enforcement Division in lansing at (517) 322-1370 for training 
information. 
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LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION OFFICES 
Lansing - Michigan Liquor Control Commission 
7150 Harris Drive, P.O. Box 30005 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
General Information 
Enforcement Division 
Financial Management 
Licensing 
Commission Office 
(517) 322-1345 
(517) 322-1370 
(517) 322-1382 
(517) 322-1400 
(517) 322-1355 
FAX (517) 322-1040 
FAX (517) 322-1016 
FAX (517) 322-6137 
FAX (517) 322-5188 
Farmington - Commission Office(248) 888-8840 FAX (248) 888-8844 
Enforcement District Offices 
Farmington 
24155 Drake Road 
Farmington, MI48335 
Escanaba 
State Office Building 
305 S. Ludington, 2nd floor 
Escanaba, MI49829 
Gaylord 
699-B S. Wisconsin 
Gaylord, MI49735 
Grand Rapids 
2942 Fuller, NE 
Grand Rapids, MI 49505 
(248) 888-8710 FAX (248) 888-8707 
(906) 786-5553 FAX (906) 786-3403 
(517) 732-6797 FAX (517) 732-5321 
(616) 447-2647 FAX (616) 447-2644 
Visit us on the world-wide web at www.cis.state.mLus/lcc 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
Respondent. 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Idaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2009-3914 
(Consolidated with Case No. CV 2009-
4185) 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES 
ORIGINAL 
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his attorney of 
record, Brian Donesley, and submits the following Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control's ("ISP") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court has permitted additional briefing regarding whether Fuchs has a "property 
interest" in his application for a Retail Alcohol Beverage License and in particular directing the 
parties' attention to a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F. 3d 
600 (6th Cir. 2001). 
In Wojcik, the Sixth Circuit, following Michigan law, explained that a first-time liquor 
license applicant did not have a property interest in a liquor license. Michigan law, however, is 
vastly different than Idaho law. In Michigan, cities are given the initial decision whether to 
approve or deny a party's application for a first-time license. A city's decision is discretionary. 
According to a publication issued to local governments from the Michigan Liquor Control 
Commission, a city may approve a later applicant over a prior one or approve no one at all, 
waiting for a more favorable applicant to come along. I Moreover, while Michigan has a quota 
system, it is a flexible one, allowing a party to transfer an unused "escrowed license" from 
another city within the county to the city of his or her choosing. Consequently, there are no 
priority list rules, such as those in Idaho ensuring an applicant's place in line. 
I See, infra, GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL 
CODE, November 2000, pp. 3-4, State of Michigan, Liquor Control Commission. (Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Brian 
DOl1csley). 
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In Idaho, ISP is given the responsibility to issue liquor licenses. It is not a discretionary 
but ministerial obligation. If an applicant complies with all legal obligations under the Idaho 
Code and the Rules Governing Alcohol Beverage Control, a license must issue. Moreover, ISP 
promulgated rules, ensuring an applicant's position on a waiting list and giving additional 
property characteristics to the application such as the right of assignment by bequest. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a liquor license is a privilege and not a property 
right.,,2 At the same time, however, it has held that a license has attributes of property and that a 
licensee is ensured due process protection by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a license applicant has 
procedural rights when an agency considers license eligibility requirements. 
This Court need not detern1ine whether a liquor license applicant has a property interest. 
The question here is much nan·ower. That is whether a license applicant's place in line, as set 
forth in the Rules Governing Alcohol Beverage Control, is a "substantive" or "vested" right. 
Idaho law provides that a statute or mle cannot be applied retroactively, if it affects a substantive 
or vested right. What determines whether a right is substantive or procedural is whether the 
statute or mle is mandatory or discretionary. ISP's rules governing priority lists are mandatory 
or contractual in nature. Once an applicant pays one-half the annual license fee, he is guaranteed 
a place in line. This is unlike the Michigan liquor licensing scheme, where local government 
units have unfettered discretion whether to approve or deny an application. Because Fuchs's 
place in line on the priority list is substantive, ISP cannot retroactively apply its rules removing 
his name from the priority lists without proper statutory authorization. 
2 Crazy Horse v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977). As discussed, illli'a, the "archaic rights/privilege distinction no 
long has any applicability in the area of procedural due process." Bundo v. City of Walled Lake, 238 N.W. 2d 154 
( 1976) (ciling Board of Regen Is v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972». 
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And, this Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies. There are no administrative remedies to exhaust. Rather, ISP's 
retroactive application of its rules is contrary to Idaho law. This Court should allow this action 
to proceed to Declaratory Judgment. 
II. 
IN MICHIGAN, CITIES HAVE DISCRETION WHETHER TO APPROVE 
A FIRST-TIME APPLICANT FOR A LIQUOR LICENSE 
In Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F. 3d 600,610 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals observed that "first time liquor license applicant was not entitled to procedural due 
process rights under Michigan law." The Wojcik court quoted a previous Sixth Circuit case, 
Shamie v. City o.!,Pontiac, 620 F. 2d 118 (6th Cir. 1980) for its holding distinguishing a first-time 
application from an actual licensee: 
Under Michigan law an applicant for a liquor license, as distinguished from a 
license holder facing renewal or revocation proceedings, does not have a 
protected interest. The holder of a liquor license may well have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to renewal. One applying for a liquor license has no such claim of 
entitlement. In the former case, there is a "property" interest; in the latter, there is 
none. 
Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F. 3d 600,610 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Shamie v. City of Pontiac, 
443 F. Supp. 679, 683 (E.D. Mich. 1977), ajJ'd, 620 F. 2d 118 (6th Cir. 1980)). 
Shamie, and the Michigan cases and statutes that underlie it, clarify why applicants in 
Michigan do not have protected property interests: the decision to grant or deny a first-time 
application is wholly discretionary. A Michigan state statute, MCL 436.1501 (2), provides that 
the initial decision whether to approve or deny a liquor license rests with the local unit of 
government: 
... An application for a license to sell alcoholic liquor for consumption on the 
premises, except in a city having a population of 750,000 or more, shall be 
approved by the local legislative body ill which the applicant's place ofbllsiness 
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is located before the license is granted by the commission, except that in the case 
of an application for renewal of an existing license, if an objection to a renewal 
has not been filed with the commission by the local legislative body not less than 
30 days before the date of expiration of the license, the approval of the local 
legislative body shall not be required ... 
MCL 436.1501 (2) (emphasis added). 
It is within the discretion of local unit of govemment to approve or deny an application. 
"[T]here is no statutory requirement that a local unit of government must approve any 
application or authorize issuing all or any licenses available under the quota." GUIDE TO THE 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL CODE, 
November 2000, pp. 3-4, State of Michigan, Liquor Control Commission. (Emphasis in original) 
(Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Brian Donesley). 
There are no priority list rules in Michigan. A city may deny a prior applicant in favor of 
another applicant or approve none at all, waiting for a better applicant to come along. For 
example, in "Test Yourself: On-premises Retail Licenses," the MLCC posed the following 
hypothetical question: 
Q There is an opening in the on-premises quota for our township. We have 
heard that a large restaurant is interested in a piece of prime property. Must we 
approve one of the applicants we currently have on file for the available license? 
A. No. The local governmental unit can decide when and if it wants to 
approve issuance of the available license. If you prefer to wait until a later time, 
you may. 
GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE 
LIQUOR CONTROL CODE at p.l1. (Exhibit 1). 
Further, licenses may be transferred from one city within a county to another: 
On-premises escrowed licenses issued under this subsection may be transferred 
subject to local legislative approval under section 501(2) to an applicant whose 
proposed operation is located within any local governmental unit in a county in 
which the escrowed license was located. 
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MCL 436.1531 (1 ).3 
Because there are no priority lists in Michigan, there are no property rights to first-time 
applications. And, in reverse, since there are no rules, there is no argument that an applicant has 
a property right. Because the local government units have unfettered discretion whether to 
approve or deny applications, applicants have no expectation that a license may be approved. 
In Wojcik, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that unilateral expectations are 
insufficient to trigger due process protection: 
Unilateral expectations of a property interest are insufficient to trigger due 
process concerns. Instead, property interests "are created and their dimensions 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 
Wojcik, 257 F. 3d 600 at 609 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,529 n.1 (1981) 
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
In Shamie, the applicant apparently conceded that Michigan law did not give him a 
protected interest in his application absent additional facts. The applicant argued that a city 
attomey's assurance that he would be told the basis for rejection gave him a protected interest. 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that the city attorney's "promise to tell [the first-time 
applicant] why his application might be rejected does not automatically confer upon him a 
'propeliy interest' protected by constitutional due process." Shamie, 620 F .2d at 120-12l. In 
short, not only was the city without obligation to approve his application, it was not even 
required to provide the basis for its denial. It could have acted arbitrarily. It could have acted 
3 Michigan has a separate statutory scheme for off-premises licenses which, under Michigan law, may be issued to 
supermarkets, convenience stores and drug stores where alcoholic beverages, including liquor, are sold for 
consumption off the premises. See MCL 436.1111 (II). This Memorandum, and the Michigan and Sixth Circuit 
cases discussed herein, pertains only to on-premises licenses. 
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unreasonably. It could have approved a subsequent applicant or none at all, waiting for a more 
promising applicant to come along, based upon the sole discretion of the city. 
Michigan has given local govemments unfettered discretion whether to approve or deny a 
first time application for a liquor license. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit, in Wojcik and Shamie 
held that a first-time applicant has no property interest protected by constitutional due process. 
As is discussed, il~fi'a, Idaho law is the opposite. 
III. 
IN IDAHO, NEW LICENSE APPLICATIONS ARE GOVERNED 
BY PRIORITY LIST RULES 
The Idaho Legislature has established a quota system, which limits the number of retail 
alcohol beverage licenses to one (1) license for each one thousand five-hundred (1,500) 
population of said city or fraction thereof, as established in the last census. I.e. § 23-903. ISP 
has promulgated rules establishing priority lists for each city in which the number of applicants 
exceeds the number of available licenses. IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. These rules further dictate 
prioritization (first in time, first in right), how places in line are reserved, how these places in line 
may and may not be transfened, and what an applicant must do to obtain a license once he is 
notified that one has become available. IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01-05. ISP has no discretion but 
to apply these rules uniformly to each applicant on each list. Based on these rules, an applicant 
has a legitimate expectation or legal entitlement that, once he bas secured a position on a priority 
list, he cannot be removed, unless he fails to comply with the statutes or rules. Furthermore, the 
applicant has a legitimate expectation or legal entitlement that he or she shall be notified, after 
waiting in tum, when a new license becomes available off the priority list. This legal 
expectation, based upon state law, is a substantive or vested right. ISP's retroactive application 
of its 2007 amendment to its IDAP A rules, removing multiple listings of Fuchs's name fr0111 five 
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priority lists violated this legal entitlement. This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss and 
permit this action to proceed to Declaratory Judgment. 
ISP has promulgated mles establishing priority lists for each city in which the number of 
applicants exceeds the number of available licenses. IDAPA 11.05.0l.013.0l. Further, ISP has 
promulgated rules governing priority lists for incorporated city liquor licenses. IDAPA 
11.05.01.013.()l-05. IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01 sets forth the criteria governing the process an 
applicant must follow to be placed on a priority list and the manner in which applicants are given 
priority. Priority is given to the earliest application: 
The Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau maintains a priority list of applicants for 
those cities in which no incorporated city liquor license is available. A separate 
list is maintained for each city. A person, partnership, or corporation desiring to 
be placed on a priority list shall file a completed application for an incorporated 
city liquor license, accompanied by payment of one-half (1/2) of the annual 
license fee. Such application need not show any particular building or premises 
upon which the liquor is to be sold, nor that the applicant is the holder of any 
license to sell beer. Priority on the list is determined by the earliest application, 
each sllcceeding application is placed on the list in the order received 
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. (Emphasis added). 
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.02 provides the manner in which ISP shall notify an applicant of an 
available license off a priority list and an applicant's obligations to respond to the notice: 
If the applicant does not notify the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau in writing 
within ten (10) days of receipt of the notice of his intention to accept the license, 
the license is offered to the next applicant in priority. An applicant accepting the 
license shall have a period of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of 
receipt of Notice of License Availability in which to complete all requirements 
necessary for the issuance of the license. Provided, however, that upon a showing 
of good cause the Director of the Idaho State Police may extend the time period in 
which to complete the necessary requirements for a period not to exceed ninety 
(90) days. 
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.02. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISSn U 0 
FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES Page 8 of 17 U 2: 47 
IDAPA 1l.05.0 l.0 l3.03 governs an applicant's obligations once he has been notified of 
an available license: 
An applicant refusing a license offered under this rule or an applicant who fails to 
complete his application may have his name placed at the end of the priority list 
upon his request. Should the applicant holding first priority refuse or fail to accept 
the license or to complete the application within the time specified, the applicant 
shall be dropped from the priority list, the deposit refunded, and the license 
offered to the applicant appearing next on the list 
IDAPA 1l.05.0 1.0 l3 .03. 
IDAPA 1l.05.0l.0l3.04 prohibits inter vivos transfers of priority list positions but 
specifically provides that a place in line may be inherited: 
An applicant for a place on an incorporated city liquor license priority list may not 
execute an inter vivos transfer or assignment of his place on the priority lists. For 
the purposes of this rule, "inter vivos transfer or assignment" means the 
substitution of any individual; partnership; corporation, including a wholly owned 
corporation; organization; association; or any other entity for the original 
applicant on the waiting list. An attempt to assign inter vivos a place on an 
incorporated city liquor license priority list shall result in the removal of the name 
of the applicant from the lists. An applicant, however, may assign his or her place 
on an alcoholic liquor license priority list by devise or bequest in a valid will. A 
place on an incorporated city liquor license priority list becomes part of an 
applicant's estate upon his or her death. 
IDAPA 1l.05.0l.013.04. 
Once ISP notifies an applicant an available license, the ISP Director has ninety (90) days 
upon receipt of a liquor license application to investigate a liquor applicant and that if "such 
applicant is qualified to receive a license, that his premises are suitable for the carrying on of the 
business, and that the requirements of tbis act and the rules promulgated by the director are met 
and complied with, [the director] shall issue such license ... " I.C § 23-907. As the rules 
demonstrate, ISP has established precise criteria ensuring an applicant's place in line on a list if 
the applicant has paid one-half of an annual license fee and ensuring him a license if he is not 
otherwise disqualified during the investigation process. ISP has provided precise requirements 
(' ( 
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as to the applicant's obligations, once notified of an available license. And, ISP has provided the 
only manner in which that place in line may be trans felTed. Consequently, applicants have a 
legitimate expectation of entitlement that, if the applicant complies with the rules, the applicant 
shall be notified of an available license, in turn. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the due process requirements "apply not only to 
courts but to state administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses." 
Eacret v. Bonner County, l39 Idaho 780, 784 (2004). It has so held in a variety of circumstances 
involving applicants for licenses or permits. In Eacret, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution entitles an applicant to an 
impartial and disinterested tribunal. Id. In Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 
774 (2009), the Court held that building permit holder, regardless of whether having a property 
right, has a right to due process, including prompt administrative or judicial review of an interim 
suspension. In Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433 (1997), held was that due process 
requirements apply to proceedings of local land use boards, including decisions on applications 
for conditional land use permits. In Rincover v. State Department of Finance, 124 Idaho 920 
(1994), held was that an applicant for registration of securities salesperson was entitled to due 
process safeguards before being deprived of opportunity to practice one's profession. 
With respect to liquor licenses, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained in dicta that 
"[a]lthough a liquor license is a privilege and not a propeliy right; the licensing procedure cannot 
be administered arbitrarily." Crazy Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977) (internal 
citations omitted).4 It has "also held that a liquor license is a right of property as between a 
4 Significantly, the Michigan Supreme Court formerly had held that a liquor license was not a "property right" but a 
"privilege granted by the state." Bundo v. City of Wa!!ed Lake, 238 N.W. 2d 154, 159 (1976). See e.g. People v. 
Seli a/i"WI , 134 N. W. 29 (1912). However, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Selzaf]i"an and similar Michigan 
cases in Bundo: "Those cases which have relied upon this doctrine of finding no property interests in liquor licenses 
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licensee and third persons in that it has 'attributes of value and assignability.'" BHA 
Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 355 (2003) (quoting Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 
394 (1963». The distinction between privileges and rights clearly is no longer applicable. See 
Board oj'Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 57l (1972) (the U.S. Supreme Court indicating that it 
had "fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once 
seemed to govern the applicability of due process rights.") Consistent with modern due process 
jurisprudence, an Idaho liquor licensee is afforded all the process protection provided under the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. I.e. § 67-5254. 5 Given Eacret, Boise Tower Associates, 
and Comer, an applicant is entitled to due process protection. 
Again, however, this Court need not determine whether an applicant has a "property 
interest." because the question here is much nalTower. Mr. Fuchs is seeking a declaration from 
this Court that ISP cannot retroactively apply IDAPA11.05.01.013.04, removing all but one of 
his listings from priority lists in each of five Idaho cities. The Idaho Code provides that "[n]o 
part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." I.e. § 73-10 l. "An 
application is deemed retrospective if it affects substantive rights." Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 
85,87 (Ct. App. 1988). "Among the rights characterized as substantive are those which are 
'contractual or vested' in nature." Id. (Citing City o.fGarden City v. Cityoj'Boise, 104 Idaho 
512,515 (1983». "Statutes which do not 'create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual rights' 
are deemed to be remedial or procedural as opposed to substantive." Id. 
can no longer be followed for this purpose." Bundo, 238 N .W. 2d at 160. See also Bisco 's Inc. v. Mich. Liquor 
Control Com '/I, 238 N .W. 2d 166 (1976). 
5 67 -5254 (I) provides: "[a]n agency shall not revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw or amend a license, or 
refuse to renew a license of a continuing nature when the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for 
renewal, unless the agency first gives notice and an opportunity for an appropriate contested case in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter or other statute." 
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Myers demonstrates why IDAPAl1.05.01.04 may not be applied retroactively. Ifa 
person files his application and waits his turn, he shall be notified when a new license becomes 
available. In Myers, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a mandatory attorney fees statute 
could not be applied retroactively but that a discretionary statute could be so applied: 
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing discretiollary 
awards of attorney fees, such statutes are generally held to be remedial or 
procedural. Consequently, they are given retroactive effect. ... However, we 
think a different analysis is required for I.C Si 12-120. Unlike I.e. Si Si 12-121 and 
61-617A, I.C 12-120 provides for a malldatory~ not discretionary award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in commercial litigation. The automatic 
nature of an award under I.C § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the 
underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It establishes an 
entitlement. In this respect, an award under the statute is closely akin to other 
"contractual or vested" rights contained in the agreement itself. 
Myers, 114 Idaho at 87 (emphasis in original). 
Here, the IDAPA rules governing priority lists are not discretionary. "Priority on the list 
is determined by the earliest application, each succeeding application is placed on the list in the 
order received." IDAPA 11.05.01.01. "When an incorporated city liquor license becomes 
available, Alcohol Beverage Control offers it in writing to the applicant whose name first 
appears on the priority list." IDAPAl1.05.01.02. "If the applicant does not notify the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Bureau in writing within ten (10) days of receipt of the notice of his intention 
to accept the license, the license is offered to the next applicant in priority." Id. Compare this 
compulsory language to Michigan's liquor laws, where a city has unfettered discretion whether 
to approve or deny a liquor license applicant and, if it wishes, may deny an application in favor 
of a subsequent application, or not approve one at all. MCL 436.1501 (2). See also GUIDE TO 
THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSlBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL CODE 
at p.ll. (Exhibit 1). As with the mandatory attorney fees statute in Myers, which guarantees an 
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applicant his place in line on a priority list, IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01, "establishes an 
entitlement." Myers, 114 Idaho at 87. 
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss and allow this action to proceed to 
Declaratory Judgment. 
IV. 
THIS MATTER FALLS SQUARLYWITHIN THREE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 
ISP's attempt to retroactively apply its 2007 amendments to its priority list rules without 
notice to Mr. Fuchs or others is a matter properly before the Court, because of three exceptions 
to the exhaustion doctrine. First, it would be futile for this Court to remand the matter back to 
the agency, when it is clear a decision has already been made. Second, ISP provided no notice to 
Mr. Fuchs of its decision retroactively to apply the amendments, until after the decision had been 
made. Finally, the lAP A provides that parties seeking to challenge the validity or applicability 
of a rule may do so by filing a declaratory judgment action in district court. 
In Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234 (Ct. App. 1990), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals set forth three exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, two of which apply here: 
Illustrative of the circumstances which require an exception to the exhaustion 
doctrine include: (1) where resort to admillistrative procedures would befutile; 
(2) where the aggrieved party is challenging the constitutionality of the agency's 
actions or of the agency itself; or (3) where the aggrieved party has 110 notice 
of the initial admillistrative decision or no opportunity to exercise the 
administrative review procedures. McConnell v. City of Seattle, 44 Wash.App. 
316,722 P.2d 121,124 (1986) 
Peterson, 117 Idaho at 23 7 (emphasis added). See also Grever v. Idaho Telephone Co., 94 Idaho 
900, 903,499 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1972). 
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First, resorting to administrative procedures would be futile in this case. There is no 
proceeding to which this Court could "remand.,,6 There is no contested case or prior proceeding, 
because ISP made its decision retroactively to apply the amendments, and it calTied the decision 
out, only notifying Mr. Fuchs and other applicants after the deed was done. There is no 
proceeding to which to "remand". Second, Fuchs had "no notice of the initial administrative 
decision or no opportunity to exercise the administrative review procedures." Fuchs was notified 
only after the decision was made by a letter that included a check refunding the money he had 
deposited to reserve his place inline. 7 ISP's actions fall squarely within Peterson's exception to 
the exhaustion doctrine for parties given no notice the "initial agency decision." Peterson, 117 
Idaho at 237. 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that there is an additional exception to 
the exhaustion doctrine regarding agency rules: 
While the general rule is that a contestant must first exhaust administrative 
remedies before filing a complaint in district court, there is an exception for 
declaratory judgments regarding agency rules. The IAPA provides: 
"The validity or applicability of a rule may be detemlined in an action for 
declaratory judgment in the district court if it is alleged that the rule, or its 
threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or 
impair, the legal rights of the petitioner .,. a declaratory judgment may be 
rendered whether or not the petitioner has requested the agency to pass upon the 
validity or applicability of the rule in question." 
Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003) (quoting I.e. §§ 67-5278 (l), (3). 
Here, Mr. Fuchs is challenging the validity of the retroactive application of an agency 
rule that has interfered with his legal rights and the legal rights of all applicants who had mUltiple 
listings on city priority lists. This challenge, attacking a broad agency action, expressly 
() "Remand" is defined as "[t]o send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for some 
further action." BLACK'S LA W DICTIONARY, 8th Ed. (2004). 
7 See July 24, 2009 letter from Lt. Robert Clements to Daniel Fuchs; Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs, filed 
September 4,2009. 
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authorized litigants to file a declaratory judgment action 111 district court under the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act, I.e. § 67-5278. 
ISP argues that the 2007 amendment to IDAPA 11.05.0l.013.04 was properly 
promulgated. But, Fuchs is not challenging the amendment as promulgated in 2007. 
Presumably, applicants who seek placement on priority lists after its effective date, March 6, 
2007, "shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority list." However, 
ISP's July 24, 2009 letter, retroactively applying the 2007 mle amendment, was a new rule. In 
Asarco, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a DEQ pollutant standard known as a "TMDL" 
constituted an agency mle and the plaintiff mining companies properly "sought a declaratory 
judgment regarding the validity of the TMDL as a rule." Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725. Although 
DEQ had not promulgated the TMDL, it was still a rule, albeit an informal and invalid one, 
because it was "an expression of agency policy not previously expressed." Asarco, 138 Idaho at 
724. Likewise, Mr. Fuchs is challenging agency action "not previously expressed." The July 24, 
2009 letter implemented a new expression of policy. Nothing in IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 
suggests that the new mle was to be applied retroactively. ISP did not attempt to do so until 
2009. This kind of informal rulemaking the Idaho Supreme Comi rejected in Asarco. It is a 
matter properly before this Court. 
There are no administrative remedies to exhaust. ISP made its initial decision 
retroactively to apply its 2007 amendments, without notice to Mr. Fuchs or any other similarly 
situated applicants. This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies and allow this action to proceed to Declaratory Judgment. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
In Michigan, local governments have unfettered discretion whether to approve or deny an 
application for a first-time liquor license. In Idaho, ISP has promulgated rules providing 
applicants' places in line on priority lists, whereby applicants shall be notified of new licenses as 
they become available. There is no discretion. ISP's administration of the lists, under the rules, 
is ministerial. Under Idaho law, statutes and rules cannot be applied retroactively, if they affect 
substantive or vested rights. Fuchs's place in line on the affected priority lists is a substantive, 
vested right. 
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. There are no administrative remedies to exhaust. Rather, ISP's retroactive 
application of its rules is contrary to Idaho law. This Court should deny ISP's Motion and allow 
this action to proceed to Declaratory Judgment. 
Brian Donesley 
Attomey for Petitioner/Plaintiff Daniel S. 
Fuchs 
(' i 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of ) 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol ) 
Beverage Control, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-03914 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Police, 
Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC") and hereby files its Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to the Court's direction given to counsel on November 2,2009. 
I. SUMMARY OF THE :FACTS 
1. Fuchs applied for numerous retail liquor by the drink licenses between June 2, 1994 
and February 13, 1995, in Blaine, Idaho Falls and Twin Falls Counties, to wit; in Blaine County 
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Fuchs remains on the Bellevue, Idaho priority list once and was issued a refund for a second 
position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Hailey, Idaho priority list once and was issued a refund 
for a second and third position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Ketchum, Idaho priority list once 
and was issued a refund for a second and third position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Sun 
Valley, Idaho priority list once and was issued a refund for a second and third position on the 
list; Fuchs remains on the Idaho Falls, Idaho priority list once and was issued a reflmd for a 
second position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Twin Falls, Idaho priority list once and was 
issued a refund for a second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth position on the list. 
2. On or about July 24, 2009, ABC, in accordance with IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04, 
returned Fuchs' applications where his name appeared more than one time on each incorporated 
city priority list. Mr. Fuchs' money was returned to him for the numerous application fees he 
submitted. ABC, per its rule, allowed Fuchs to retain the highest place he held on each list 
mentioned above in paragraph number 1. 
3. On November 2,2009, the court directed the parties to file a memorandum addressing 
the opinion of a Sixth Circuit Comi of Appeals case and any subsequent cases. See, Wojcik v. 
Romulus, 257 F.3d. 600 (2001). 
II. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED WHEN: 
A. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAI~LY PROTECTED PROPERTY 
INTEREST EXTENDED TO A LIQUOR LICENSE APPLICANT, WHOSE 
NAME APPEARS ON A PRIORITY LIST. NEITHER IDAHO'S LIQUOR 
ACT NOR ABC'S RULES PROVIDE FOR SUCH AND ANY EXPECTATION 
OF SUCH, ON THE PART O"F THE APPLICANT IS UNILATERAL IN 
NATURE. 
B. IF THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY 
INTEREST BETWEEN THE STATE OF IDAHO AND A LIQUOR 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
LICENSE APPLICANT, THEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ARE 
INFRINGED UPON AND THE STATE OF IDAHO CAN APPLY AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE RETROACTIVELY IN ORDER TO CARRY 
OUT LEGISIJATIVE INTENT TO DISCOURAGE SPECULATION IN 
LIQUOR LICENSING. 
C. AI,TERNATIVELY, IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE AGENCY'S 
ACTION GIVES RISE TO A CONTESTED CASE, THE APPLICANT HAS 
STILL FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ANI> 
THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED SO THAT A COMPLETE 
RECORD MAY BE DEVELOPED FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW ON 
APPEAl ... 
APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT ON THE ISSUES 
A. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST 
EXTENDED TO A LIQUOR LICENSE APPLICANT, WHOSE NAME APPEARS 
ON A PRIORITY LIST. NEITHER IDAHO'S LIQUOR ACT NOR ABC'S 
RULES PROVIDE FOR SUCH AND ANY EXPECTATION OF SUCH, ON THE 
PART OF THE APPLICANT IS UNILATERAL IN NATURE. 
This Court invited counsel for both sides to submit additional briefing for a case handed 
down from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, arising from the State of Michigan, However, in 
order to more effectively compare similarities and differences of Michigan's liquor law, a 
foundation ofIdaho's laws and regulations is provided below. 
IDAHO CODE § 23-901 declares the legislature'S policy in the regulation and sale of 
alcoholic beverages by and through the state's liquor stores and the director ofIdaho State 
Police. The director, along with the county commissioners and the councils of cities in the state 
of Idaho, are "empowered and authorized to grant licenses to persons qualified under this act ... 
and under the rules promulgated by said director ... " 
Much like Michigan's code provisions, a duality in the granting ofliquor licenses exists 
also in Idaho. The final decision, to issue a liquor license in Michigan, appears to rest with the 
state's liquor control commission. Municipalities in Michigan appear to play an initial role in the 
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permitting process. In Idaho, it appears the final authority in granting a liquor license is vested 
in the director of Idaho State Police. Likewise, a liquor license applicant in Idaho must also seek 
approval from the county and city where the license is to be placed. See, IDAHO CODE §§ 23~ 
903,23-916 and 23-1009. 
IDAHO CODE §§ 23-905 and 23-910 covers the larger portion of requirements that an 
applicant must meet in order to be granted a liquor by the drink license from ABC. At anyone 
of these points, the director (through ABC's delegated authority) could deem a premise 
unsuitable or an applicant unqualified. 
Another relevant statute is IDAHO CODE § 23-907. It states in pertinent part, 
If the director shall determine that the contents of the application are true, 
[that the applicant's premises are suitable and that the requirements of this 
act and the rules promulgated by the director are met], that such applicant 
is qualified to receive a license; otherwise the application shall be denied and 
the license fee, less the costs and expenses of investigation, are returned to 
the applicant. (emphasis added) 
The placement of the word "if' before the director's determination creates a conditional 
clause bringing into question whether the contents of an application are true or not, or if an 
applicant may have met other requirements. What this means grammatically, is that the director 
must determine: 1) whether the contents of an application are true or not, 2) if an applicant 
qualifies by ABC's rules, and 3) if an applicant's premises are suitable. 
While some elements may be answered more definitively, such as the truthfulness of the 
contents of an application, other elements may not be identified so easily. For example, a 
premise may not be suitable for a number of reasons. Some reasons include proximity to a 
church or school, does the premise have a history of numerous calls for service by law 
enforcement, what types of other businesses are close to the premises, and is there a residential 
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area in close proximity that will be impacted negatively. Reasons such as these may require the 
director to use discretion in deciding whether a license will be granted. 
Even the word "determine" is defined as: "to establish or asceliain definitely, as after 
consideration, investigation, or calculation." Dictionary.com (December 2,2009), As the 
language plainly states, the director's determination must be made prior to issuing a liquor 
license to an applicant. The director's determination is based upon an investigation and his 
further consideration of whether or not an applicant is qualified to receive a license. The 
legislature's use of the word "determine," lends extra support in symbolizing the amount of 
discretion the director has in approving liquor license applicants. To think otherwise would lead 
to an absurd contortion of the law, i.e. that anyone who applies for a liguor license is guaranteed 
to receive a liquor license, regardless of the statutory requirements. Clearly this is not the case. 
When an application is denied by the director, then the applicant's license fee is returned 
minus any costs associated with an investigation. The requirement to return the application fee 
or a portion of it clearly demonstrates that any type of contractual relationship is absent. 
Fm1hermore, an applicant is on notice that an application can be denied. Therefore, there can be 
no expectation on the part of an applicant that a license is guaranteed. 
Furthermore, in an instance such as this one, an applicant merely wishing to be placed on 
a waiting list may do so with a minimal investment. The only requirements to be placed 011 the 
waiting list are that one-half (112) of the application fee is paid at the time a two-page application 
is submitted. Additionally, persons such as Mr. Fuchs desiring only to be placed on the waiting 
list are not required to name or show any pmticular building or premises upon which liquor is to 
be sold nor are they required to show that they are the holder of a license to sell beer. IDAPA 
Rule 11.05.01.013.01 and IDAHO CODE § 23-910(5). 
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In fact, such persons are not even required to submit the lion's share of the application 
materials as required by IDAHO CODE § 23-905 until a person's name comes to the top of the 
waiting list. Therefore, up until this point, any effort in relation to time and expense on the part 
of said person to get their name on the waiting list is nominal at best. 
IDAHO CODE § 23-932, provides additional evidence in the amount of discretion that the 
director has in liquor licensing. It states in relevant part, 
[D]irector shall be empowered and it is made his duty to prescribe ... , the 
proof to be furnished and the conditions to be observed in the issuance of 
licenses ... the conditions and qualifications necessary to obtain a license ... 
The language is plain in giving the director the discretion over the proof to be furnished 
and conditions an applicant is to observe in obtaining a liquor license. The director also has the 
discretion in prescribing the conditions and qualifications needed by an applicant to obtain a 
liquor license. Because the Idaho Legislature granted such expansive authority to the director of 
Idaho State Police, any other interpretation would lead to a distortion of the law. Surely, the 
legislatLue did not intend for liquor licenses to be issued to anyone and everyone who asked to be 
placed on the waiting list. Nor did the legislature intend that it be involved in the discretionary 
decisions of who obtains a liquor license. Any claims made by Mr. Fuchs that the director acts 
only in a ministerial capacity and has no discretion in the issuance of liquor licenses, is without 
merit. 
Against this similar legal backdrop, the United States Court of Appeals, in the Sixth 
Circuit held, 
A first time (enteliainment pelmit) applicant had no constitutionally 
cognizable property interest in said permit, where state law required approval 
of the permit by the state liquor commission and city; pennitee was not 
entitled to any procedural or substantive due process rights." Wojick v. City 
of Romulus 257 F.3d 600,610-612 (2001). 
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Wojick built its holding upon the foundation established in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527,529 n. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1908,68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth_408 
U.S.S64, 577, (1972»; see also, Verba v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 851 F.2d 811, 813 (6th 
Cir.1988), 
Even though individuals often claim property interests under various 
provisions of the Constitution, such interests are not created by the 
Constitution; nor may individuals manufacture a propeIiy interest. Unilateral 
expectations of a property interest are insufficient to trigger due process 
concerns. Instead, property interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law~rules or understandings that secure certain benefits 
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. (emphasis added). 
In Roth, the court stated where there was no state statute entitling an assistant professor to 
reemployment, or any other creation of a legitimate claim to such~ there was no property interest 
in the position. Therefore, the assistant professor was not protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the University was not required to grant a hearing to this employee. 
In order to get to the merits of a due process claim, the Supreme Court's analysis in Roth 
clearly shows that a cognizable propelty interest must be established first. This appears to be in 
contravention to the position taken by Mr. Fuchs. 
In Wojick, the court also looked to another Michigan case for support of its mling that 
first time applicants of enteltainment penuits have no rights giving rise to due process. Shamie 
v. City of Pontiac, 443 F. Supp. 679,683 (E.D.Mich.1977), aff'd in part, 620 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 
1980) ("Where state law required approval of state liquor commission and city [U]nder 
Michigan Jaw a first time applicant for a liquor license, as distinguished from a license holder 
facing renewal or revocation proceedings, does not have a protected interest.") (emphasis 
added). 
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While Idaho has never specifically addressed the issue of whether or not a liquor license 
applicant has an alleged property interest in a position on a municipal priority list, there are 
several Idaho cases that are germane to this limited discussion. They are as follows: 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 354 (2003) (reaffirming the Idaho 
Supreme Comi's previous holding, "that a liquor license is not a right of property, 
implying that it is not property in any constitutional sense.") 
Crazy Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977) ("A liquor license applicant 
can be denied a license because there is no constitutional guarantee [in] the right to 
compete in the retail liquor markeC')(citing, Gartland v. Talbott" 72 Idaho 125,131 
(1951) ("the selling of intoxicating liquor is a proper subject for control and regulation 
under the police power. It is likewise universally accepted that no one has an inherent or 
constitutional right to engage in a business of selling or dealing in intoxicating liquors.") 
(citations omitted) 
Nampa Lodge No. 1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 215~16, (1951) A liquor license is 
simply the grant or permission under govenm1ental authority to the licensee to engage in 
the business of selling liquor. Such a license is a temporary permit to do that which 
would otherwise be unlawful; it is a privilege rather than a natmal right and is personal to 
the licensee; it is neither a right of propeliy nor a contract, or a contract right. 
Cf Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 394, (1963) ("a liquor license is a right of 
propeliy as between a licensee and third persons in that it has "attributes of value and 
assignability. ") 
Idaho's high comi has consistently ruled numerous times, over the span of 45 plus years, 
that a liquor licensee has no constitutional property right or interest in a liquor license as between 
a licensee and the state. ABC argues that a mere applicant could never expect to have more 
rights than a card carrying licensee and any such expectation would be completely and totally 
unilateral on the part of the applicant. 
B. IF THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED I>ROPERTY 
INTEREST BETWEEN THE STATE OF IDAHO AND A LIQUOR LICENSE 
APPLICANT, THEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ARE INFRINGED UPON 
AND THE STATE OF IDAHO CAN APPLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE 
RETROACTIVEL Y IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT LEGISLA TIVE INTJ1~NT TO 
DISCOURAGE SPECULATION IN LIQUOR LICENSING. 
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Beginning with the enactment of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IOAP A") 
itself, the bill's authors, Michael S. Gilmore and Dale D. Goble, wrote a comprehensive 
explanation and analysis of how administrative rule writing and contested cases before state 
agencies was to be carried out. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for the 
Practitioner, 30 Idaho Law Rev. 273, 367 (199311994). 
According to IDAHO CODE § 67-5224(5)(a), "[a] rule which is final and effective may be 
applied retroactively, as provided in the rule." Gilmore and Goble go on to state that some of 
those occasions of when a rule may be applied retroactively, i.e. where the agency is correcting a 
mistake or where retroactivity is unlikely to pose constitutional problems. ld. at 303. 
Idaho's high court has also examined the tension between prospective and retroactive 
application of statutes/rules. See, City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515 
(1983), (citing Ohlinger v. Us., 135 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Idaho 1955), Remedial or procedural 
statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights are 
generally held to operate retrospectively.") See also, Floyd v. Board of Commissioners of 
Bonneville County, 131 Idaho 234, 238 (1998), ("patiies do not have a substantial vested right in 
a particular standard of review by a court.") See also, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of 
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statues are to be Construed, 3 Van.L. 
Rev. 395,402 (1950), identifying the conflict between the canon t.hat, 
[ a] statute imposing a new penalty or forfeiture or a new liability or 
disability, or creating a new right of action will not be construed as having a 
retroactive effect; 
And the countervailing rule that 
[r]emedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive 
interpretation will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such 
construction. (citations omitted). 
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IDAPA rule 11.05.01.013.04 ("Rule .04") is the rule upon which the agency's action in 
this case turns. It provides in pertinent pati, 
An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city 
priority list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate 10 the Director the 
ability to place an awarded lkense into actual use as required by Section 23-
908(4), Idaho Code and these rules. 
As noted by the limited agency record, ABC asserts that Rule .04 is purely a procedural 
rule and is remedial in nature. Rule .04 states that an applicant is required to show that the 
license will be put into actual use according to IDAHO CODE § 23-908. ABC directs the attention 
of this COUlt to the Statement of Purpose drafted when IDAHO CODE § 23-908 was moving 
through the legislature. Agency Record ("A.R.") 22, attached and incorporated herein. While 
we are not privy as to any nefarious acts associated with liquor licensing speculation, we do 
know this piece of legislation was not created in a vacuum. According to this document, the 
legislatU1'e surely must have felt the issue important enough that the state should control the 
speCUlation in liquor licensing. 
As the record reflects Rule .04 was drafted in the summer of 2006. A.R. 2. It was 
disseminated to a working ad hoc group, consisting of community partners and interest groups, 
whose goal was to reform Idaho's liquor laws. ABC sought input fl'om this group as pmt of its 
informal rule making process. A.R. 3 and 4. A second draft of the rule was composed based 
upon those suggestions. A.R. 6 
The only change made to Rule .04 happened when the words "at a time" was inserted. 
The essence of the rule was left unchanged. A.R. 2 and 6. Rule .04 was sent out again to the 
same ad hoc group where a discussion of the rule took place. A.R. 8 and 9. Rule .04 was 
published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin on October 4,2006. A.R. 13. ABC's rule 
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changes went before the respective House and Senate subcommittees for commentary. A.R. 16, 
17 and 19. 
According to the testimony by ABC during the I-louse presentation, the new licenses 
being issued were either not being used or they were being used illegally. A.R. 16, pg. 2. 
Comments, fro111 certain members of the ad hoc group, about Rule .04 included testimony that 
they felt a change in this section was discriminatory and Ulmecessary.ld., pg.3. The House 
voted to approve ABC's rules, but struck the rule addressing the allowance of a multi-purpose 
arena. Id. 
ABC's Rules were also presented to the Senate subcommittee. A.R. 17 and 19. 
According to the testimony given by Brian Donesley, "Rule ,013.04 issue was the waiting list." 
A.R. 17, pg. 2. Mr. Donesley explained to the committee that "[t]he priority list is first in time, 
first in line, and ISP's complaint is that persons have more than one place on the waiting list 
within a city. This rule change addresses that." ld. The subcommittee then rescheduled another 
time for additional testimony to be taken. ld. At the following meeting, Mr. Donesley spoke 
about Rule .04 stating there had been litigation 25 years earlier over the priority list. A.R. 19, pg. 
4. However, it is unknown if ABC has been able to locate any documents to date evidencing 
this action. Like the House, the Senate subcommittee voted to approve ABC's rules as written, 
but moved to reject the multi-purpose arena rule. Id., pg.7. 
It is obvious that as Rule ,04 was making its way through the rulemaking process, there 
was ample opportunity by the legislative subcommittees, to either change the rule or completely 
reject this rule in its entirety. However, knowing now that the legislature had previously sought 
to limit the speculation of liquor licenses, it is no surprise that the legislature passed Rule ,04 as 
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it was written. It is clear that Rule .04 is remedial in nature as to correct the overpopulation of 
waiting lists by speculators. 
As the testimony reflects, Rule .04 was drafted to correct a procedure that allowed the 
speculation ofliquor licenses. Applicants' actions in submitting their names numerous times for 
each municipal priority list is in violation OfIDAHO CODE § 23·908. Therefore, applicants should 
have no expectation of being able to maintain a position on a waiting list due to their unclean 
hands. 
Furthem10re, if one were to look at the context of the entirety of ABC's IDAPA rules 
addressing priority lists, the fundamental nature of this group of rules implicitly demonstrates 
only how ABC is to process applications as they are received. See IDAPA 11.05.0 I.O 13 et seq. 
There are no substantive or implied contract rights found in any of these rules. When the rules 
are read alongside the statutes discussed above, it is clear that a mere applicant on a waiting list 
has no property interest in a position on that list. 
C. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE AGENCY'S ACTION 
GIVES RISE TO A CONTESTED CASE, THE APPLICANT HAS STILL FAILED 
TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE MATTER 
SHOULD BE REMANDED SO THAT A COMPLETE RECORD MAY BE 
DEVELOPED FOR THIS COURT'S REVIE\V ON APPEAL. 
As argued before, in ABC's Response to the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Judicial 
Review, IDAHO CODE § 23-933 provides the statutory mechanism to be applied in contested 
cases brought by ABC before the director. It states that such a procedure shall be in accordance 
with the provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("lAP A") found in Title 67, 
chapter 52, IDAHO CODE. See also, ABC's Response to the Petitioner's Amended Petition for 
Judicial Review. 
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IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(6) defines a contested case as "a proceeding that results in the 
issuance of an order," Additionally, IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(12) defines an order as "an agency 
action of particular applicability that determines the ... privileges ... of one or more specific 
persons." Finally, agency action is defined by IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(3) as "an agency's 
perfonnance of: or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by law." 
Mr. Fuchs claims that because ABC sent only a letter to him stating the action it was 
taking, i.e. removing him from various priority lists, that ABC did not issue a formal order giving 
him notice of the agency action. As a result, Mr. Fuchs asserts that because of the way ABC 
applied Rule .04 to his case, he should be able to seek relief directly to the district court. Such an 
assertion completely disregards the law stated above. 
If this COUli were to apply the doctrine of liberal construction, it would construe the 
lAP A's language, so as to give full legislative effect in this immediate action. The reasoning 
found in American Falls Reservoir District No.2, v. Idaho Department qlWater Resources, 143 
Idaho 862~ 871-873 (2007) is likewise, proper in this instance. In American Falls, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held, "IDAHO CODE § 67~5278 .. , [provides] standing to challenge a rule, but 
does not eliminate the need for completion of administrative proceedings for an as applied 
challenge." Cf Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232 (2009) (finding that ifno 
administrative remedy for the agency action exists to contest an agency's action, then a party can 
seek declaratory relief without exhausting administrative remedies first). 
Fuchs clearly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in this matter as required by 
statute and case law. The absence of discovery and testimony taken before a hearing officer in a 
case such as this clearly violates the policy provisions set [ol1h found in the Arnerican Falls 
opinion. 
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Unquestionably, ABC was performing a duty placed on it by Rule .04, which was to 
ensure that those who may be granted the privilege of selling alcohol be able to show that they 
could truly put a liquor license into actual use and were not just speCUlating in liquor licensing. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The terms and conditions under which a liquor license is granted are subject to the 
pleasure of the legislature. Most importantly, in the State ofIdaho, a liquor license is a grant or 
permission under government authority to the licensee to engage in the business of selling liquor. 
Such a license is a temporary permit to do that, which would otherwise be unlawful. No 
property rights, as between the state and a licensee, have been established either in law or rule. 
The Michigan cases above, clearly distinguishes the difference between a license holder 
and a license applicant in the State of Michigan. In Michigan, while a liquor licensee may 
have some protected interest in an already issued liquor license, an applicant for a liquor license, 
does not have a protected interest and does not have any entitlement in such. 
ABC respectfully asks this court to find, that based upon Idaho's laws, regulations and 
case law, a liquor license applicant can have no expectation of having any property rights in a 
position on a waiting list and that Mr. Fuchs' petition be dismissed in its entirety per I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(1) and lor 12(b)(6). 
If this COUli should find that Mr. Fuchs' has some protected interest in a position on a 
waiting list, then ABC respectfully requests that Mr. Fuchs' petition be dismissed for failure to 
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exhaust administrative remedies. 
--1ft 
Dated this _1_ day of December, 2009. 
A E 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '1 ~day of December, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
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Brian Donesley, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
PO Box 419 
Boise, 1D 83701-0419 
f-U.S. Mail 
_Hand Delivery 
__ Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
_Overnight Mail 
_Facsimile: (208) 343A 188 
_Statehouse Mail 
_ Electronic Delivery 
Deputy Attorney General 
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STATHlEtlT OF 'PUI~I'OSE 
RS 4883C2 
The purrO!;C of this bill is to discoul".'12,Q speculatioll in liquOl" 
licensing by reqltir.in~ Llle ori~in;l.l holder of the liccn:;e to put it 
into use immediately upon its r~ceipt and to continuo its use for six 
consecutive months and by providing thot the license will not be 
tranSferable for two ~ears after its origin~l issuance. 
The bill further. pro·,rides for payment to the state of a transfcl· 
f cc of 10% of the purchase price o[ the liquor license, ,·lith some 
~peci[ic exemptions. 
I t specifies that the transfe:t of 25% of the stocl::. of a corporn-
tion shall be presumed to be the transfer of the controlling interest 
of the corporation. 
FIS CAL H1P ACT 
Estimated revenue of $900,000 per year. 
2Z 
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Control, 
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Control, 
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his attorney of 
record, Brian Donesley, and submits the following Supplemental Reply MeJlnorandum in 
opposition to Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol. 
Beverage Control's ("ISP") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court has permitted additional briefing, regarding whether Fuchs has at "property 
interest" in his application for a Retail Alcohol Beverage License. Fuchs filed his Supplemental 
Memorandum In Opposition To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies ("Fuchs' Supplemental Memorandum?1) on November 23 1 2009. ISF' 
filed Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("ISP's 
Supplemental Memorandum") on December 7, 2009. Fuchs submits this Reply Nlemorand1.Il:rl, 
because ISP bas demonstrated in its briefing that there are no disputes as to any mat~~rial facts, 
and that no additional discovery or briefing is necessary. J This Cou.rt has all uf the applicable 
facts and legal authority before it and may issue its ruling declaring that rSF.' may not 
retroactively apply IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 in violation ofLC. § 73-101. 
II. 
ISP DOES NOT H,<\. VE DISCRETION TO APPROVE OR DENY 
QUALIFIED LIQUOR LICENSE APPLICATIONS 
In Michigan, local governmental units have unfettered discretion to decide whetht~r to 
grant any particular first-time liquor license applicant the right to sell retail liquor for 
consumption on its premises. (Fuchs' Supplemental Memorandum at 4-7). In Idaho, by corif:rru;t, 
J In ISP's Suppleme:ntal Memorandum has made several irrelevant faotual assertions, citing the "Agency Reoord," 
(lSP's Supplemental Memorandum at 10). Fuchs assumes these facts to be true for the purposes of this brieting, As 
a practical matter, any facts beyond Mr, Fuchs' placement On the five city priority lists and the July 24, 2009 letter 
removing his name from the lists are irrelevant to these proceedings. 
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ISP promulgated IDAPA rules establishing a priority system, first in time, first in right, that 
guarantees that a liquor license applicant shall be notified of an available license if 111e applic:mt 
complies with specific requirements and waits in tum. IDAPA 11.05.01.01~5. (Fuchs' 
Supplemental Memorandum at 7-11). Moreover, once an applicant submits an application for a 
liquor license, the ISP Director has a must issue the license within ninety (90) days, if the 
applicant has demonstrated that he is qualified and no disqualifying circumstancel:> t:xi~~t. I.e. § 
23-907. ISP has argued to the contrary~ that it has complete discretion whether to approve or 
deny an application, similar to the discretion provided to Michigan cities and townships oveT 
first-time applicants. (Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum at 4-6). This is wrong:. ISP's 
role in administering liquor license applications is purely ministerial. 
In Mickelson v. City o/Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Cottrt rejected 
a city~ s attempt to apply a 1940 beer licensing ordinance over a 1968 zoning ordinance s:o that it 
could deny a beer license to an otherwise qualified applicant. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the later ordinance controlled but, mote importantly to this case, explained that if an 
applicant is qualified to receive the license, the license must issue: 
The record also indicates that Mickelson possessed all tile other qualifications, 
and none of the disqualifications, set by statute and ordinance as prerequisite)s for 
the issuance of a license to operate a beer tavern. The city council therefore had 
no discretion to deny him a license; its duty to issue the license was pure~y 
ministerial, and the district court erred in not issuing its writ of mandate to 
compel the city council to perform its duty. 
Mickelson, 101 Idaho at 308 (emphasis added). 
While Mickelson involved a city's issuance ofa beer license, ISP's role is likewi:;e 
ministerial. Once ISP notifies an applicant an available license) the ISP Director has ninety (90) 
days upon receipt of a liquor license application to investigate a liquor applicant. IffOl.U]d thal 
"such applicant is qualified to receive a license, that his premises are suitable for the carJ:ying On 
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of the business, and that the requirements of this act and the rules promulgated by the director are 
met and complied with, [the director] shall issue such license ... " I.e. § 23-907. 
Further, ISP does not dispute that, under Idaho law, license applicants have due process 
rights. In Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained that due process requirements "apply not only to courts but to state administrative 
agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses.".2 (fuchs's Supplemental 
Memorandum at 1 0-11). Instead of addressing Eacret and the other Idaho cases providing due 
process protection to applicants, ISP continues to argu1e what it always argues: that a liquor 
license is a "privilege" and not a "property right." (Respondent's Supplemental Memor,andum at 
7-8). ISP's position misses the point. Both applicants and licensees have due process protection. 
Moreover, ISP's position is antiquated, having been dispensed with many years agO', when the 
United States Supreme Court "fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' 
and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of due process rights." Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 u.s. 564, 571 (1972). 
ISP established a set of rule governing priority lists. As a result, first-time appHc:aJO.t~; who 
place their name on these priority lists have a legal expectation, based upon state law, that, if 
they comply with the legal requirements set forth in the nIles and statutes and wait their 1:1.1111, 
they shall be notified of new license when it becomes available. Because there was no limitation 
011 the nwnber oftiln<::;5 any particular applicant's nam~ may appear on a priority list until 2007, 
those applicants who placed their names on lists before that date are entitled to each oftheir 
places in line. 
2 See also, Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. H08land, 147 Xdaho 774 (2009) and Comer v. County o/Twill.Falls, 130 
Idaho 433 (1997). 
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III. 
ABSENT EXPRESS AUTHORITY, ISP CANNOT RETROACTIVELY APPLY ITS 
RULES AFFECTING SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
It is established Idaho law that unless a statute expressly so provides, it cannot be: applie:d 
retroactively, if it affects a substantive right. The Idaho Courts specifically have explained that a 
statute that affects a substantive right is one that affects rights which are "contractual or vested." 
Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85,87 (1988). Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish o:r 
destroy contractual or vested rights are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to 
substantive." [d. Without explaining any basis for its position, ISP argues that IDAFA 
11.05,01.04 is a procedural or remedial tule and tberef,ore it can be applied retroactively, This 
argument makes no sense. IDAPA 11.05.01.01 through .05 establish a priority list system. It 
creates or enlarges a substantive right, the right to a place in line on a priority list. IDAPA 
11.05.01.04 cannot be applied retroactively. 
ISP argues that it may apply its rules retroactively, based upon I.e. § 67-5224 (5) (a). 
(ISP's Supplemental Memorandum at 9). Not only was no I'finar' rule promulgated, this statute 
provides "[a] rule which is final and effective may be applied retroactively as provided in the 
rule." (Emphasis added). This statute does not apply on its face. I.C. § 67-5224 (5) (a) provides 
that retroactivity is pennitted if the "final" rule itself provides. This is consistent with I.e. § 73-
101, which states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so deelal'ed.,,3 
Nothing in IDAPA 11.05.01.04 suggests any kind of retroactive application. ISP knows this. In 
fact, it did not even attempt retroactive application until two years after the nlle was 
promulgated. That ISP would suggest that LC. § 67-5224 (5) (a) supports its condu<;t 
demonstrales to what length it will go to justify its actions. 
3 It sh()uld be further noted that ISP takes 1. C. § 67~5224 (5) (a) out of its context. The purpose of tlw statute was to 
address potential probJem!1 created by the time between the publication of a pending rule and its final adoption. The 
title of the statute makes that obvious: "Pending Rule -- Final Rule - Effective Date," 
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Finally, ISP does not even address the mandatory/discretionary distinction tJlat tl:u~ },1yers 
court uses to demonstrate the difference between substantive and procedural statutes. (Fuchs' 
Supplemental Memorandum at 12). Statutes that are mandatory affect substantive rights; 
statutes that are discretionary are procedural or remedial. Myers, 114 Idaho at 87. The! m.APA 
rules governing priority lists are mandatory and not discretionary. "Priority on the list is 
determined by the earliest application, each succeeding application is placed on the list: in the 
order received.~' IDAPA 11.05.01.01. Moreover, IDAPA 11.05.01.01 creates a rigM because it 
establishes a priority system that had previously not existed. ISP's position that IDAP A 
11.05.01.04 is a procedural rule is without merit. 
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore) because it has :all ofthe~ 
necessary facts and legal authority before it, the Court should declare that ISP's attempt 
retroactively to apply IDAP A 11.05.01.04 is void and prohibited as a matter of law. 
IV, 
ISP DOES NOT CRAI,LENGE FUCH'S ~RGUMENT THAT THIS CASJE F'}.!J:"I,S 
WITHIN THREE EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 
There is no dispute that the general rule is that a party must first exhaust administrative 
remedies before resorting to district court. American Palls Reservoir Dist. No.2, v. ldAi!flO Dept. 
o/Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,871.873 (2007). In his Supplemental Memorandum, Fuchs 
asserted three exceptions to that rule that apply here. (Fuchs' Supplemental Memorandum at 13· 
15). Firsl, courts do not require exhaustion, when remand would be futile. Peterson v. City of 
Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 237 (et. App. 1990). Second, courts do not require remand 'wh,~n the 
agency provided the party no notice of its intended action, only infonning him of it after the 
action was completed. Id. Finally, courts do not require exhaustion when tbe party is challenging 
the validity ofa rule. Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003); I.e. §§ 67-5278 (1), (3). 
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ISP ignores these exceptions. Instead, ISP does nothing more than reiterate the general. 
rule that exhaustion is required. (ISP's Supplemental Memorandum at 12-13). ISP's faihlre 
even to respond to Fuchs' arguments is a tacit admission that these three exceptions apply. By 
failing to argue otherwise, ISP concedes that this case falls squarely within the thre:e exc.eptions 
to the exhaustion doctrine. 
Instead ISP argues that this Courl should dismiss this action based upon e:roaustion and 
return it to a non-existent hearing officer so that ISP may conduct discovery. (ISP's 
Supplemental Memorandum at 13, "the absence of discovery and testimony taken before a 
hearing officer in a case such as this clearly violates the policy provisions se forth foun.d [sic] in 
the American Falls opinion.") ISP fails to demonstrate why such discovery would be necl~ssary 
or beneficial. ISP already made its decision retroactively to apply IDAPAl 1.05.01.04. There is 
no hearing officer to which this Court may remand this matter, nor is there any reason t'o appoi,nt 
one nOw. ISP has already made its decision. 
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Admill:istrative 
Remedies and hold that ISP is prohibited from retroactively applying IDAP A 11.05.01004. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Further, this Court has all of the material, undisputed facts before it and all of the 
pertinent legal authority. ISP violated Idaho law when it retroactively applied mAPA 
11.05.01.04, removing Fuchs' name and the names of other applicants from five city priority 
lists. This Court should declare ISP's retroactive application null and void and order IS? to 
restore each listing of Fuchs , name On each of the priority lists to the place they secured prior to 
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July 24,2009. This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 9th day of December, 2009. 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for PetitionerlPlaintiff 
Daniel S. Fuchs 
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his attorney of 
record, Brian Donesley, and submits the followiug Second Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol 
Beverage Control's ("ISP") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: 
"It is significant that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is 
procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat." Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,436 (1971) (cited by State ex rei., Richardson v, Pierando:z.zi, 117 
Idaho 1,5-6 (1989», 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
. This Court pennitted additional briefing following oral argument, allowing, inter alia, 
Fuchs to address an Idaho Supreme Court decision ISP raised at argument, State ex rei. 
Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1 (1989), ISP argued that Pierandozzi held that ISP has 
such broad and unlimited authority under the Twenty-First Amendment that ISP rules supersede 
other Constitutional provisions or statutory authority. In fact, Pierandozzi holds that the Twenty-
first Amendment gave the Idaho legislature, not ISP, a "broad sweep" of authority, and it also 
explained that all Constitutional provisions are on equal footiug and that each "must be 
considered in light of the other." 117 Idaho at 5. As confirmation of this principle, Pierandoni 
cited to Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down a Wisconsin liquor statute as being in violation of the Due Process Clause ofthe 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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ISP's citation to Pierandozzi is an attempt to distract this Court from the sole issue 
involved in this case: whether ISP may retroactively apply a 2007 amendment to its priority list 
rules~ IDAPA 11.05.01.01~5, contrary to the Idaho Code's express prohibition against 
retroactivity, I.C. § 73-101. This Court should prohibit it from doing so. This Court should deny 
ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
II. 
PIERANDOZZI DID NOT GIVE ISP UNBRIDLED AUTHORITY 
In its oral argument, ISP suggested that this matter is controlled by State ex reI. 
Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1 (1989). ISP argued that Pierandoz:zi provided ISP some 
kind of supreme authority that trumps other constitutional and statutory concerns. This is not 
true. In Pierandozzi, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the "tenus and conditions under 
which a liquor license is granted are subject to the pleasure of the legislature under the 'broad 
sweep' of authority granted to the states under the Twenty-First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution." 117 Idaho at 4 (emphasis added). Further, it reconciled one Constitutional 
provision, the First Amendment, with another, the Twenty-First Amendment, holding that the 
"Twenty First Amendment power over alcohol is broad enough to embrace state power to zone 
strong sexual stimuli away from places where liquor is served." ld. at 6. What matters to the 
present case, however, is that Pierandozzi explained that there was nothing in the Twenty-First 
Amendment that made it superior to any other Constitutional provision: 
[F]ar from declarhlg the Twenty,First Amendment alone to be the supreme law of 
the land, the [U.S. Supreme] Court recognized that each of the provisions in the 
Constitution "must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context ofthe 
issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. II ••• [California v. LaRue, 409 
U.S. 109 (1972)] should not be understood to st.and for the proposition that the 
Twenty-First Amendment overrides the First Amendment, but rather for the 
notion that "the Twenty-First Amendment pow~r ov~r alcohol consumption is 
broad enough to embrace state power to zone strong sexual stimuli away from 
places where liquor is served." 
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Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho at 5. 
To demonstrate that the Twenty-First Amendment does not pre-empt other constitutional 
provisions, Pierandozzi cited Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court held to the contrary, striking down a state liquor statute that violated the Due 
Process clause by permitting officials to post names of suspected inebriates at liquor stores, 
without an opportunity of notice and hearing, subjecting them to stigma and ridicule: 
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of 
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential. "Posting" illlder the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of 
illness, to others it is a stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a 
degrading one. Under the Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no 
process at all. This appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may 
have been the victim of an official's caprice. Only when the whole proceedings 
leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive 
results be prevented. 
Conslantineau, 400 U.S. at 437.1 
While the Idaho Supreme Court has he.ld that a liquor license is a privilege and not a 
property right/ there can be no dispute that a liquor licensee is afforded all the due process 
protections of any license bolderunderthe IAPA~ I.e. § 67·5254. Northern Frontiers v. Slate ex 
reI., Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 440 n. 3 (Ct. App. 1996) (agency actions involVing liquor licenses 
"must be reviewable by courts oflaw, inasmuch as they affect property rights.") (citing State v. 
Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 280 (1957». Furthennore, the Idaho courts have repeatedly held license or 
pennit applicants are also entitled to due process rights during consideration of el:igibility of a 
1 Pierandozzl also cites Liquor Corp. v. Duffy. 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (Twenty-First Amendment does not provide 
exception to anti-trust laws); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Twenty-First Amendment does not override the 
Equal Protection Clause); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc" 459 U,S, 116 (1982) (Twenty-First Amendment does not 
fre-empt the Establishment Clause). 
Crazy Horse v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 76'2, 765 (1977) (Although a liquor license is a privilege and not a property right, 
licensing procedure cannot be "administered arbitrarily"). 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMJN1STRATIVE REMEDlES 
Page 4 of7 
12/24/2009 12:42 DONESLEY LAW OFFICE PAGE 05/08 
license or permit Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784 (2004); Boise Tower Associates, 
LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774 (2009). 
Pierandozzi does not stand for any notion that the Twenty-First Amendment preempts 
other Constitutional provisions. Nor does it hold that the ISP has any kind of super-authority. 
This Court should reject ISP's attempt to override the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and deny its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
llI. 
IDAPA 11.05.01.01 CREATED A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT WmCH CANNOT BE 
AMENDEDRETROACT~LY 
The Idaho Courts have specifically explained that a statute that affects a substantive right 
is one that affects rights which are "contractual or vested." Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85,87 
(1988). Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights 
are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive." Id. ISP' s suggestion that 
its 2007 amendment to the rules was "remedial/' that it is an attempt to discourage speculation in 
liquor licensing, misses the point. IDAPA 11.05.01.01-5 created a vested or contractual right to 
an applicant's place in line on the priority lists. The Idaho Legislature's prohibition against 
retroactive application of statutes should apply with even greater force to agency rules, I.e. § 
73·101. 
The only issue that is before this Court is whether ISP can retroactively apply 
11.05.01.01-4, remOVing Fuchs's name from the priority lisls. This is why ISP's suggestion that 
it must conduct "discovery" to detennine whether Mr. Fuchs is qualified to be issued a license is 
without merit. That issue, whether Mr. Fuchs is qualified, is not ripe. Mr. Fuchs's then actual 
qualifications only become an issue once he has been notified of an available license off a list 
and he has made a timely application in response. 
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ISP's retroactive application of its 2007 amendment to its priority list rules violated I.e. § 
73~101. This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. 
IV. 
ISP HAS NO DISCRETION. IT MUST ISSUE LICENSES 
TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS 
ISP is required, pursuant to the Retail Sale of Liquor-by-the-Drink Act, I.e. § 23-901 et 
seq., to issue licenses to applicants who possess all of the qualifications and none of the 
disqualifications of a liquor license. Once ISP has detennined that an application is true, that the 
applicant possesses all of the qualificalions and none of the disqualifications, and that the 
premises is suitable, the director may, in his discretion, issue the license. Uptick Corp. v. Ahlin, 
103 Idaho 364, 369 (1982). If the ISP director abused his discretion and refused to issue a 
license to a qualified applicant, that applicant would have reCOurse in a court oflaw. Northern 
Frontiers v, State ex rei. , Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 440 n. 3 (Ct. App, 1996).3 
ISP is limited in its administration of liquor licensing by the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho 
Code, its own rules, and the oversight of the Idaho legislature. This Court should deny ISP' s 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
v . 
. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
~ This is in stark contrast to Michigan where ~ocal government units have unfettered discretion to approve or deny 
ftrst-time applications. At oral argument, ISP argued that Michigan and Idaho law are similar because ISP claimed 
that cities larger than 75,000 people do not have the right off JIst refusal over a [JIst-time applicant In facl, iliis is 
true only for cities larger than 750,000 people, i.e. Detroit. MCL 436.1501(2); U,s. Census Bure.au. Regardless of 
the error, the two cases that discuss the rights of a fJI$t-time applicant, involve a city'S denial ofa first-time 
application. See Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F, 3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2001); Shamie v. City of Pontiac, 620 F: 2d 
118 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of ) 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol ) 
Beverage Control, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
Daniel S. Fuchs ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
) 
STA TE OF IDAHO, Department of ) 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol ) 
Beverage Control, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2009-03914 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE'S RESPONSE TO 
DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
ABC's RESPONSE TO DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO DISMISS" 1 
" ' 
COMES NOW, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Police, 
Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC") and hereby responds to Daniel S. Fuchs' Supplemental 
Reply Memorandum in Opposition of ABC's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to the Court's 
direction given to counsel on December 14, 2009. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court may even consider whether or not ABC may apply IDAPA Rule 
11.05.01.013.04 as it was written, it is imperative that Mr. Fuchs be able to overcome a primary 
hurdle; whether or not he has enough of a propeliy interest, as a mere applicant for a liquor 
license, to obtain standing. 
Mr. Fuchs seeks to convince this Court that standing, or his lack thereof, is of little 
consequence in this matter. Mr. Fuchs makes several claims in his briefing, all of which are 
questionable when viewed in the proper context. ABC will attempt to address each asseliion 
made by Mr. Fuchs, in the order presented and will incorporate its briefing on the Pierandozzi 
case as appropriate. 
II. ABC's DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY 
Mr. Fuchs attempts to differentiate Michigan liquor licensing law from Idaho's. His 
further attempt to persuade this Couli that the two U.S. District Court cases should not be 
similarly applied in this case is without a basis in law. 
Mr. Fuchs attributes an inordinate amount of validity that a local governmental body, in 
the state of Michigan, is the ultimate decision maker in the granting of liquor licenses in that 
I The Court directed ABC to respond to Mr. Fuchs' (Second) Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition To 
Respondent's Motion To Dismiss For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, dated December 9,2009. The 
parties were also directed to submit additional, but limited, briefing for the case of State, ex. rei. Richardson v. 
Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho I (1989), by January 8,2010. 
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state, Mr. Fuchs implies that all first-time liquor licenses, in Michigan, are granted exclusively 
by local governmental units. This is not so according to Mr. Fuchs' own exhibits. For example, 
Mr. Fuchs' Exhibit 1 states, "Local units of government. , . and the Michigan Liquor Control 
Commission ("MLCC") work together in both the licensing process and the enforcement of the 
state's liquor laws." 12& i. See also, pp. 3,4,10, and 21.2 
Mr. Fuchs asserts that rsp established a priority system through its rules and therefore 
"guarantees that a liquor license applicant shall be notified of an available license if the applicant 
complies with specific requirements and waits in tmn." (Fuchs' Reply at 3). Mr. Fuchs must be 
implying there is some guarantee to remain on the waiting list to begin with so that the futme 
notification he refers to may be had. This assertion fails for two reasons. 
First, in looking at the plain language of the rules, there are no written words of guarantee 
that an applicant's name shall remain on the list. In fact, besides the rule stating that an applicant 
shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority list, other rules provide 
an additional means to remove an applicant from a priority list. 
Furthermore, there is no implied guarantee that an applicant's name shall remain on the 
list either. If anything, the fact that other rules exist that allow for the removal/disqualitlcation of 
an applicant implies there really is no guarantee that an applicant has an interest in remaining on 
a municipal priority list. 
Similar to the authority vested in ISP's Director, Michigan's Liquor Control Commission 
considers many of the same factors when granting new licenses to its applicants. While the list is 
2 Michigan's Liquor Control Code 436,120 I (2) states, "Except as otherwise provided in this act, the commission 
shal1 have the sole right, power, and duty (0 control the alcoholic beverage traffic ... within this state, including the 
... sale thereof. (J 998) 
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actually more extensive, some of the more relevant factors the MLCC considers in granting a 
liquor license are set forth below: 
The commission shall consider all of the following factors in determining 
whether an applicant may be issued a license or permit 
(a) The applicant's management experience in the alcoholic liquor 
business. 
(b) The applicant's general management experience. 
(c) The applicant's general business reputation. 
(d) The opinions of the local residents, locallegisiative body, or local 
law enforcement agency with regard to the proposed business. 
C e) The applicant's moral character. 
Ci) The order in which the competing initial application forms are 
submitted to the commission; however, this subdivision shall not apply to an 
application for a resort license authorized by section 531 of 1998 PA 58, 
MCL 436.1531. (emphasis added). Mich. Admin. Code r. 436.1105 rr. 5 
( 1979).3 
See, J&P Market, Inc.v. Liquor Control Com 'n, 199 Mich. App. 646, 652 (1993), 
("Opinion of local authorities is only one factor to be considered in deciding whether to grant 
carryout license."); T.D.N Enterprises, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 90 Mich. 
App. 437, 440 (1979), (Commission found that four applicants for [1] available SDD [liquor] 
license all of whom, were all eligible and qualified equally, except as to priority in time of filing 
requests for license, did not act arbitrarily or capriciously nor did it abuse its discretion in 
awarding the license [based on applicants' priority].); cl, Semaan v. Liquor Control 
CommiSSion, 136 Mich. App. 243 (1984), aff'd, 425 Mich. App. 28 (1986). 
As shown by the above, it is clear what degree of authority a local governmental entity 
has, in the state of Michigan, in the liquor licensing process. See, Mich. Const. art. IV, § 40; 
Mich. Compo Laws § 436.1201 (1998), (setting forth the authority of the MLCC to regulate the 
possession and sale of alcoholic liquor) and; Mich. Compo Laws § 436.1501 (1998), ("An 
application for a license to sell alcoholic liquor for consumption on the premises, except in a city 
having a population of 750,000 or more, shall be approved by the local legislative body in which 
3 Michigan Administrative Code, Rule 436.1105 at: 
hJ:tr2:llwww.michigan.gov/documents/dleg/AACS4 J &. 10 I 0 I 493.120 297622 7.ndf document pp. 1484-1485; 
Adobe pdf pages 93-94. 
ABC's RESPONSE TO DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 4 
I! I) ( ') rl ,,~ k;] \ 
the applicant's place of business is located before the license is granted by the commission ... ") 
(emphasis added). 
Secondly, by Mr. Fuchs' own admission, an "applicant must comply with specific 
requirements set forth in the rules and statutes and wait their turn ... " (Fuchs' Reply at p. 4). In 
this case, Mr. Fuchs held more than one position at a time on several incorporated municipal 
priority lists. He was listed two (2) times on the priority list for Bellevue, Idaho; three (3) times 
for Hailey, Idaho; three (3) times for Ketchum, Idaho; three (3) times for Sun Valley, Idaho; two 
(2) times for Idaho Falls; and nine (9) times for Twin Falls, Idaho. The fact that his name 
appeared for a total of twenty two (22) times on the named incorporated city priority lists 
constitutes a disqualifying event according to lDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04. 
It should be noted that ifMr. Fuchs sought to obtain a similar type liquor license in the 
state of Michigan, the process in Michigan would be almost identical to Idaho's. For a side-by-
side comparison, the table below briefly outlines the similarities and some differences between 
the licensing processes in both states: 
IDAHO MICHIGAN 
c--
One (on-premises} liquor license per 1,500 people One (Class C, on-premises) liquor license per 1,500 
in any municipality. I.e. §23-903. people or major fraction in any municipality (with 
a few exceptions for the MlCC to grant another 
limited number} MCl 436.1531 and 436.1533. 
Applicant submits application (for on-premises, Applicant submits "completed" application (for 
liquor license) with one-half of an annual fee Class C, on-premises, liquor license) with fee 
(approx. $400.00} along with two-page application. ~;~i6fu"@f:11lQ~fmiRW$~mlJ.~,~®~(;3'U10'r~0r) t ,!(~al;.<:l::,;~'k}.,!ti0dJ~fu:., ~lL"!i{,~M'.;"'f;i!1{'~l- i i;}j"".;,v."Wk-~J,l\l~ffi"I\':t.""~.t~.l\ ~!\;t • MCl 
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. No prior approvals from a 436.1525(1)(0). A completed application, means 
county, city or planning and zoning permits are an application complete on its face and submitted 
required to be submitted at this time. with any applicable licensing fees as well as any 
other information, records, approval, security, or 
similar item required by law or rule from a local 
unit of government... Includes background checks, 
fingerprinting, submission of financial statements, 
insurance documents, place where alcohol is to be 
served. Mich. Admin. Code r. 436.1105. 
Applicant placed on waiting list, in order received. Applicant is placed on waiting list, in order 
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IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. received. Mich. Admin. Code r. 436.1105. 
Newly issued license becomes available based Enforcement investigates the applicant and makes 
upon increase in population. Applicant is notified recommendation to MlCe. MlCC also notifies local 
to accept or decline offer and to produce all other law enforcement for input and approval. 
application materials, such as fingerprint cards, 
background check, submission of financial 
statements. IDAPA §§ 11.05.01.013.02, 
11.05.01.013.03 and 11..05.01.013.04. I.e. §23-
905. 
Enforcement investigates the applicant to ensure Applicant gets approval, by resolution, from local 
applicant is qualified. governmental entity and submits it to MlCe. 
Director (ABC) reviews all of the above and either MlCC reviews all of the above and either grants or 
grants or denies the license. I.e. § 23-907. denies the license. Mich. Admin. Code r. 
Licensee also seeks local approval. I.C. § 23-933B. 436.1105 and MCl 436.1525(3). 
As much as Mr. Fuchs would like to asseli othenvise, one can see the similarities in the 
licensing process between the two states are striking. 
Mr. Fuchs fmiher relies on Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, (1980), for the 
proposition that the issuance of a license to sell alcohol is purely a ministerial act, in which a city 
has no discretion in either accepting or rejecting the applicant. It should be noted that the 
Mickelsen Court clearly distinguished the amount of discretion a city has in licensing liquor as 
opposed to beer. ld. at 307. 
Therein, the COUli stated, "unlike the rather broad "local option" afforded local 
government in the case of liquor, the right to sell beer may not be denied by local govenunent 
arbitrarily; and in fact local government may only place 'reasonable' restrictions on the sale of 
beer." Id. This authority for local agencies to control liquor licensing, to which the Mickelsen 
Comi is referring, comes from IDAHO CODE § 23-933B. It states, 
The licensing authority of any county or incorporated municipality shall have and 
exercise the same power to revoke, suspend, or to refuse to grant or renewal of a 
retailer's license issued or issuable by it, as are granted to the director in this act 
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In this case, the application for the license in question is not only for beer but also for 
liquor. Therefore, Mr. Fuchs' assertions that a city or the director's liquor licensing authority is 
purely ministerial are laid bare. As noted above, the Mickelsen Court clearly recognized the 
existence of some kind of discretionary authority that local cities have in controlling liquor 
licensing. Idaho's beer licensing statute found in IDAHO CODE § 23-1010 mirrors much of the 
code provisions that ISP's director must follow for liquor licensing. It states in relevant part, 
(1) Every person who shall apply for a state license to sell beer at retail shall 
tender the license fee to, and file written application for license with, the 
director. The application shall be on a form prescribed by the director which 
shall require such information concerning the applicant, the premises for which 
license is sought and the business to be conducted thereon by the applicant as 
the director may deem necessary or advisable, and which shall enable the 
director to detemline that the applicant is eligible and has none of the 
disqualifications for license, as provided for in this section. (emphasis added) 
Mr. Fuchs' mischaracterizes ISP's position that "ISP does not dispute that license 
applicants have due process rights." Instead, Mr. Fuchs attempts to bypass the hurdle of 
determining if any Fourteenth Amendment property interests exist first for a mere applicant for a 
liquor license that would give rise to due process as set out in the Board of Regents v. Roth,408 
U.S. 564,569-571 (1972). The court stated if there was no Fourteenth Amendment property 
interests found, university authorities would not be required to give the employee a hearing when 
they declined to renew that employee's contract. ld. 
In order to suppOli his position that he is entitled to due process as a liquor license 
applicant, Mr. Fuchs' insinuates that the Fourteenth Amendment trumps the Twenty-First 
Amendment. See, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), (finding, that a person has 
a fundamental interest in their name, that gives rise to due process); but, cf California v. LaRue, 
409 U.S. 109 (1972), (holding, in the narrow context of liquor licensing "the state has the power 
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to regulate nude and sexually explicit conduct in licensed establishments without offending the 
[First Amendment of] the Constitution") 
LaRue was eventually disavowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of, 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 517 U.S, 484, 514-516 (1996). Therein the Court 
found, 
[AJpart from the Twenty-first Amendment, the State has ample power to 
prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages in inappropriate locations, Moreover, in 
subsequent cases, the COUlt has recognized that the States' inherent police 
powers provide ample authority to restrict the kind of "bacchanalian revelries" 
described in the LaRue opinion regardless of whether alcoholic beverages are 
involved. 
As argued previously, it appears the 44 Liquormart case has merely shifted the states' 
source of authority away from the Twenty-First Amendment to a state's police power, such 
authority to regulate liquor licensing is still intact. 
Therefore, Mr. Fuchs' stance still fails for a couple of reasons. 1) Fuchs fails to 
acknowledge that in order to obtain due process to begin with, one must have a cognizable 
property interest first as set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra. As ABC argued before, 
Mr. Fuchs does not have a fundamental propelty interest in a place on a waiting list as a mere 
applicant that would allow him the benefit of due process. (Respondent's Supplemental 
Memorandum in SUppOlt of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 3-8). 
Secondly, Mr. Fuchs' position totally discounts the context of the issues and interests at 
stake according to State, ex. rei. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1,6 (1989) and the state's 
police powers to regulate liquor licensing. It is reasonable to assume, while the Twenty-First 
Amendment may apply nanowly in cases involving liquor licensing, the state's police power to 
regulate is also a factor to be considered. To accept Mr. Fuchs' position, even on such a nanow 
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issue, would clearly violate and do substantial harm to the Twenty-First Amendment and would 
undermine the state's authority to regulate liquor licensing.4 
Mr. Fuchs' fmther allegations that the Director ofISP lacks the authority to control and 
regulate liquor licensing are unfounded. IDAHO CODE §§ 23-901 and 23-903 clearly provide the 
Director of ISP with a broad grant of authority to regulate and control the sale of liquor within 
Idaho's borders. 
Fmthermore, Mr. Fuchs' enoneously wishes to have this Court extend a blanket 
reliance on Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784 (2004), in order to nullify the 
significance of the state's authority to regulate liquor licensing. Unlike a (planning and) zoning 
application for a land use permit, the business of selling intoxicating liquors is one which the 
legislature has the power to impose such conditions and restrictions as in its judgment may seem 
wise. To categorize a zoning application the same as an application for a liquor license would 
disregard the legislature's authority and intent to regulate an industry so unlike many others. 
Two cases presenting somewhat similar issues before this Court are also found in the 
State of Michigan. While not controlling in Idaho, these cases established: 
1) A city's resolution establishing priorities for [Class C liquor] license approval, in 
order to avoid the problem of specu1atory use, was not in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Jones v. City a/Troy, 405 F. Supp. 464 ,470-472 (E.D. Mich. 1975), and; 
2) Where application for a license to sell liquor is made and before a license is granted 
an ordinance prohibiting saloons is passed, a writ of mandamus will not thereafter be granted to 
4 ART. III SECTION 26. POWER AND AUTHORITY OVER INTOXICATING LIQUORS. From and after the 
thirty-first day of December in the year 1934, the legislature of the state ofIdaho shall have full power and authority 
to permit, control and regulate or prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and transportation for sale, of 
intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. 
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compel the issuance of a license. Fuchs v. Common Council of Village of Grass Lake, 166 Mich. 
569(1911). 
ABC contends that a conect ruling would include a finding that a liquor license 
applicant does not have a property interest in either the application itself or a place on a priority 
list. Therefore, the issue of due process is not even reached according to Board of Regents. 
Thus, Mr. Fuchs is without a remedy and his action should be dismissed. To find otherwise, 
would be an enor in the law. 
III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF IDAPA RULE 11.05.01.013.04 
Mr. Fuchs' response adds nothing new to the position already offered by him. His 
reliance on Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85, 87 (1988) (that statutes that are mandatory affect 
substantive rights), fails to account for the exception found in case law in Idaho's liquor-
licensing realm. i.e. no substantive right exists in a liquor license, as between the state and a 
licensee. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has continually held that even a liquor licensee has no so-
called property rights as between the licensee and the state. (Respondent's Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 8.) Therefore, any assertion by an applicant 
to have some form of due process afforded to them, because of substantive right, clearly lacks a 
basis in law. 
Furthermore, any assertion that some type of contractual agreement between an 
applicant and the state exists is also without merit. Such an assertion would be considered 
completely unilateral on the part of the applicant. Even a bona fide-card-carrying licensee is 
subject to suspension or revocation of the license at any moment when a violation of the law is 
discovered. 
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The authority to take away such a privilege only further supports the existence of a 
unilateral relationship between a licensee and the state. A mere applicant cannot expect to be 
entitled to a more extensive remedy than what an actual licensee has. 
Moreover, it is unclear how Mr. Fuchs can show that IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 is 
anything but substantively procedural and/or remedial in nature. As ABC argued previously, 
because no contractual or vested rights in an application exist in the first place, this rule does not 
create, enlarge, diminish or destroy any contractual or vested rights. (Respondent's 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp.8-II.) The relevant IDAPA 
Rule(s) only instructs ABC in hO\v to process the applications it receives. [do 
The intent ofIDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 was in fact to discourage the speculation of 
liquor licenses. ld. The rule was approved by legislative fiat. Jd. Mr. Fuchs' name appeared 
twenty two (22) times on the municipal priority lists named above in only six Idaho cities. One 
must ask is he seeking relief with unclean hands? 
IV. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 
Again, Mr. Fuchs' appears to mischaracterize ABC's position of the exhaustion 
doctrine. 5 ABC reiterates that if no Fourteenth Amendment propeliy interest exists, then this 
Court cannot reach the exhaustion doctrine as 110 administrative or judicial remedy exists and the 
petition for judicial review must be denied. 
If, however, the Court finds that Mr. Fuchs has due process in an liquor license 
application that results in a contested case, then the exhaustion doctrine should be applied for 
5 Such assertion by Mr. Fuchs' may be due in part to the fact that briefing, previously directed by the Court, was to 
be submitted eonculTently and not in responsive fashion as undertaken by Mr. Fuchs. Any implication asserted by 
Mr. Fuchs that ABC was non-responsive to his Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition To Respondent's Motion 
To Dismiss For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, and/or that ABC agreed with the same should be 
disregarded. 
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many reasons. While Mr. Fuchs asserts the three exceptions, he fails to meet the burden of 
showing of how remand would be futile. Just because he says it would be, doesn't necessarily 
make it so. In this case, remand for further proceedings is the more reasonable course of action 
on the grounds set forth below. 
While Mr. Fuchs would like this COUlt to believe that discovery in a case such as this is 
utmecessary, he himself denied his involvement as a speculator in liquor licensing. IDAPA Rule 
11.05.01.013.04 was promulgated to specifically eradicate the problems associated with the 
speculation of liquor licenses. ABC believes discovery is more essential now than before as this 
is an outstanding issue of fact that should be established. 
Testimony, be it through deposition or through an administrative hearing, has not been 
taken. Again, other than the number of times that Mr. Fuchs' name appeared on the priority lists, 
such testimony could reveal the extent to which Mr. Fuchs is a liquor license speculator. 
Testimony as to the purpose ofIDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 should also be taken so 
that either the administrative hearing officer or this Court can make a fully informed decision on 
the issue of the rule's remedial nature. 
The Court only has in its possession a partial record. Therefore, any determination 
based upon an application of law to factual circumstances that mayor may not support Mr. 
Fuchs' claims is made more difficult. Mr. Fuchs' asseltion that remand would be futile is 
therefore without merit. 
Additionally, Mr. Fuchs' assertion that he received no notice of the alleged agency's 
action is without merit as well. Mr. Fuchs was provided notice in two possible ways. 
The first and more obvious notice occurred when Mr. Fuchs received the letter, along 
with his refund, stating that his name was being removed from the municipal priority lists. 
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It is apparent from the filing of the petition for judicial review that Mr. Fuchs enlisted 
the assistance of counsel to advise him on how he should proceed in this matter once he received 
that letter. Instead of seeking an immediate reconsideration or moving the case into an 
administrative appeals process, Mr. Fuchs decided to wait and try to bring his case before this 
Court instead. 
Such action taken by Mr. Fuchs does not appear to be a qualifying situation that would 
allow him to circumvent the administrative process at this point. Especially in light of the 
holding(s) found in American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2, v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 
Idaho 862 (2007). 
The second and less obvious form of notice occUlTed when the IDAPA Rule was 
moving through the legislative approval process. Again, ABC believes that developing some 
testimony in this area would not only be reasonable, but would be extremely helpful to the 
decision maker. 
Finally, Mr. Fuchs relies on the Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003) for the 
proposition that a court does not require exhaustion when the party is challenging the validity of 
a rule. It is arguable that Mr. Fuchs is not per se challenging the validity of IDAP A Rule 
11.05.01.013.04. He is merely challenging the fact that it cannot be applied retroactively. 
Nevertheless, IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 was in faet promulgated according to the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and obtained legislative approval as required by law. The 
rule was promulgated to fulfill the legislature'S purpose to eurb the speculation ofliquor licenses. 
Any issue with how ABC was to implement that purpose should have been addressed during the 
legislative rule-making proceedings and hearings. 
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Again ABC asserts that discovery and/or testimony could reveal much to establish the 
underlying facts upon which this case and the law may turn. Mr. Fuchs' assertions that 
discovery is mmecessary or not beneficial is clearly without merit. 
V. SECTIONS III AND IV OF DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUI>PLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESIJONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
DATED: DECEMBER 24, 2009 
ABC contends that Mr. Fuchs' most recent filing is incolTectly entitled as a "Second 
Supplemental Memorandum ... ," and contains material and argument that is outside the scope 
of briefing directed by the Comi on December 14, 2009. 
Mr. Fuchs' briefing dated December 24,2009, would be a more accurate 
characterization if it were entitled "Third Supplemental Memorandum ... " \\lhile the Court 
allowed ABC to respond to Mr. Fuchs' previous and (Second) Supplemental Memorandum ... , 
Mr. Fuchs was directed to limit his briefing to the State, ex. reI. Richardson v. Pierandozzi case 
in his December 24,2009 submission to the COUli. See, Footnote 1 above. 
In reviewing that submission, ABC discovered that Mr. Fuchs has once again exceeded 
the Court's directives. ABC respectfully requests that the COUli disregard Sections III and IV of 
Mr. Fuchs' most recent Supplemental Memorandum as they are outside the scope of this Court's 
December 14,2009, directives. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Vv'bile Mr. Fuchs would like us to believe he has a legal remedy, this is not the case. 
Before reaching the relief he seeks, he must prove he has standing to obtain relief As case law 
clearly indicates, he cannot provide any legal authority to SUppOli his claim that, as a mere 
applicant for a liquor license, he has a Fourteenth Amendment property interest on a priority list 
that would allow him due process. 
Both Idaho and Michigan's liquor licensing regulations are similar in nature when it 
comes to obtaining a liquor license. Like Michigan, this Court should find that Mr. Fuchs has no 
such interest or standing as a mere applicant and therefore, any legal relief through due process 
is not available to him. lfthe COUli makes such a finding, ISP respectfully requests that Mr. 
Fuchs Petition for Judicial Review be denied in its entirety. 
In the alternative, if the COUli finds that Mr. Fuchs has some type of propeliy interest 
that would give rise to due process, then ABC would respectfully request that its Motion to 
Dismiss For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies be granted, and that the matter be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
Dated this -If- day of January 2010. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
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COMES NOW, Plaintiff/Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his 
attorney of record, Brian Donesley, and submits the following Supplemental Memorandum re: 
Consolidation Issues: 
At the telephone conference ofFebnlary 19,2010, this Court expressed concern about the 
possible implications of the Idaho Supreme Court case, Euclid Avenue Trust v. City a/Eoise, 146 
Idaho 306 (2008), on the consolidation of a Petitlon for Review case with the Declaratory Relief 
case. In Euclid Avenue Trust, the Idaho Supreme Court held that actions seeking civil damages 
or declaratory relief may not be combined \vith petitions for judicial review under the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act. In Euclid Avenue Trust, the plaintiff filed a pleading entitled 
"Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and Request for Jury Trial." The fee category indicated 
on the pleading was that for a civil complaint more than $l >000. The Court observed that there 
had been an "increasing tendency, particularly in land use cases, for counsel to combine civil 
damage claims with their administrative appeal." 146 Idaho at 308. By its ruling in Euclid 
Avenue Trust, the Court put an end to that trend: 
The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by good 
policy underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the 
other is an original action. They are processed differently by our courts ... Thus 
we are consLrained to hold that actions seeking civil damages or declaratory relief 
may not be combined with petitions for judicial review under rDAP A. 
Euclid Avenue Trust, 146 Idaho at 309. 
Here, Fuchs did not combine a civil action and a petition for review in tbe same 
pleading. Instead, Fuchs filed separately a Petition for Review in Case No. CV 2009~ 
3914 and a Complaint for Declaratory Reliefin Case No. CV 2009-4185. There are two 
separate actions, two separate filing fees. Once the two separate actions were filed, 
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Fuchs moved for consolidation pursuant to Rule 42(a), LR.C.P, ISP stipulated to 
consolidation. And this Court issued the Order of Consolidation on September 17,2009. 
Euclid Avemte Trust should have no impact on this matter. The Idaho Supreme 
Court long ago held that whenever it may expedite the business and further the interests 
of the litigants, at the same time minimizing the expense of the public and litigants alike, 
the order of consolidation should be entered. Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc. 83 
Idaho 502 (1961). Both a petition for review and an action for declaratory relief were 
necessary actions, given that a state agency was involved and which had engaged in 
improper rulemaking. If Fuchs had not filed a timely petition for review, he risked 
forfeiting rights and remedies provided in the Idaho Administrative Code. An action for 
declaratory relief, however, is independently proper since I.e. § 67-5278 specifically 
authorizes such an action as an exception to the exhaustion requirement when a party is 
challenging the validity of a nde. See, Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003). 
It comports with sound judicial economy for this Court to retain both matters. 
The Court is able to sort out which procedures and remedies are proper for each action, 
while minimizing costs to litigants and the public by (;onsolidation of the actions into one 
case, 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2010. 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney fOT Petitioner/Plaintiff 
Daniel S. Fuchs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On thi.s;..0dJIay QfMarch, 2010~ I hereby certify that I served th~ above document on the 
addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated below: 
Cheryl Meade~ Deputy A.G. 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228) 
~/f1'~ ~ 
Barbi McCary Crowell 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, ) 
) Case No. CV 2009-3914 
Petitioner, ) CV 2009-4185 
) 
vs. ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of State) AND ORDER DISMISSING 
Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage ) PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
Control, ) REVIEW AND COMPLAINT FOR 
) DECLARA TORY AND 
Respondent. ) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
THIS MATTER is before the court on the motion of the State of Idaho to dismiss 
the petitioner's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Oral argument 
was conducted on December 14, 2009, with Brian Donesley representing Daniel S. Fuchs 
and Cheryl E. Meade representing the State of Idaho, Department of State Police, 
Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control. The parties filed supplemental briefing on 
December 24,2009 and January 8, 2010. The matter was initially taken under 
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advisement on January 11, 2010. However, due to questions which arose regarding 
issues raised in the parties' briefing, the court held a status hearing on March 4,2010. 
During the hearing the parties agreed to submit both of the above-numbered cases for 
determination by the court, as set forth below. Therefore, the court took both cases 
under advisement as of March 5, 2010. 
The court has considered the briefing and pleadings of the parties, together with 
the oral arguments of counsel. Based thereon, and for the reasons stated herein, the 
court hereby GRANTS the state's motion to dismiss as to both cases. 
I. BACKGROUND 
There are two cases pending before this court regarding disputes between Mr. 
Daniel Fuchs (Fuchs) and the Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control. (ABC). 
Based upon the parties' stipulation, the court considers the state's motion to dismiss in 
each case. 
A. Legal Posture. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §23-903, the Director of the Idaho State Police has been 
"empowered, authorized and directed by the Idaho Legislature to issue licenses to 
qualified applicants whereby the licensee is authorized to sell liquor at retail by the 
drink." The number of liquor licenses available throughout the state is finite; the 
licenses issued for any incorporated city shall not exceed one license for each one 
thousand five-hundred population. Id. ABC maintains a priority list of applicants for 
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those cities in which no city liquor license is available. A separate list is maintained for 
each city. 
To obtain a place on such a list a person or entity is required to file a completed 
application, accompanied by payment of one-half of the required annual license fee. 
Priority on the list is determined by a "first in time, first in right" system, with the 
earliest application having priority. Each succeeding application is placed on the list in 
the order it was received. 
B. Factual Background.1 
Between 1994 and 1995, Fuchs applied for and was placed on the incorporated 
city priority lists for each of the following cities: Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, 
Hailey, Bellevue and Idaho Falls. Fuchs' name appears twenty-two times as a liquor 
license applicant on these cities' lists. 
In 2006 the ABC began to promulgate administrative rules to be presented 
during the 2007 Idaho legislative session. As part of that process, ABC amended the 
rule regarding the number of times any applicant may place their name on the priority 
list for each incorporated city. See IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.042 (hereinafter the "Rule"). 
ABC followed the proper process for rule making and ultimately the Idaho Legislature 
1 The court's statement of facts is gleaned from the pmiies' briefing and factual statements in this case. There is no 
agency record filed with the cOUli at this stage of the proceedings, although the state has attached several documents 
to its motion to dismiss. To the extent that neither party has moved to strike the other's factual recitations or 
affidavits, this court will rely upon such facts as accurate. 
2 The amended Rule provides: "An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority 
list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate to the Director the ability to place an awarded license into actual use 
as required by Section 23-908(4), Idaho Code and these rules." 
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passed the rule as written in January 2007. These rules were also published by the 
Director of the Idaho State Police (ISP) pursuant to Idaho Code §23-932. The rule 
contains no "grandfather" clause. 
On or about July 24, 2009, the ISP sent a letter to Fuchs, informing him that it was 
removing all but one listing of his name from the priority lists for the above-referenced 
cities, citing the Rule and stating, II an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on 
each incorporated city list." The ISP also returned Fuchs' applications for each city 
where his name appeared more than one time on the priority list. Fuchs' application 
fees were likewise returned3 to him at that time. Despite the removal of Fuchs' 
duplicate applications, Fuchs retained the highest place he held on each city's list as of 
July 24. 
C. Procedural Posture. 
Fuchs thereafter filed two legal proceedings with this court: 1) a Petition for 
Judicial Review(Case No. CV 2009-3914) (hereinafter referred to as the "Judicial 
Review"), filed August 19, 2009, pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code (the 
Administrative Procedure Act); and 2) a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief4 (Case No. CV 2009-4185), filed September 4, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the 
] Fuchs attempted to tender the check to the court during argument on the state's motion to dismiss. The check was 
returned to counsel for the state. 
4 The court originally granted injunctive relief to Fuchs based upon a stipulation of the parties on November 5,2009. 
The original order was later amended on January 5, 2010. 
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"DEC action."). Fuchs never sought administrative review before the ABC prior to 
filing these two cases. 
ABC responded to the Judicial Review by filing a Response and Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. ABC also filed a response to 
the complaint for declaratory relief. 
The parties briefed the matter and the court granted oral argument, which was 
held on December 14,2009. Both Fuchs and ABC thereafter filed supplemental briefing, 
with ABC's final Memorandum filed January 8,2010. The court then took the matter 
under advisement on January 11, 2010. 
In Fuchs' supplemental memoranda, he argues that this court should grant the 
relief he seeks in the DEC action. Neither party filed any motion for summary 
judgment in the DEC action, and ABC's response memoranda did not indicate a desire 
for this court to rule on the DEC action as part of the state's dispositive motion in the 
Judicial Review. 
The court therefore sought clarification from the parties in a telephonic status 
hearing held March 4,2010. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that due to the 
"confusion resulting from a conglomerated proceeding[,]" claims for judicial review 
and for declaratory judgment and/or damages should not be combined. See Euclid Ave. 
Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 309, 193 P.3d 853,856 (2008). Nevertheless, the 
court made the parties aware of this case, and each stated their position that the court 
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could consider the state's motion to dismiss as if made in both cases. Therefore, based 
upon the court's conclusion during the telephone conference, this court is ruling upon 
the state's motion to dismiss both the Judicial Review and the DEC action. The Court's 
concern for confusion referenced in Euclid Ave. is not an issue given the procedural 
posture of this case. 
II. ANALYSIS 
1. The Petition for Judicial Review Is Dismissed. 
A. Introduction. 
When a district court entertains a petition for judicial review, it does so in an 
appellate capacity. Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County Com'rs, __ 
Idaho -.-J -.-J 214 P.3d 646, 648 (2009) (citing Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun 
Valley, 144 Idaho 584,588, 166 P.3d 374, 378 (2007); Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational 
Licenses, 144 Idaho 281,284, 160 P.3d 438, 441 (2007)). 
A party's right to appeal an administrative decision, i.e., to obtain judicial review, 
is governed by statute. Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 133, 139 P.3d 732, 735 
(2006) ("Judicial review of an administrative decision is wholly statutory; there is no 
right of judicial review absent the statutory grant."). Section 67-5270 allows judicial 
review for a "person aggrieved by final agency action ... if the person complies with 
the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code." 
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B. Standard of Review. 
A motion filed in judicial review proceeding is processed "in the same manner as 
motions before the district court." LR.C.P.84(0). As noted above in footnote I, this 
court has no agency record, although neither party has objected to the other's affidavits 
and/or filings. The court therefore relies upon those documents in analyzing the issues 
before the court. Neither party has contested the facts set forth in the documents filed 
with the court, see Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133 n.l, 106 P.3d 455, 
459 n.l (2005); therefore, this court applies the standard of a 12(b)(6) motion, construing 
any disputed facts, to the extent that there are any, in favor of Fuchs. 
C. Fuchs' Petition for Judicial Review is Dismissed for Failure to 
Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
1. Judicial Review is only available as provided by statute. 
Any party seeking judicial review must satisfy the principal requirement that 
they exhaust all administrative remedies required by the Administrative Procedure Act 
prior to seeking judicial review. See Idaho Code §67-5271 (2006). "[T]he exhaustion 
doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction because a I district court does not acquire 
subject matter jurisdiction until all the administrative remedies have been exhausted.' 
Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho at 135,106 P.3d at 461 (quoting Fairway 
Development v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 125,804 P.2d 294, 298 (1990)). 
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"Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought 
from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act. 
Absent a statutory exception, the exhaustion of an administrative remedy is a 
prerequisite for resort to the courts." Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 381, 383, 766 P.2d 
1262, 1264 (Ct. App. 1988). The Administrative Procedure Act thus "requires an 
exhaustion of the 'full gamut' of administrative remedies before judicial review may be 
sought." Lochsa Falls, L.L.c. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963,968 (2009). If a 
claimant fails to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissal of the claim is warranted. 
Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d 615, 618 (2004). 
However, this doctrine is not absolute; under unusual circumstances a court may 
circumvent this rule, but only where the interests of justice so require or where the 
agency acts outside its authority. Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786 
P.2d 1136, 1138 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
There is no dispute here that Fuchs did nothing, prior to filing this administrative 
appeal, to exhaust the remedies5 that he has before ABC. Pursuant to Idaho Code §23-
932, ISP's director has sweeping authority to "make, promulgate and publish such rules 
and regulations" as the "director may deem necessary for carrying out the 
provisions of [the statute]." The director has the authority to establish "the proof to 
5 Those remedies are governed by the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General, IDAPA 
04.11.01 and IDAPA 11.05.01.003. 
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be furnished and the conditions to be observed in the issuance of licenses . .. ff as well as 
lithe conditions and qualifications necessary to obtain a license .... " Id. "Procedures for 
the suspension, revocation, or refusal to grant or renew licenses issued under this [Retail 
Sale of Liquor by the Drink] chapter shall be in accordance with the provisions of [the 
Administrative Procedure Act]" Idaho Code §23-933(1) (2009). As part of this 
comprehensive authority, the director has determined, with legislative approval, to limit 
potential applicants for liquor licenses to one application per incorporated city. 
Fuchs does not dispute the director's authority to so rule; he disputes the validity 
of the rule as given retroactive application in his circumstances. The question here is a 
legal one: whether this court should exercise jurisdiction at this time, or require Fuchs 
to pursue his claims before the administrative body that is charged with authority to 
interpret and apply the rules and statutes that govern liquor licensing in the state of 
Idaho. This court concludes that Fuchs must return to the agency to state his initial 
claims and to make an adequate record for judicial review, if any, in the future. 
2. The exceptions to the general rule are not applicable here. 
As noted above, Idaho recognizes exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies rule 
where an agency acts without authority, or where the interests of justice otherwise 
require. This court concludes that these exceptions do not apply in this case. 
a. The ISP/ABC did not act without proper authority in 
adopting the Rule in question. 
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There is no support for Fuchs' claim that the 15P/ABC acted outside the scope of 
their authority in adopting the rule in question. Indeed, Fuchs does not dispute the 
validity of the rule itself, he disputes its enforcement in a retroactive way. 
The limited record before this court clearly establishes that the agency 
promulgated the rule as required by law, that the rule was published appropriately, 
and that the legislature passed the rule as now constituted. As noted above, the 15P's 
Director has extensive authority to "make, promulgate and publish such rules and 
regulations" as the" director may deem necessary for carrying out the provisions of" the 
statute. Idaho Code §23-932 (2009). As such, the rule was properly adopted and this 
exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply. 
b. The interests of justice do not require this court to 
consider Fuchs' claims before exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals noted in Peterson v. City of Pocatello, supra, that the 
circumstances which require an exception to the exhaustion doctrine include: (1) where 
resort to administrative procedures would be futile; (2) where the aggrieved party is 
challenging the constitutionality of the agency's actions or of the agency itself; or (3) 
where the aggrieved party has no notice of the initial administrative decision or no 
opportunity to exercise administrative review procedures. See Peterson, 117 Idaho at 236, 
786 P.2d at 1138. 
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i. Futility. 
This court concludes that return to the agency in this case would not be futile for 
Fuchs. Upon remand the agency, or its designated hearing officer, the applicability of 
the Rule to Fuchs' situation may be determined with establishment of a proper record. 
The Director of the ISP is the administrative tribunal charged with enforcement 
of the provisions of Title 23, chapter 9, Idaho Code. By rule, the Director has delegated 
his authority for licensing establishments to ABC IDAPA 11.05.01.011.02. The issue 
here is one which the specialization of ABC is particularly suited to manage. That fact-
finder should be presented with the question whether there is some compelling reason 
for Fuchs' name to appear twenty-two times on priority lists in six Idaho cities, 
particularly in light of the statutory purpose "to deal with issues of licensees involved in 
alleged acts of hidden ownership, i.e. unlawful transfers of liquor licenses, in violation 
of I.C §23-908(4)." Affidavit of Robert Clements in Support of State's Response, etc., 1110. 
Moreover, ABC has specific jurisdiction for enforcement and determination of 
licensure issues. /I An agency must be granted the authority to administer the statute 
before it [and it] is impliedly clothed with the power to construe the law." Hamilton ex 
reI. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 571, 21 P.3d 890, 893 (2001) (citing 
J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991)). "[G]reat weight should 
be given to an agency's interpretation of its own rules." Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 
Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409, 412 (Ct. App. 1996). 
'Q '{ 1 c \~, ' B' __ j 
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This court also accepts the legal proposition that the Rule's application is 
remedial. As such, additional facts should be established before a fact-finder to 
determine what extent, if any, the Rule should apply to Fuchs' situation. This is 
particularly the case since Fuchs applied for multiple licenses fifteen-plus years ago. 
Finally, the record in the judicial review proceeding does not exist, other than as 
stated in footnote 1, above. An adequate record is obligatory for this court to provide 
appropriate judicial review. See I.R.c.P. 84(f)(3); see also Workman Family Partnership v. 
City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 36-37, 655 P.2d 926,930 - 931 (1982) (in order for there to 
be effective judicial review of agency decisions, there must be a record of the 
proceedings and adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law). 
This court cannot substitute its judicial judgment for administrative judgment. 
At this juncture there is no way to determine whether the administrative agency has 
applied the criteria prescribed by statute and by its own regulations or whether it acted 
arbitrarily or on an ad hoc basis. See also South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board 
of Commissioners, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977) (quoted in Workman Family 
Partnership): "What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, 
specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the 
evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is based. 
Conclusions are not sufficient." 
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11. Applicants hold no vested rights for multiple 
places on the priority lists for each city; thus, 
Fuchs has no right to notice and no constitutional 
claim. 
The court also concludes that Fuchs does not have a sufficient property interest 
in his position on the lists in question to raise a constitutional question, or a question of 
notice. Idaho's Supreme Court has held that a I/liquor license is simply the grant or 
permission under governmental authority to the licensee to engage in the business of 
selling liquor. Such a license is a temporary permit to do that which would otherwise be 
unlawful; it is a privilege rather than a natural right and is personal to the licensee; it is 
neither a right of property nor a contract, or a contract right." Nampa Lodge No. 1389 v. 
Smylie 71 Idaho 212, 215-216, 229 P.2d 991,993 (1951). See also BHA Investments, Inc. v. 
State, 138 Idaho 348, 354-355, 63 P.3d 474, 480 - 481 (2003) (liquor license transfer fee 
does not amount to an unconstitutional taking, reaffirming Nampa Lodge No. 1389). 
This court recognizes that the statutes/rules in question have been amended and 
updated since the Court's ruling in Nampa Lodge 1389. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that a liquor license is a right of property as between a licensee and third 
persons in that it has 1/ attributes of value and assignability." Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 
386,394,379 P.2d 792, 797 (1963). However, these rights of aSSignability and value in a 
licensee do not give rise to a sufficient vested interest to grant Fuchs the relief he seeks 
here. 
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In the first place, this court concludes that being on a list is deserving of even 
lesser legal status than actually holding a license. See Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 P.3d 
600 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan law, holding that one applying for a liquor license 
has no such claim of entitlement; as such, there is no 'property' interest in a place on the 
list). 
Secondarily, while a statute will not generally be applied retroactively in the 
absence of clear legislative intent to that effect, I.c. § 73-101, it also is the rule in Idaho 
that retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights. 
City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512,515,660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1983) (citing 
Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc., v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 624, 636 P.2d 745, 746 (1981); 
Buckalew v. City of Grangeville, 100 Idaho 460, 600 P.2d 136 (1979)). Thus, remedial or 
procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or 
vested rights are generally held to operate retrospectively. Id. (citing Ohlinger v. U.S., 135 
P.5upp. 40 (D. Idaho 1955)). As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
"A retrospective or retroactive law is one which takes away 
or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a 
new disability in respect to transactions or considerations 
already past." 82 c.J.5. Statutes § 407 (1999). "[I]n Idaho, a 
statute is not applied retroactively unless there is 'clear 
legislative intent to that effect.' " Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 
Idaho 430, 432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987) (quoting City of 
Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515, 660 P.2d 1355, 
1358 (1983)). However, in the absence of an express declaration 
of legislative intent, a statute, which is renwdial or procedural in 
nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy 
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contractual or vested rights, is generally held not to be retroactive, 
even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to 
which it applies. Id. 
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence 104 Idaho 172, 174, 657 P.2d 469, 
471 (1982) (emphasis added). 
In this instance Fuchs has no vested rights. "[T]he selling of intoxicating liquor is 
a proper subject for control and regulation under the police power. It is likewise 
universally accepted that no one has an inherent or constitutional right to engage in a 
business of selling or dealing in intoxicating liquors." Crazy Horse v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 
762, 765, 572 P.2d 865, 868 (1977) (citations omitted). The mere fact that the person holds 
a liquor license does not vest him with any property right that would entitle him to any 
damages by reason of the revocation or cancellation of such license. Nims v. Gilmore, 17 
Idaho 609, 107 P. 79, 81 (1910). See also, O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 44,202 
P.2d 401, 405 (1949) (a license to operate a beer parlor does not confer any vested 
property right). 
Therefore, Petitioner has no vested property right for being on the list. Thus, he 
has no right to notice and a hearing, and the agency action was not retroactive. 
Therefore, the exceptions to the statutory requirement of exhaustion are not established 
in this case. The Judicial Review is therefore DISMISSED. 
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2. The Complaint for Declaratory Relief is Dismissed. 
As noted above, the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a] 
person is not entitled to judicial review of an agency action until that person has 
exhausted all administrative remedies required in this chapter." I.e. § 67-5271 (2006). 
The doctrine of exhaustion requires that where an administrative remedy is provided 
by statute, relief must first be sought by exhausting such remedies before the courts will 
act. This doctrine is applicable not only to petitions for judicial review, but to actions 
for declaratory judgment as well. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. Idaho Dept. of 
Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 871-872, 154 P.3d 433, 442-443 (2007); Regan v. Kootenai 
County, 140 Idaho 721, 724-725, 100 P.3d 615, 618-619 (2004). "If a claimant fails to 
exhaust administrative remedies, dismissal of the claim is warranted." Regan, 140 Idaho 
at 724, 100 P.3d at 618. 
The court concludes that the analysis set forth above regarding the Judicial 
Review is equally applicable to Fuchs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. As 
the Court noted in Regan: 
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that 
"[a] person is not entitled to judicial review of an agency 
action until that person has exhausted all administrative 
remedies required in this chapter." I.e. § 67-5271. The 
doctrine of exhaustion requires that where an administrative 
remedy is provided by statute, relief must first be sought by 
exhausting such remedies before the courts will act. . . . No 
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened 
injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been 
exhausted. . " Furthermore, the doctrine of exhaustion 
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generally requires that the case run the full gamut of 
administrative proceedings before an application for judicial 
relief may be considered .... 
Id. (case citations omitted). 
These considerations are applicable to Fuchs' declaratory judgment action for 
good reason. As the Court noted further, important policy concerns support the 
requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies: : 
As we have previously recognized, important policy 
considerations underlie the requirement for exhausting 
administrative remedies, such as providing the opportunity 
for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention, 
deferring to the administrative process established by the 
Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of 
comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative 
body 
Id. at 725, 100 P.3d at 619 (quoting White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 
401-02,80 P.3d 332, 337-38 (2003)). 
These considerations are applicable to Fuchs' declaratory judgment action. As 
noted above, the ISP and particularly the ABC have the specialized function to review 
and determine a wide variety of issues surrounding liquor licensing in this state. It is 
that body's expertise to which this court defers in dismissing the declaratory judgment 
claim. "Actions for declaratory judgment are not intended as a substitute for a statutory 
procedure and such administrative remedies must be exhausted." V-I Oil Co. v. County 
of Bannock, 97 Idaho 807,810,554 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1976) (citation omitted). "The courts 
are loath to interfere prematurely with administrative proceedings and thus they will 
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not, as a rule, assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until 
administrative remedies have been exhausted, except where the administrative remedy 
is not adequate." Regan, 140 Idaho at 725, 100 P.3d at 619 (quoting 22A Am. Jur.2d 
Declaratory Judgments § 83 (2003)). As noted above, the court finds the administrative 
remedy adequate in this case. See supra, p. 11-12. 
The courts analyzing declaratory judgment actions have also recognized the 
same two exceptions set forth previously to the application of this rule, namely: 1) 
when the interests of justice so require; and 2) when an agency has acted outside its 
authority. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443; 
Regan, 140 Idaho at 726, 100 P.3d at 619. 
The court has discussed both of these exceptions in detail previously in this 
opinion. See supra, pp. 9-15. The nature of Fuchs' constitutional claims do not change 
this analysis. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2, 143 Idaho at 871, 154 P.3d at 442 
(" Although a district court has jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues, 
administrative remedies generally must be exhausted before constitutional claims are 
raised."). Thus, this court will not exercise jurisdiction over any constitutional claims 
stated by Fuchs in any greater detail than has already been addressed regarding notice 
and retroactivity. "[R]aising a constitutional challenge does not alleviate the necessity 
of establishing a complete administrative record." Id. Fuchs' declaratory judgment 
claims are therefore DISMISSED. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that Fuchs has failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, both the Judicial Review and the DEC 
action are DISMISSED without prejudice. Accordingly, the Order RE Preliminary 
Injunction issued on November 5,2009 as amended on January 5, 2010 is likewise 
DISMISSED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this /C"1ay of March, 2010. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the -1L- day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following 
persons: 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
P.O. Box 419 
Boise, ID 83701-0419 
Cheryl E. Meade 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642 
k(1 
Deputy Clerk },~ 
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Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
Respondent. 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
Defendant. 
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CASE NO. CV 2009-3914 
(Consolidated with Case No. CV 2009-
4185) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
I (] 32f) 
o RJ GLf\JAL 
I 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Daniel S. Fuchs, appeals against the above-named 
Respondent, Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control, to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing Petition for Judicial Review and 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief entered in the above entitled action on the 10th 
day of March, 2010, the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, District Judge, presiding. 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described 
in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1) (2) and (f) I.A.R. 
3. The appeal is based upon the July 24, 2009 notice from Respondent, Idaho State 
Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control, to Appellant that it was removing listings of his 
name from Retail Alcohol Beverage License Priority Lists for new issue licenses for the Idaho 
cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey and Bellevue. 
a. This notice was in violation of Appellant's rights to due process of law guaranteed by 
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and arising under 
the law and statutes of the State of Idaho, specifically but not exclusively: the Idaho Constitution, 
Article I, § 17. 
b. This notice was an administrative rule not formally promulgated in accordance with 
procedures specified in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq. 
Consequently, this notice was void and of no effect. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
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5. (a) No reporter's transcript is requested. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included m the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
• Motion for Consolidation: Rule 42(a), I.R.C.P., filed September 8,2009; 
• Petitioner's Motion for Order of Stay, I.R.C.P. 84(m), filed September 8, 2009; 
• Affidavit of Robert Clements in Support of State's Response and Motion to 
Dismiss Petitioner's Amended Petition for Judicial Review filed September 10, 
2009; 
• Respondent's Response to Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed September 10, 
2009; 
• Order for Consolidation entered September 17, 2009; 
• Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed September 21, 2009; 
• Order re: Preliminary Injunction entered November 5, 2009; 
• Affidavit of Brian Donesley in Support of Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies filed on November 23,2009; 
• Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed on November 23, 2009; 
• Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed 
on December 8, 2009; 
• Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed on December 9, 
2009; 
• Second Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed on December 24, 
2009 
• ABC's Response to Daniel S. Fuchs' (Second) Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to ABC's Motion to Dismiss filed on January 11,2010; 
• Supplemental Memorandum re: Consolidation filed on March 3,2010. 
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7. Appellant does not request additional documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court, other than those documents 
referenced above. 
8. I certifY: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
(b) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20 (and the attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code). 
DATED this t/~day of April, 2010. \~") 
(L"~ (1,~-, (", 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this ) ltfLday of April, 2010, I hereby certify that I served the above document on the 
addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated below: 
Cheryl Meade, Deputy A.G. 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
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] U.S. Mail 
] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228) 
04/29/2010 11:36 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CHERYL E. MEADE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 884-7050 
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228 
Idaho State Bar No. 6200 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
ST A IE OF IDAHO, Department of ) 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol ) 
Beverage Control, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
Daniel S. Fuchs ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of ) 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol ) 
Beverage Control, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2009-03914 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE'S REQUEST FOR 
DOCUMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE 
CLERK'S RECORD 
I.A.R. 28 
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PAGE 02/05 
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COMES NOW, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Police, 
Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC") and hereby requests that the standard record be prepared 
pursuant to tA.R. 28 (b). Additionally, pursuant to tA.R. 28(c) that the following documents be 
specifically included in the clerk's record: 
1. Daniel Fuchs' Petition for Judicial Review, filed on August 19, 2009. 
2. Daniel Fuchs' Amended Petition for Judicial Review, filed on August 20, 2009. 
3. Court's Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review, issued by the District Court, 
filed on August 21, 2009-
4. Petitioner's (Daniel Fuchs') Statement oflssues for Judicial Review, filed on August 
25,2009. 
5. Affidavit of Brian Dones)ey, filed on September 4,2009. 
6. Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs, filed on September 4, 2009. 
7. Daniel Fuchs' Motion for Consolidation, filed on September 4,2009. 
8. Daniel Fuchs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction~ fiJed September 4,2009. 
9. Daniel Fuchs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, 
filed September 4, 2009. 
10_ Daniel Fuchs' Complaint for Declaratory Relief: filed September 4,2009 (with 
Fuchs' Exhibits 1-2 attached). 
11. Respondent's (ABC's) Response To Amended Petition for Judicial Review and 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, filed September 
8,2009 (with ABC's Exhibits 1-21 and Affidavit of Robert Clements attached), 
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12. ABC's Response to Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed September 
10,2009. 
13. Defendant's (ABC's) Objection to Motion for Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, filed September 10, 2009. 
14. Respondent's (ABC's) Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
filed December 7, 2009 (with ABC Exhibit 22 attached). 
Dated this 2.. q day of April 2010. 
. ~ MfL~ a ~Clkh6= it { CHERYL E. MEADE 
o - Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERrlFY that on this ~q day of April, 201O~ I caused to be served a tnle and 
correct copy of the foregoing ABCsREQUEST TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
IN THE CLERK'S RECORD by the U.S. Mail, first-class postage as follows to: 
Brian Donesley, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
PO Box 419 
Boise, ID 83701-0419 
_U.S. Mail 
_Hand Delivery 
_Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
_Overnight Mail 
~Facsimi1e: (208) 343-4188 
Statehouse Mail 
_ Electronic Delivery 
~ 4.v":' cd. W 8-
CHeRYL . MEADE 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Date: 5/20/2010 Fifth J District Court - Twin Falls County User: COOPE 
Time: 10: 18 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Date Code User Judge 
9/4/2009 NCOC SCHULZ New Case Filed-Other Claims Randy J. Stoker 
SCHULZ Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Randy J. Stoker 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Fuchs, Daniel S. (plaintiff) 
Receipt number: 9023905 Dated: 9/4/2009 
Amount: $88.00 (Cash) For: Fuchs, Daniel S. 
(plaintiff) 
COMP SCHULZ Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief Randy J. Stoker 
MOTN SCHULZ Motion For Temporary Restraining Order And Randy J. Stoker 
Preliminary Injunction, I.R.C.P. 65 (a) 
MOTN SCHULZ Motion For Consolidation: Rule 42(a), I.R.C.P. Randy J. Stoker 
AFFD SCHULZ Affidavit Of Daniel S. Fuchs Randy J. Stoker 
AFFD SCHULZ Affidavit Of Brian Donesely Randy J. Stoker 
MEMO SCHULZ Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Randy J. Stoker 
Temporary Restraining Order And Preliminary 
Injunction 
9/8/2009 APER SCHULZ Plaintiff: Fuchs, Daniel S. Appearance Brian N Randy J. Stoker 
Donesley 
CESV NIELSEN Amended Randy J. Stoker 
Certificate Of Service 
fax 
9/10/2009 NIELSEN ABC's Response to Complaint for Declaratory Randy J. Stoker 
and Injunctive Relief 
OBJC NIELSEN Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Randy J. Stoker 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and 
Stipulation to Consolidate Cases 
9/14/2009 OBJC NIELSEN Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Randy J. Stoker 
Restraning Order and Preliminary Injunction and 
Stipulation to Consolidate Cases 
NIELSEN ABC's Response to Complaint for Declaratory Randy J. Stoker 
and Injunctive Relief 
9/17/2009 ORDR COOPE Order for Consolidation Randy J. Stoker 
9/21/2009 OBJC NIELSEN Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Randy J. Stoker 
Change Venue 
fax 
MEMO NIELSEN Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Randy J. Stoker 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies 
fax 
9/22/2009 CHJG COOPE Change Assigned Judge G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN Amended Certificate of Service G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
9/23/2009 OBJC NIELSEN Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to G. Richard Bevan 
Change Venue 
9/28/2009 REQU NIELSEN Request of Petitioner for Setting of Hearing G. Richard @etc)~ 
fax 
n ~~? h 
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Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Date Code User 
9/29/2009 REQU NIELSEN Request of Petitioner for Setting of Hearing 
9/30/2009 HRSC COOPE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/02/200909:00 
AM) for TRO, preliminary injunction and change 
venue 
10/512009 NOHG NIELSEN Notice Of Hearing on Motions: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction, I.R.C.P. 65(a) 
2. Respondent's (Alternative) Motion to Change 
Venue 
NOSV NIELSEN Notice Of Service of PetitionerlPlaintiffs First Set 
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents 
10/28/2009 NOSV NIELSEN Notice Of Serving 
fax 
11/212009 CMIN COOPE Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 11/2/2009 
Time: 1 :02 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Minutes Clerk: Sharie Cooper 
Tape Number: 
DCHH COOPE Hearing result for Motion held on 11/02/2009 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: for TRO, preliminary injunction and 
change venue 
HRSC COOPE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/14/200909:00 
AM) Motion TRO, Prelim Injunc 
CONT COOPE Continued (Motion 12/14/200910:30 AM) to 
dismiss 
11/512009 ORDR COOPE Order RE: Preliminary Injunction 
12/7/2009 MEMO COOPE Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss 
12/10/2009 MISC SCHORZMAN Camera request from Times-News for 12.14.09 
hearing GRANTED 
12/14/2009 CMIN COOPE Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing date: 12/14/2009 Time: 10:39 AM Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey Audio tape number: ct rm 
1 
DCHH CO OPE Hearing result for Motion held on 12/14/2009 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: to dismiss 
2/12/2010 APER COOPE Defendant: State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State 
Police, Bureau 0 Appearance Cheryl E Meade 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
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Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Date Code User 
2/12/2010 HRSC COOPE Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/19/201008:30 
AM) 
2/19/2010 CMIN COOPE Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Status 
Hearing date: 2/19/2010 
Time: 11 :56 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom #1 
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Minutes Clerk: Sharie Cooper 
Tape Number: 
DCHH COOPE Hearing result for Status held on 02/19/2010 
08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
3/2/2010 HRSC COOPE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
03/04/2010 03:00 PM) 
COOPE Notice Of Hearing 
3/3/2010 LETT COOPE Letter from Brian Donesley 
MEMO COOPE Supplemental Memorandum RE: Consolidation 
Issues 
3/4/2010 CMIN COOPE Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Status by Phone 
Hearing date: 3/4/2010 
Time: 1 :07 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Minutes Clerk: Sharie Cooper 
Tape Number: 
Brian Donesley for Petitioner 
Cheryl Meade for Respondent 
DCHH COOPE Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
03/04/201003:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
3/5/2010 ADVS COOPE Case Taken Under Advisement 
3/10/2010 OPIN COOPE Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing 
Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
CDIS COOPE Civil DispositionlJudgment entered: entered for: 
State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0, 
Defendant; Fuchs, Daniel S., Plaintiff. Filing date: 
3/10/2010 
3/17/2010 SCND AIKELE Scanned 
4/19/2010 NTOA COOPE Notice Of Appeal 
APSC COOPE Appealed To The Supreme Court 
4/22/2010 CCOA COOPE Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard,Bevann 
I U ' ' , . 
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Date: 5120/2010 
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Fifth District Court - Twin Falls County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0 
Date Code User 
4/29/2010 MISC COOPE Alcohol Beverage's Request for Documents to be 
Included in the Clerk's Record IAR. 28 
4/30/2010 CCOA COOPE Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
5/6/2010 NOTC COOPE Petitioner/Plaintiff/Appellant's Notice of 
Non-Opposition to Request that Documents be 
Included in the Clerk's Record 
5/12/2010 SCDF COOPE Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s) 
Filed 
SCDF COOPE Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's 
Certificate Filed 
SCDF COOPE Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record 
Due Date Set 
CCOA COOPE Second Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 011 THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01;' TWIN 1''ALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
STATE OF IDAHO, Depaliment ofIdaho 
State Police, BUreal.l. of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
Defellda.ut. 
CASE NO. c~-Oq- ~ \ 7:/0 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
COMDS NOW the Plaintiff, Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attorney of record~ 
Brian Donesley, and alleges and complains as follows: 
I. PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1 This action is brought pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1201, et seq, Idaho 
Code § 67-5278, and 42 USC 1983 for deprivation of federal and state constJhltional1y protected 
rights, privileges and immunities without due process of law) contrary to Amendment 14 of tbe 
Constitution of the United States, Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and 
other applicable law. 
2. Plaintiff Daniel S. Fuchs is and at all times relevant has been. a resident of Tl-vin 
Falls, Tvvin Falls County, ldaho. 
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3. Defendant The State of Idaho) Department of Idaho State Police, is a 
governmental department of the State of Idaho, subject to suit, \vith constitutional and statutory 
responsibilities due and owing to its citizens pursuant to the Idaho Constitution and governing 
statutes, rules and regulations peliaining thereto and deriving from such authority. References to 
the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of Defendant The State of Idaho, Department of Slate 
Police (hereinafter: "ISP/ABC") include that administrative subdivision of The Idaho Smre 
Department of Idaho State Police. 
4. Venue and jurisdiction are proper in Twin Falls County, Idaho, as Plaintiff resides 
in Twin Falls County, and this action pertains, in part, to Plaintiffs application for a State of 
Idaho retail alcohol beverage license for the sale of alcoholic beverages for the city of Twin 
Falls. 
II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. Alticle Ill, § 26 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the Idaho Legislature ha~\ 
the full power and authority to regulate the sale of or liquor: 
From and after the thirty-first day of December in the year 1934, the legislatme of 
the state of Idaho shall have full power and authority to pennlt, control and 
regulate or prohibit the Inanufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and transportation for 
sale, of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. 
6. Pursuant to I.e. § 23-903, the Director of the Idaho State Police has been 
"'empowered, authorized and directed by the Idaho Legislature to issue licenses to qualified 
applicants \vhereby the licensee is authorized to sell liquor at retail by the ill-ink." Pursuant to 
I.e. § 23-903, the number of licenses so issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for 
each one thousand five-hundred (1,500) population of said city or fraction thereof, as established 
in the last cenSllS. Defendant ISP/ ABC maintains a priority list of applicants for those cities in 
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which no incorporated city liquor license is available. A separate list is maintained for each Clty 
A person desiring to be placed on a priority list is required to file a completed application for an 
incorporated city liquor license, accompanied by payment of one-half (112) of the annual license 
fee. Priority all the list 1S detennined by the earliest application. Each succeeding application is 
placed on this list in the order received. 
7. From June 3, 1994 to February 13, 1995, Plaintiff applied for and wal:i placed on 
the incorporated city priority lists for liquor licenses for each of the follo\ving Idaho cities Twin 
Falls; Sun Valley; Ketchum; Haney; Idaho Falls; and Bellevue. 
8. On March 6, 2007, Defendant ISPI ABC caused to be amended the nlles 
governmg alcohol beverage control. Among other things, ISP/ABC amended IDAPA 
11.05.01.013.04, entitled "Limitations on Pll0rity Lists/' to include language, hmiting the 
number of positions to one (1) only that any applicant may ho1d on any city priority list as 
follows: 
An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city 
priority list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate to the Director the ability 
to place an awarded license into actual use as requlred by Section 23-908(4), 
Idaho Code and these rules. 
9. On July 24, 2009, Defendant ISP/ABC sent a letter to Plaintiff inforrning Plaintiff 
that it was rem.oving all but one listing of his name from the priority lists for each of the above-
referenced cities, citing IDAP A 11.01.013.04, stating that "an applicant shall hold only one 
po::;ition at a Lime On tach incorporaLed city list." (Con'espondence [rom LL R. Clements tu 
Plaintiff D. Fuchs, dated July 24, 2009, a true and con-eet copy of which is attached as Exhibit 
1). Defendant ISP/ABC summarily enclosed a check refunding Plaintiffs license application 
fees for the each of his priority applications which exceeded one (1) for each city named. 
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10, Plaintiff was entitled to notice and hearing of Defendant ISP/ ABC's intention to 
apply IDAPA 11.05.01,013.04 retroactively to applicants holding more than one (1) posirion Oil 
each city priority list prior to March 6, 2007, the date the 1ll1e was amended. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that "[nJo state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges and inununities of citizens ... nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty; or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person vvithin its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'; Atiicle I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution sirnilarly 
states that "[nJo person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law." 
11. Aside from any unnecessary property right analysis, the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, I.e. § § 67-5201 et seq., and the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure, 
IDAPA 04.11.01 et seq., set forth procedural due process requirements for the State to follow, 
should it seek to depri.ve a person of a legally protected right, privilege or property interest In 
particular, I.e. § 67-5240 states that a proceeding by an agency that "may result jn the issuance 
of an order is a contested case" is governed by the provisions of the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, unless otherwise provided by law. An "Order" means "an agency action (If 
particular applicability that detennines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or otber 
legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons." I.e. § 67-5201 (12), Pursuant to the above-
referenced and other applicable law, Plaintiff was entitled to notice and hearing before the order 
was issued and/or before the final agency action occ<.Uled which resulted in Plaintiff being 
removed from the priority lists. 
12. Defendant ISP/ABC's July 24, 2009 letter was an unlawful "Order" as defined by 
I.e. § 67-5201 (12) and/or final agency action issued and implemented without notice or warning 
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to Plaintiff, done arbitrarily, capriciously or as an unreasonable exercise of police power, beyond 
the scope of the State's authority, in violation of already established law, including the 
Constitution, Amendment 14, the Idaho Constitution, Art. I, § 13, the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, Idaho Code § 67-5201 et seq. and the Idaho Rules of Administrative ProccdLu'e, 
IDAP A 04.11.01. et seq. 
13. Defendant ISP/ ABC has continued to issue Notices of License Availability to 
applicants on the priority lists. On August 7, 2009, Nichole Harvey, an employee of Defendant 
ISP/ ABC, sent Plaintiff a Notice of License A vaUabiliry by certified mail infonnillg Plaintiff that 
a new incorporated city alcohol beverage license to sell liquor by the drink had become available 
in the City of Twin Falls and that Plaintiff was priority applicant (Correspondence from N, 
Harvey to D. Fuchs dated August 7, 2009, a tllle and conect copy of which is attached as 
Exhib.it2). Based upon infomlation and belief, Defendant ISPI ABC has issued and continues to 
issue similar Notices of Lict:nse Availability to other priority applicants on each of the priority 
lists from which Plaintiffs name ha.s been removed. See Affidavit of Brian Donesley;fT1ed 
herewith. 
14. Plaintiff shall be ineparably banned, if Defendant is not enjoined from continuing 
to notify applicants of the availability of licenses and/or issuing said licenses to other persons, 
Plaintiffs na:me was removed from the priority lists, Subsequent applicants may be notified. 
Some have already been notified of available licenses. This conduct excludes Plaintiff fiom Ius 
lawflll placement on the lists and threatens Plaintiff with the loss of rights, privileges and 
immunities, without due process of law, including but not limited to, protected property and 
liberty interests pertaining to the liquor licenses and occupations to whicb he is entitJed. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJtJNCTXV£ REUEF 
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15. This matter }s subject to the COll1t's temporalY restraining order and/or 
preliminary injuDction and such other declaratory and injunctive relief sought, inasmucb as 
issues pertain to matters which involve clearly established law, violations of righTs which an:' 
threatening immediate, continuing and irremediable hanns to Plaintiff for which there are no 
remedies at law, such as money damages, as any new business profits are speculative, and since 
any licenses to be issued are those which are attributable to Plaintiff having lost his position 
within a tightly regulated, statutory scheme of allocation ofliquor licenses, the numbers of wbicll 
are regulated by statute~ and, further, involving a substantial1ikelihood of success 011 the merits 
by Plaintiff, as established by the filings before the COU1t. 
III. DECLARATORY RELIEF (CQO)lt One) 
(IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04) 
16. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 15 as if 
fully set f01th herein. 
17. ISP/ABC's July 24,2009 notice constituted a "final agency action," within the 
meaning ofIdaho Code §67-5270 (2) .. 
18. Plaintiffis an interested person, whose rights, status or legal relations are affected 
by the Defendants j interpretation of the Title 23, Idaho Code, as well as by Defendants-
promulgation and application of rules thereunder, including but not limited to IDAP A 
11.05.013.04. 
19. Defendant ISP/ABCs July 24, 2009 removal of Plaintiff fronl the above,· 
referenced priority lists was an illegal, retroactive application of IDAPA 11.05.0'1.013.04, as 
amended, in violation of Idaho law, including but not limited to Amendment 14 of the u.s 
Constitution, Art. I, § 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
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Act) I.e. §§ 67-5201, et seq. I.e. § 73-101, the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure, JDAP.A 
04.11.01 et seq, and other applicable law. 
20, Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court that Defendant's application of 
IDAPA 11.05,01.013.04, as applied to Plaintiff, exceeds and/or is outside the authority granted 
to ISPI ABC by the Idaho Legislature, and that Defendant's attempt to apply said rule 
retroactively is null and void. 
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Count Two) 
21, Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs 1 through 20 as if 
fully set forth herein. 
22, Defendant acted outside its administntive authority, when it applied IDAPl\ 
11.05.01.013.04 to Plaintiff retroactively for applications filed prior to the effective date of the 
March 6, 2007 amendment that purported to limit applicants to only one position on a priority 
list for any Idaho city. 
23, This Court is respectfully requested to exercise its jurisdiction over this action, to 
maintain the status quo before the unlawful actions of Defendant, enjoining Defendants from 
issuing notices of license availability and/or licenses to applicants on the priority lists for the 
cities of Twin Falls, SUD Valley, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Idaho, other than to 
Plaintiff, until further order of this Court. 
V. VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (Count Three) 
24. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs 1 through 23 as if 
fully set forth herein, 
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25. Plaintiff is infot1l1ed and believes and based upon that information and belief 
alleges that the law does not provide an adequate administrative remedy or other relief for tbe 
unlawful, retroactive application of the statutes, rules and regulations goveming alcoholic 
beverages, as set fotth in Title 23, Chapters 6,7,8,9,10,11 ,12,13,14, and TDAPA 11.0S,(J] oftbe 
Rules Goveming Alcohol Beverage Control et seq.. Defendant ISP/ABC's illegaJ and 
retroactive application of IDAPA 11.05,01.013,04 results in Plaintiffs denial of substantive and 
procedural due process rights arising pursuant to Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the 
United States, and Article. 1, § 13 of Constitution of the State of Idaho, relating to Plaintiff s 
protected libe11y and property interests. 
VI. ATTORNEX.FEES 
26. Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of Brian, Donesley, Attorney al 
Law, in order to prosecute this action alld is entitled to reasonable attomey fees and costs of suit 
pursuant to I.e. §§ 12-117, 121, Rule 54(e), LR.C.P., 42 USC 1983 and 1988 and other 
applicable law. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
'WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court: 
(a) Issue its temporary restraining order eqjoining Defendants from issuing notices of 
license availability and/or licetlses to any license applicants on the incorporated city priority list 
for the Tdaho cities of Twin Fa11s, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Idaho, 
other than to Plaintiff: until the motion for preliminary injunction JTlay be heard; 
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(b) After hearing on the matter, issue its preliminm), injunction enjoining Defendants 
fi'om issuing notices of license availability and/or licenses to any license applicants on tIle 
incorporated city priority list for the cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, HfliIey, Idaho 
Fans and Bellevue, Idaho, other than to Plaintiff, pending tlle final adjudication; 
(c) Declare, adjudge and decree that IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 is null and void and of 
no effect, as applied retroactively 1:0 Plaintiff, and that IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 shall not ftlrther 
or again be applied retroactively; 
(d) Declare, adjudge and decree that Plaintiff shall be reinstated to the same place~; 
Plaintiff held on the priority lists for the incorporated cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, 
Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Idaho before Defendant ISPJABC issued its July 24, 2009 
letter and removed Plaintiffs name from said lists; 
(e) Restore the status quo by ordering that ISPJ ABC shall rescind any hcenses issued 
to third party priority list applicants whose names appeared after Plaintiffs name on said priority 
lists before July 24, 2009, or the date of Plaintiffs removal from such lists and who were issued 
licenses that would not have been so issued but for the wrongful acts of Defendant ISP/ABC as 
alleged in doing so; 
Cf) Award to Plaintiff the costs of this action including reasonable attoI11ey fees, in 
accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of law, including but not limited to Idaho Code 
§§12-117, and12-121; Rule 54, LR.C.P.; 42 U.S.c. 1988; and, 
(g) Award such other and furthet relief as the COUli considers just and proper. 
DATED this l day of September, 2009. 
'2 __ " c\~ t~" 
Brian Donesley 
AttoI11ey for Plaintiff Daniel S, Fuchs 
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Idaho State Police 
Daniel Fuchs 
526 K Shoup Ave West 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Dear Mr. Fuchs; 
S«rice $in,(;e 1939 
July 24, 2009 
C.L "Butch" Otter 
~Of 
We have recently reviewed the priority waiting list for incorporated dty liquor 
licenses for the state of Idaho . . The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 11 11tle 
OS Chapter 01.013.04 discusses the Ilmltatlons on the priority list speclflcalty 
stating that "an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each 
Incorporated city priority list", 
Daniel S. Fuchs appears on the priority list for the following cltles; Twin Falls( 
Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls, and Bellevue numerous times. The fee 
for your priority applications, receipt numbers 7675, 7676, 7677, 7678, 7679/ 
7681, 7680, 7538, 7687,7532,. 7531, 7685( 7684, 7534, 7682, and 7692 for the 
above mentioned cities of dated June 2, 1994 - February 13( 1995 are being 
refunded based on the limitations described above. Enclosed is a check for the 
full amount of ($5,175.00). Please contact our office if you have any questions. 
s#~!~~ 
Lt. Robert Clements 
Bureau Chief 
Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau 
Idaho State Police 
P.o. Box 700, Meridian, Idaho 83680-0700 
-t._. 
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Idaho State Police 
Service since 1939 
Cdooci G. Jerry RUlIf4II1 
Dfn:,cw 
.c\ugl)"t 7, ZOO') C.l... "8I1tih" Oftl'r 
(;ollm\or 
D:uud S, 1 'nebs 
S26 "K" Sll,)up Ave \Xiest 
Twin Fi!lI~, TD 1i1.10 I 
y,-,,, :m~ herehy notified du( a new fncorponll("'d CIty lIlmhol heverage lict.:nse to sell liqllor l,y Lht: drink h\l~ 
becoIne' IIVlIUU\"k ill the City ofl'vl'in Falls aod YelU ~tc ;\ priority "l'plkSll1r. 
' I 'p apply for the nl,~iJf\J;;,lc litllloI lice:.ut(!,'., ylll! tnmt, \v1thit, ten (10) day!! of r(:ccipt ollhitl II:ttel', n(")tjfy rhib office in 
wriring of your iULt;nl [0 proceed '\v.ith the Hpplk:I\1 ion pl'oca;;; . 
if )'Oll npply for ~he liq\lor by the drink !iwIlSt:. you hnvc onc hund~d find cj,g-hry (1 [010) J ays from rhc elmc or 
rL'lTipl (j( LItis letter to submit n compJ.ctc. arrli~~\fion whidl yo.u vedfy you hfl.ve cornpl(~f'(~d ~lJ nt:cc~s\tl)' 
l'<'quircnwnl'!I for the iol1LI<l.nCe of t:I\' llonuoU license t"or. thr. ~ak of li\.luvt by (he drink. Please nOt.; rh~ t il may l!!:k<.: 
lIP LO alf\~ry (90) (h,y!' \o(J pnjL:~1S your completed at'plicncion. F;t;lurc 1.0 mct:l widl all 5t.llturory l'eclllirCnlc:nl', rrmy 
fl;;$ult in \\ uenil'll of thr. lic.c·n~(~. 
'Upon il1t1u1I,ncl; of the license to scllliquo"r by the drink, yuu., Ule orlgibnlliccnsee, mu"t immcui!lh.:ly 
begin ~aJe!l of \i'1IAm hy the drink at le"Gt eight (8) hourI> ;t day, "ix (6) days a weel~ for sn. COflf;('cutivc 
llHHllh:o: . This liquor by the drink liccm;e canllot be transferred for a pcrimluf two yea.cs and h sllbjccr I'() 
:Intlllul renev,'IlL fdaho Godc requires Cllch J;1t'wl), i~~!wd liqllOf by the dtiok Jjc(.n$(~ to be: [lbcetl itlto ilCtu<1f U6e 
by ('he urWI.",llice(].<;t:~ at r.hc time of issuan<;c and .rcmain ill \I~~~ for Ilr )~115t sb:. (6) COrtSCCllfiv(: JTHmlh, or be 
r"r(t.:i~ed to the SLltC-. Illhbu elY! It": ~2,"'.1)()P,(4)1, 1\11 alcohol bC"'crai:,>(! li<:t:rm~ t'n ur-r he p romInently disphyt:d in " 
~1)ir~hle pn.:miot: where legitimate: s;tlt:~ of uk;vltnlic. bc:vcrl\Ac~ by the ddnk Qk\: plitr.;~\. 
If you fail to notify thix nfficl: in wt1\ing within t;¢il (10 da~ of the rcct::llll of dlis lettcl, OJ: to (.:umplcrc:rh<:; 
"'pplic9.tion within the time descrincll herein, yout mllne ~'.!11 be r~,movcd from the priority list and yom 
mr.mc)' will he rcfundc;d. P.covidcd, howe,v{',r, thar Ilpon :;h{)willg of good C;l.1.1.:iC the Alcohol licv l'T~'.g~ Comrol 
f.,utelLl, ld"ho $trtH: Polke, Illll.y c.".Lcnd the tim/.! in which [0 cQmplc/c lilt.: w.!ccssary [cquitcn~e-nts tor ~ period 1I0l 
[0 ",.;cccd nil1cry (90) dily\'. . 
!\n ,1r rli('.~ rj ()n i:; (:[!d()~t;d for your convenience, 
j~~~~ 
N ich,)k Harvey ·ja.J..Ul~ 
ManagemcN }\~~I ,~ r:lnl 
/\ . .lcohQl Bt.'VNllge CQntrnl HIl "'~I-I 
Idahu ~ ta(e Police 
------------------------~------------------------------~ 
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313 
Attorney at Law 
540 N orth Avenue H 
Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND .FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
PJaintiff~ 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control; 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. C~- Oq- 4 \ ~') 
MOTION FOR TElVIPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, 
I.R.C.P. 65 (a) et seq. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attorney of record, 
Brian Donesley, and hereby moves this COUli for its Temporaty Restraining Order and, 
following a hearing, for the Court's Preliminary Injunction enjoining Defendant Idaho State 
Police, Akohol Beverage Control, fi-om notifying third parties of the availability of retail alcohol 
beverage licenses) and from issuing any licenses to third parties from the priority lists for the 
cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey and Bellevue) Idaho, and fionJ continuing allY 
other administrative proceedings or actions pertaining to Defendant regarding the priority lisls 
for these cities. 
MonON FOR TEMpORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND .rru:L1.l\HNARY INJUNCnON, I.RC.P. (6~) :}:J 1 
(~) et seq. . Page 1 of' ~ 
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Plaintiff, contemporaneously~ has filed his Complaint for DeclaratOlY Judgment and 
InjlUlctive Relief, Memorandum in support of this Motion and supporting affidavits, 
This Motion is brought to restore the status quo pertaining to the parties prior tu 
ISPIABC's removal of Plaintiff's name from the priority lists for these designated five (5) cities, 
pending the hearing of this motion for preliminary injunction, 
The relief requeSTed of the Court is as follows: 
(1) The Court's temporalY restraining order staying, suspending and postponing tI.le 
notification to any third party of the availability of retail alcohol beverage 1ioenses, and fronl 
issuing any licenses to third p31iies for the cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum" HaiJey and 
BcllCYtlC, Idaho, and from continuing any other agency adtninistrativc proceodings or actions 
related to the priority lists; 
(2) Expedited hearing on this motion for preliminary injlUlctiot1) suspending and 
postponing DefenJ:mt's oth(;r administrative proceedings or actions related to the priority lists, 
based upon or related to the facts recited in the Cornplaint and Memorandum, and restoring the 
status quo pe11aining to the pal1ies prior to the Plaintiff s removal from the priority lists, pending 
final detennination and resolution in this jUdicial action; and, 
(3) Such other and fmiher related relief and orders as justice may require to preserve 
Plaintiff's protected legal rights, privileges, immunities and property interests, based upon or 
related to the facts alleged in the Complaint and Memorandum. 
This Motion is brought in accordance with Rule 65(a) et seq. ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and is supported by the Complaint by Plaintiff, Memorandum in Support of MotioJl, 
Affidavit of Brian Douesley and Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs filed contemporaneously herewitb 
and other filings in the Court records in this action, 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, LRC1). 65J 35 2 
(a) ct seq. 
Concurrently with this Motion, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Consolidate this case will, 
Fuchs v State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Case No. CV 2009-3914, UPOll 
Petition for Judicial Review. Plaintiff has l1'Aoved the Court in the judicial review case to issue its 
stay prohibiting further agency action, until this matter may be adjudicated, or fmther order 0 f 
the Court. Should the cases have been consolidated, before this COUl1's ruling on this present 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, the motions may be consolidated conclU1'emly in the 
consolidated case. 
DATED this l day of September, 2009. 
~"''''\.A (i~J\ "-"1 
Brian Donesley 
Attomey for Plaintiff Dal1iel S. Fuchs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 4th day of September, 2009, I hereby celiify that I served tbe above document on 
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following party(s) by method indicated 
below: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Office of Attomey General 
700 W. Jefferson Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
Stephanie Altig, Deputy AG. 
Idaho State Police 
700 S, Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
Robert Clements 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian,ID $3642-6202 
(X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334-2530) 
[ J u.s. Mail 
[X ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884-7090) 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884-7096) 
4AvLicL 
Tina Burke 
Legal Assistant 
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313 
Attomey at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TRE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF T"iIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Idaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
STATB OF IDAHO ) 
)ss, 
County of ) 
Defenda.nt. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL S. FUCHS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, being first duly swom OIl oath, deposes and says; 
1. Affiant is the Plaintiffin the above-entitled action and has personal y,now)edge of 
the facts contained in this Affidavit. 
2. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and conect copy of a letter Affiant received frorn 
Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau Chief of the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of the Defendant 
Idaho State Police dated July 24,2009, 
AFFIDA VIT OF DANIEL S, FUCHS Page 1 of} , { D 
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3. Attached as Ex.hibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a letter Affiant :received from 
Nichole Harvey, Management Assistant of the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of the 
Defendant Idaho State Police on August 7, 2009. 
4. Further, your Affiant sayclh naught. 
DATED this 1.) day of September, 2009. 
~~gfX 
DANlliL S. P CHS 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me, this _..L........~day of September, 2009. 
~~W.W.I~o.'!th,,~ ¥~~~ .. -.. *9~~.;.-<~~_-.../ ___ -:-
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... ,\. PUSUC / i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On thisl,tf4 day of September, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document on 
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following party(s) by method indicated 
below: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey General 
Office of Attomey General 
700 'vv. Jefferson Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise) ID 83720 
Stephanie Altig, Deputy A.G. 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
MeJidian, ID 83642-6202 
Rubert Clements 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642~6202 
AFFIDA VIT OF DANIEL S. FUCliS 
[ X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334-2530) 
[ ] u.s. Mail 
[X ] Hand-Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ J Facsimile (884- 7090) 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X J Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Oven-light Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884-7096) 
Tina Burke 
Legal Assistant 
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Idaho State Police 
DanIel fuchs 
. 526 K Shoup Ave West 
Twin Fallsi ID 83301 
Dear Mr. Fuchs; 
Service since 1939 
July 24, 2009 
C.L. "Dutch" Onef 
Gmemot 
We have recently reviewed the priority waiting list for incorporated city liquor 
!lcenses for the state of Idaho. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 11 lltle 
05 Chapter 01.013_04 discusses th~ limitations on the priority list specifically 
stating that \\an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each 
incorporated city priority listll , 
Daniel S. Fuchs appears on the priority list for the following cities; Twin Falls, 
Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hail~y( Idaho Falls, and Bellevue numerous times. The fee 
fOr your priority applications, receipt numbers 7675, 7676, 7677, 7678, 7679, 
7681, 7680, 7538, 7687, 7532( 7531, 7685, 7684, 7534( 7682 1 and 7692 for the 
abOve mentioned cities Of dated June 2, 1994 - February 13, 1995 are being 
refunded based on the limitations described above. Enclosed is a check for the 
full amount of ($5 t 175.00). Please r;ontact our office if you have any questions. 
Lt. RObert Clements 
Bureau Chief 
AlCOhOl Beverage control Bureau 
Idaho Stete Police 
P.O. Box 7001 Merldian.Idaho 83680-0700 
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Idaho State Police 
Colonel G. Jerry RuueU 
D!rec.tot 
DaJliel S. hlChs 
526 "K" Slmup Aye We::;t 
1\viLl f~lls, m R.'BO 1 
Service since 1939 
.r\uglJ.t 7, 2009 
I\c; NoLice of License Avci1nbility, Cc.r.titid M:lil 
60 p. 1 
G.L.. "Botell" Ott"'. 
(iovtftlor 
Y(llJ m~ herehy notified thaI a new Incorpo{"du;d City 1I1ml101 beverage Ib::nse to scilliqlltlr by Lhl: drink ha, 
bcCOmt'lIvllUrtbk ill the City of'l'Vl1n Falls ;J.od you Uc ,\ priority ~l'plir.sl11r. 
')'0 apply lor the !'l.\'fl.ihbk litjllOr 1ic~u~~' .. , YOll mmt, withili ten (10) day!! of receipt or lhi:J lillIe!', l1C'1tify thl6 office j" 
wri6ng oC your iULt;Ill [Q proceed with the ~\pplktlt ion PI'OCr::i:\. 
If you apply for the liquor by the (lrink 1iQ..:lIs~. you have one hundred and cJghry (1[0\0) Jays from the d;uc of 
rN:eil'L or Lhis letter to SllbLn1C n compicte. ;!rrli~~(ion which you verifY you h{\.\Ie cornpl(~t(~d :ill m;CI~:;s\try 
fC<Juircnwl;l'!! for the i~~Llll.!lCe of nt1 annual license. tOr. rhr. Ral(: of li~Ij()t by the drink. Please nOte th:l r il may Utkc 
IIp LO aif\{!~ (On) clijYli 10 pr{icetls your completed applicncion. F~ilnr~: 1.<) Im:ct with all statlH01), t"ecluircmc:n rs [Tlay 
result in 1'1 deni\\l of the licens(:. 
Upon ill,nl,um.:c (Jf the license to sell liquor by the drink, yuu, the origiballiccnsee, mUl'i immcdj~ldy 
begin !;:\letl of li(lU{)1" hy Un; drink Pot le~6t eight (8) hours <l day, Itix (6) days a week for six cons«;:.:;utivc 
mOl1tb~. This liquor by the drink licc.:11~l~ cafHlot he transferred for a pcriuJ of two ye~(s ~Lld is 8ubjecr f{) 
~~ntIlHll renewal. Td."\ho ~odc requires each ~H:wl)' i::;~ll~rlliq\lor by the dtiok Jjccn$(~ ro In: phlCCU into ilCW:U use 
by d:zu urigilmllicell.<;t:tt: at t.hc til11.c of issunn<;c and remain itl \I"~' ror nr Jellst sh (6) consccllTivc mOl1 lh~ or be 
[o,r{J,ed to the statt. Ildaho CUI k: »2.V)()R(4)J. AU alcohol bc'7era/:,><.' 1i<.:t:'m~ t'ntl~t he pmmlnenrly disphyed in :, 
~I)i r:< hk pn:l!l.i~c where legitimate: sale~ of uk;(,Iltnlic. bc:vc:rl\Ac~ by the drink uk!: pljtc~~. 
If you fail to notify thiM offict: in wthing within ttn (10 daY5 of the rccdl'l of Wis leltcl, or to n."Tlph:::lcrh<; 
application within th~ time de!>crinctl hcrdn, your 11IillnC will be r~moved from the priority lis1 :md your 
money will he rcfulldr:d. Provided, howe,v(',r, rhar IlrOll );huwillg of good cau:;c the Alcohol Iicvera!;1.: Comrol 
Buteau, Idnho $t'aH: Police, Illay c~Lclld the time in which [0 comrlek II".: llCCtSSllLY n;l'luircnit'm. to~ :1 pC!r1od !lot 
to <:~cccd nil1cty (90) day\'. 
!\n .ippli<::<tion i:; £:nd()~ed for your CQl1veniC!nc:e. 
1'1,,,.,1, yl)U tor your tll'l'l.C in thi.s mattel. We Jr.J('lk Inrw<ird to receiving your 'wl,itl " .11 r~~l'()IH;e. 
\~~ 
Nichok Harvey .1T 
Managemcm .1\~Xll\r;mJ 
Alcohol BI..·"\I(!tnge Control 1~1l e,~u 
Idaho Sta~e Police 
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TVVIN FALLS 
DANIEL S .. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
Y. 
STATE O:F IDAHO, Depaliment ofIdaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Defendant. 
AFFIDA VIT OF BRIAN DONESEL Y 
BRlAN DONESLEY, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
r H~L.. L Lf,' L t' 
1. Affiant is attorney for Plaintiff in the above-referenced action and has personal 
knowledge of the facts contained in this Affidavit. 
2. On September 3, 2009, Affiant was infonned by Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau 
Chief, Alcohol Beverage Control of the Deparnnent of Idaho Stare Police that the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Bureau of Defendant of Idaho State Police was preparing to issue notices to 
applicants on the priority lists of some if not all of the cities from which Plaintiff Daniel Fuchs' 
IJ 0 
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name has been removed, that license positions held by Plaintiff Fuchs are now availabJe to tliern. 
Lt. Clements suggested that, if Plaintiff intended to seek an injunction against the IdallO State 
Police, Akohol Beverage Control or a stay of agency action, Plaintiff should do so as soon as 
possible and an injunction obtained, as the notices shall be issued fOlihwith, unless otherwise 
enjoined by a court of law. Affiant told Lt Clements and Jenny Gruoke l Deputy Attomey 
General for Idaho State Police, that the Complaint would be filed by no later than September LI, 
2009. 
3. Affiant hereby certifies, pursuant to I.RGP, 65 (b), that the following efforts 
have been made to give notice to Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police of 
Plaintiffs' intent to move for a temporary restrail1ing order and prelirn.jnary injunction in this 
matter: 
(a) I contacted met with Lt. Robel1 Clements, Bureau Chiet~ Alcohol 
Beverage Control Bureau, Idaho State Police and with Jenny Gnmke, Deputy 
Attomey General, Idaho State Police, on September 3, 2009. I told them that, as 
attomey for Plaintiff, I was preparing to file a Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctjve Relief, a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction and other filings at the soonest possible time with respect to the 
striking of Plaintiff Fuchs' name from the waiting lists for liquor licenses in the 
cities of Twin Falls, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue. 
(b) FUliher; on this date, I sent by facsimile a copy of said Motion, the 
Mem.orandum in SUpp01t of the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction, the Complaint for Declaratory and InjlU1ctive Relief, the 
Motion to Consolidate, the Affidavit of Daniel Fuchs and this Affidavit. 
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4. FUlther, Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this __ S_<_day of September, 2009. 
Brian Donesley 
Attomey for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND S\VORN to before me, this I/I!; day of September, 2009. 
~jf~~~~---
< Notary Public for Idaho 
AFFIDA VIT OF BRIAN DONESLEY 
Residing at:'¢;Cl''i.{ (:cd<{ito 
Commission expires: < (jf;L;/IPI8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 4th day of September, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document 011 
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following pany(s) by method indicated 
below: 
Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney General 
Office of Attomey General 
700 W. Jefferson Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise,ID 83720 
Stephanie Altig, Deputy AG. 
Idaho State Police 
700 S, Stratford Drive 
Meridian,ID 83642-6202 
Robert Clements 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
AFFIDA VIT OF BRIAN DONESLEY 
[ X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mai] 
[ ] Facsimile (334-2530) 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884-7090) 
[ J U.S. Mail 
[X ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884··7096) 
\~ie~~~ .~~. ~""-=--,,,---
Thla Burke 
Legal Assistant 
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RRTAN DONESLEY ISB#2313 
Attomey at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS~ 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho 
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. cV- oq -4 \ 2.5 
lVIElYIORANDUl\1 IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR TEl\1PORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attomey of record, Brian 
Donesley, and hereby submits the following Mernorandurn in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action involves Defendant Idaho State Police's duties and responsibilities to 
administer the issuance of retail alcohol beverage licenses in the State of Idaho. The Alcohol 
Beverage Control Bureau of Defendant Idaho State Police (hereinafter uISP/ABC") maintains 
priority lists for incorporated cities. Plaintiff secured positions on priority lists by filing 
applications and paying fees for five Idaho cities between 1994 and 1995. In 2007, Defendant 
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ISP/ABC amended the mles govemmg alcohol beverage control, limiting applicants to one 
position only on any given priority list. On July 24, 2009, without notice or vvaming, ISP/ABC 
removed all but one of Plaintiffs places on tl1e priority list for each Twin falls, Ketchum, 
Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Defendant lSP/ABC's action was an unlawful, retroaclrvc 
application of an IDAP A rule, in violation of Plaintiff s due process rights and express 
prohibition in Idaho Code against retroactive application of law. 
On August 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed his Petition for Judicial Review of ISP! ABC action in 
Fuchs v. State of Idaho. Department of Idaho State Police, Case No. 2009-39J4. Coneurrently 
with this Motion, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and a Motion 
lu Consolidate the Petition for Judicial Review with this action. 
By this Motion, Plaintiff moves this Court to enjoin Defendant ISP/ABC frorn notifying 
any succeeding applicants on the respective priority lists or issuing licenses to any such 
applicants, until further order of .the Court. Should this Coun have consolidated the two cases) 
Phlintiff moves this Court, also, to stay agency action, pending resolution of this matter pursuant 
to LRCP. 84 (m). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to LC. § 23-903, the Director of Defendant Idaho State Police has been 
"empowered, authorized and directed by the Idaho Legislature to issue licenses to qualified 
applicants whereby the licensee is authorized to sell liquor at retail by the drink." Pursuant to 
I.e. § 23-903, the number of licenses so issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for 
each one thousand five-hundred (1,500) population of said city or fraction thereof, as established 
in the last census, Defendant ISP! ABC maintains a priority list of appljcants for those cities in 
which no incorporated city liquor license is available. A separate list is maintained for each city. 
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A person, pminership, or corporation desiring to be placed on a prioIity list is required to .file a 
completed application for an incorporated city liquor license, accompanied by payment of ()lle~ 
half (112) of the required annual license fee. Priority on the list is detennined by the earliest 
application. Each succeeding application is placed on this list in th.e order it was received 
Between June 3, 1994 and Februa1Y 13, 1995, Plaintiff applied for and was placed o.n the 
incorporated city priority lists for the following Idaho cities: Twin Falls; Sun Valley; Ketchum; 
Hailey; Idaho Falls; and Bellevue. 
On March 6, 2007, Defendant ISP/ABC amended the rules goveming alcohol beverage 
control. Among other things, ISP/ABC amended IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04, "Limitations on 
Priority Lists," to inc1u.de the following language, litniting the number of positions to one (1) 
only that any applicant may hold on any city priority list: 
An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city 
priority list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate to the Director the ability 
to place an awarded license into actual use as required by Section 23-908(4), 
Idaho Code and these rules. 
On July 24,2009, Defendant ISP/ABC sent a letter to Plaintiff, mfonning him that it "vas 
removing all but one listing of his name from the priority lists for the above-referenced cities, 
dUng IDAPA 11.01.013.04, and stating that "an applicant shall hold only one positiou at a lime 
on each incorporated city list" (Conespondence from Lt. R. Clements to D. Fuchs, dated July 
24,2009, a tme and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Daniel S. 
Fuchs.) Defendant ISPI ABC summarily mailed to Plaintiff a check refunding PlaintitTs license 
application fees for all of his priority appHcations in Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Idaho 
Falls and Bellevue exceeding one (1). 
Defendant ISP/ABC has continued to issue Notices of License Availability to applicants 
on the priority lists. On August 7, 2009, Nichole Harvey, an employee of Defendant ISP/ABC, 
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sent Plaintiff a Notice of License Availability by certified mail, lrlfonl1ing Plaintiff that a new, 
incorporated city alcohol beverage license to sell liquor by the drink had become available in the 
City of Twin Falls and that Plaimiffwas the priority applicant. (Col1'espondence from N. Harvey 
to D. Fuchs dated Al.lg1.lst 7, 2009, a true and conect copy of vvhich is attached as ExhibH 2 to 
the Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs.) Based upon infoD11atiol1 and belief, Defendant ISP/ABC ha~; 
issued and continues to issue similar Notices of License Availability to other priority applicants 
on each of the priority lists £1:0111 which Plaintiffs name has been removed, In fact, Defendan( 
ISP has infonned Plaintiffs counsel that it intends to issue notices of availability to applicants Oll 
the affected priority lists in the near future. 
2. On September 3, 2009, Affiant was infolmed by Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau 
Chief~ Alcohol Beverage Control of the Department of Idaho State Police that the 
Alcohol Beverage Control Bmeau of Defendant of Idaho State Police was 
preparing to issue notices to applicants on the priority lists of some if not all of the 
cities from which Plaintiff Daniel Fuchs' name has been removed, that license 
positions held by Plaintiff Fuchs are now available to them. Lt. Clements 
suggested that, if Plaintiff intended to seek an injunction against the Idaho State 
Police, Alcohol Beverage Control or a stay of agency action, Plaintiff shoUld do 
so as soon as possible and an injunction obtained, as the notices shall be issued 
forthwith, uXJ.less otherwise enjoined by a court of law. Affiant told Lt Clements 
and Jenny Grunke, Deputy Attorney General for Idaho State Police) that the 
Complaint would be filed by no later than September 4,2009, 
Affidavit of Brian Donesley at ~ 2. 
Plaintiff shall be ilTeparably ham1ed, if Defendant is not enjoined from continuing to 
notify applicants of the availability of licenses or issuing said licenses to other persons. 
Plaintiffs name was removed fro111 the priolity lists; subsequent applicants shall be notified: and, 
others are believed already to have been notified of available licenses. Such conduct excludes 
Plaintiff from his lawful positions on the lists and threatens Plaintiff with the loss of rights, 
privileges and immunities, withoilt due process of law, including but not limited to property and 
liberty interests pertaining to liquor licenses to which he is entitled. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFF HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 65 (b) AND (e) AND THIS 
COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN INJUNCTION RESTRAINING DEFENDANT FROl\1 
FURTHER AGENCY ACTION 
Rule 65(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the grounds upon ""hich the 
COUl1may grant a preliminary injunction. The granting or denying of a temporary injunction is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court, based upon the circumstances of the particular case, 
Such exercise shall not be disturbed on appeal unless a cJear abuse of discretion is shown 
TVestern Gas & Power of Idaho v. Nash, 75 Idaho 327, 330-31,272 P.2d 316 (1954). "An 
injunction is an equitable remedy issued under established principles which guide courts of 
equity," Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936 F.Supp. 738, 742 (D. Idabo, 1996). "The object 
of injunctive relief is to prevent injury, threatened and probable to result, unless interrupted," 
Miller v. Ririe Joint School Dis!. No. 252, 132 Idaho 385, 973 P.2d 156 (1999) (quoting Cazier v. 
Econorny Cash Stores inc., 71 Idaho, 178, 187 1951 ». 
Plaintiffs arc entitled to an injlllction, if they demonstrate that they arc "likely to succeed 
on the merits of their claims and may suffer in-eparable injury, or that serious questions exist OIl 
the merits and the balance of hardships tips in their favor." Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. 
Reese, 392 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1239 (D. Idaho 2005). The two tests arc flot sepa.rate but repre::,enl 
"a sliding scale in which the required probability of success on the merits decreases as the degree 
of harm increases," Id, (Citing Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda, 59 F.3d 902, 913 
(9th Cir.199S». If a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the merits, then 
plaintiffs need "only to make a minimal showing of hann to justify the preliminary injunction," 
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cit'. 2002). See also Idaho Sporting 
Congress Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (91,h Cit'. 2000) (the stronger the likeli.hood on tbe 
rnerits, the less burdeu is placed on plaintiffs to dern.onstrate irreparable harm), 
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Defendant ISP/ABC summarily removed Plaintiffs name from the priority lists, withoul 
waming, and without the opportunity to be heard and to object before the action was taken. 
Subsequently, Defendant ISP/ABC has continued to notify priority list applicants of the 
availability of new licenses, Plaintiff received such a notice. A ffidavil of Daniel Fuchs 
Plaintiff was entitled to notice and hearing before the order was issued which resulted in PlainlJff 
being removed from the priority lists, See I.e. §§ 67-5201(12), 5240. Notice and hearing are 
particularly irnportant in this case, because Defendant ISPI ABC's actions were unlawfuL 
There can be no dispute that Defendant ISP!ABC's July 24, 2009 letter ,vas a retroactive 
application of law. IDAPA 11.05.01.013,04 was amended in 2007, limiting applicants to only 
one position on any city priority list. Plaintiff applied for and was placed on the priority lists in 
1994 and 1995. I.C. § 73" 1 01 provides that "no part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." "In the absence of an express declaration of legislative intent that a 
statute apply retroactively, it will not be so applied. '· State v. Dateel Chenzical Industries, Ltd, 
141 Idaho 102, 105 (2005) (quoting Gailey v, Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432 (1987») "An 
application is deemed retrospective ifit affects substantive rights." lvfyers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 
85, 87 (et. App. 1988). "Among the rights characterized as substanhve are those whICh are 
'contractual or vested' in nature," Id. (Intemal citations omitted). Plaintiff has shown 
likelihood of success on the merits of this case. 
The second prong of the "sliding scale" test requires that Plamtiff demonstrate that be 
shall suffer irreparable hann, if the injunction is not granted. Plaintiff shall be irreparably 
ham1ed here, if Defendant ISP!ABC is not enjoined, because, if ISP/ABC continues to notify 
succeeding applicants of new licenses and/or issue new licenses, Plaintiff's rightful position OJ] 
those lists shall be lost. Moreover, this situation is unique, in that the irreparable harm would nol 
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be confined to Plaintiff. The rights and legal interests of subsequent applicants who rely on 
notices of license availability they receive or license they are issued may be affected. LIcenses 
issued to them might be ordered rescinded, cancelled Or revoked, 111 order to affect relief sought 
here by Plaintiff. 
Defendant ISPi ABC may argue that Plaintiff should be required to await completion of 
agency action before seeking judicial relief. However, ISP/ABC offered Plaintiff no heat'ing or 
opportunity to challenge the retroactive application ofIDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 in the first place. 
Th.e July 24, 2009 letter was final agency action. An injunction is the proper remedy to prevent 
additional hann flowing from it. Wrongs which are the probable result of given mean.s should be 
prevented, not awaited. Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores .. 71 Idaho 178, 187) 228 P.2d 436, 441 
(1951). 
Defendant ISPi ABC may assert, without merit, that it is impem1issible for this Court to 
interfere with its actions. HIn the instances where exercise of the authority transgresses the 
bounds of reasonableness, or is arbitrary in result, to the point where there is." a deprivation of 
property without due process of law (Idaho Const Art 1, §13), an action would lie fOL, 
injunctive relief." Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 52, 390 P.2d 291, 295 (1964). See also, 
Fritchman v. Athey, 36 Idaho 560, 211 P. 1080 (1922) C'Courts wiH not interfere by injunction 
with the exercise of discretion vested by law in administrative boards, but wiH, in proper cases, 
interfere with the action or threatened action by administrative boards outside their discretion 
a,n.d beyond their powers); Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F.Supp. 370, 372 (D. Idallo, 1957) ("[A] suit to 
enjoin a subordinate official, 01' to set aside action taken by him ... is allthorizedwhere U1e 
subordinate official exceeded his authority. His authority would be exceeded where he exercised 
authority granted him arbitrarily or capriciQusly, or where the subordinate employee exceeded 
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the statutOlY authority, either directly or under the gmse of an ultra vires m311date of his 
superior"). 
Finally, injunctive relief is proper, because Plaintiff has nO adequate remedy at law. "If 
threat of injmy is real, an injunction may issue even though the injUlY, if it were to occur, could 
be measured only by speculation and conjecture; one reason to issue an injunction may be thaI 
damages, being immeasurable, will not provide a remedy at law." Treasure Val. Potato 
Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203 (9th Cit'. 1974), cen. denied, 95 S.Ct. 314, 
419 U.S. 999,42 LEd. 273. While Plaintiff shall suffer real and ineparable ham; if Defendant 
ISP is not enjoined, it would be impossible to calculate damages. Any measure of loss of 
potential income from a lost license and prospective business conduct would be speculative in 
nature. The threat of haml is real and immediate, however. Defendant ISP has said that it intends 
to issue new notices of availability in the near future. See Affidavit of Brian Donesley at 11 2. 
This Courl should grant Plaintiff a temporary restraining order pending hearing and a 
preliminaIY inj'unction, enjoining Defendant ISP from notifying succeeding applicants on the 
affected priority lists of available licenses, or issuing rerail alcohol beverage licenses until fm1ber 
Order of this Couli. 
IV. 
I.R.C.P. RULE 84(m) PROVIDES FOR A STAY OF AGENCY ACTION DURING 
THE PENDENCY OF A PETITION FOR nJDICIAL REVIEvV 
Plaintiff filed his Petition for Judicial Review of Defendant ISP/ABC's final agency 
action on August 19, 2009 in Fuchs v. State of Idaho, Dept. oj Idaho State Police, Case No. CV 
2009-3914. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed his Motion to Consolidate the two cases, based upon 
the grounds and reasons of C0111111011 issues of law and fact~ and economy to the Court and the 
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parties, and that the interests of justice would best be served by consolidation of these cases 
which involve substantially common issues of law and fact between the same parties. Should 
this Court consolidate these cases, it may also slay, concllnenLly, Lhe agency [rom [urlher (ll:lio)l, 
pursuant to powers granted to the Court. in Judicial Review proceedings. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(m) provides the Court with a basis to grant Plaintiff a 
stay of agency action pending the outcome of this proceeding: 
Unkss otherwise provided by statute, the filing of a petition for judiCial revIew 
with the district court does not antomatically stay the proceedings and 
enforcement of the action of an agerlcy that is subject to the petition. Unless 
prohibited by statute, the agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a 
stay upon appropriate terms. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(m) (emphasis added). 
An injunction or a stay of Defendant ISP/ABC prohibiting notifying succeeding 
applicants on the implicated priority lists shall prevent fmther harm to Plaintiff And, Plaintiff s 
rights, privileges and legal interests attendant to his positions on the priority lists, hence the 
status quo, thereby would be preserved. A stay shall protect the right and lcgal interests of third 
padies, as well, because their places on the priority lists shall be preserved, Should Defend3~nt 
ISP/ ABC continue to notify succeeding applicants of the availability of new licenses, or issue 
licenses to them, such actions may be required to be 'Undone. By contrast, there would be no 
ham1 to Defendant ISP / ABC, if enjoined. ISP / ABC has no substantive stake in whether licenses 
are issued. 
This Court should issue enjoin Defendant ISP/ ABC from notifying to any such 
succeeding applicants on the affected priority lists, or issuing retail alcohol beverage licenses. 
Concunently) this COUlt should issue its stay order prohibiting Defendant ISP/ ABC from taking 
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further agency action with respect to the affected priority lists, until this matter has been 
adjudicated. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff requests that this Court issue its Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining 
Defendant ISP/ABC from notifying succeeding applicants of available licenses or from issuing 
liccnscs in the cities of Twin Falls, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, pending hearing. 
Plaintiff further requests that this Court issue a Preliminary Injunction so enjoining Defendant 
ISP / ABC, upon hearing of this Motion. Concurrently, if the case shall have been consolidated 
timely, Plaintiff moves this Court to stay Defendant ISP! ABC from furiher agency action during 
the pendency of the Petition for Judicial Review. 
DATED this L day of September, 2009. 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Plaintiff Daniel S. Fuchs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 4th day of September, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document on 
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following pa~iy(s) by method indicated 
below.: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. Jefferson Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise,ID 83720 
Stephanie Altig, Deputy AG. 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
Robert Clements 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian,ID 83642-6202 
[ X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ J Facsimile (334-2530) 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X J Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884-7090) 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X 1 Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (884-7096) 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
2009 SEP 10 Pl'1 3: 55 
CHER YL E. MEADE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Dr. 
Meridian, Idaho 83680-0700 
Telephone: (208) 884-7050 
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228 
Idaho State Bar No. 6200 
Attorney for the Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV-09-4185 
) 
) 
) ABC's RESPONSE TO 
) COMPLAINT FOR 
) DECLARATORY AND 
) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant, by and through its attorney, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General, 
hereby responds to and answers Plaintiff's Complaint For Relief and asserts its affirmative 
defenses. 
I. DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff s Complaint except for 
those expressly admitted. 
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I. PARTIES AND JlJRISDICTION (paragraphs 1-4), 
1. Plaintiffs paragraph 1 is a legal conclusion for which no response is required. 
2. Defendant admits paragraph 2. 
3. Defendant admits paragraph 3. 
4. Defendant denies paragraph 4, in that venue is proper in Twin Falls County. 
Defendant's administrative office, containing all records and documents, along with numerous 
personnel, associated with this case are located in Meridian, Idaho. Venue is proper in Ada 
County for these reasons and should be moved accordingly. 
II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS (paragraphs 5-15) 
5. Defendant admits paragraph 5. 
6. Defendant admits paragraph 6 to the extent that current statute and IDAPA rules al10w 
for. Otherwise Defendant denies any procedure that Plaintiff mayor may not perceive as being 
correct 
7. Defendant admits paragraph 7. 
8. Defendant admits paragraph 8 to the extent that current IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 
states that "An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority 
list." Otherwise Defendant denies any procedure that Plaintiff mayor may not perceive as being 
correct. 
9. Defendant admits the first sentence of paragraph 9. Defendant denies the 
argumentative characterization of the second sentence of paragraph 9. 
10. Defendant denies paragraph 10 to the extent that Plaintiff alleges he was entitled to 
notice and hearing. (Affirmative Defense --- Public notice and hearings of the rulema.1dng were 
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conducted at the time the rule was approved.) Defendant neither admits nor denies sentences 2 
and 3, paragraph 10 as they are legal conclusions for which no response is required. 
11. Defendant denies sentence 1, paragraph 11 to the extent that Plaintiff s 
characterization that a property right analysis is unnecessary. It appears that Plaintiffs 
Complaint is overly argumentative and is in fact arguing for a property right. Defendant denies 
there is any legal property right held by a mere applicant on a list of names to the extent that 
paragraph 11 alleges there seems to be. To the extent that Plaintiff is making legal conclusions 
as to the law, Defendant neither admits nor denies as no response is required. Defendant denies 
the tinal sentence of paragraph 11. 
12. Defendant denies paragraph 12. To the extent that Plaintiff is making legal 
conclusions as to the law, Defendant neither admits nor denies as no response is required. 
13. Defendant admits paragraph 13 to the extent that it is required by law to offer a 
retail-liquor-by-the-drink license to the next applicant on the list as that name appears. 
14. Defendant denies paragraph 14 in its entirety. 
15. Defendant denies paragraph 15 to the extent that Plaintiff will substantially succeed 
on the merits of this action. To the extent that Plaintiff is making legal conclusions as to the la w, 
Defendant neither admits nor denies as no response is required. 
III. DECLARATORY RELIEF (paragraphs 16-20) 
16. Defendant reincorporates its answers in full from above, to Plaintiff's paragraphs 
lthrough 15. 
17. Defendant denies paragraph 17 to the extent that the July 24, 2009, letter to Plaintiff 
constituted a final agency action. 
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18. Defendant denies paragraph 18. 
1 9. Defendant denies paragraph 19. 
20. Defendant denies paragraph 20. 
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (paragraphs 21-23) 
21. Defendant reincorporates its answers in full from above to Plaintiff's paragraphs 
1 through 20. 
22. Defendant denies paragraph 22. 
23. Defendant denies paragraph 23 to the extent Plaintiff appears to be making a prayer 
for relief instead of asserting disputable facts or law. 
V. VIOLATION Ol? DUE PROCESS (paragraphs 24-25) 
24. Defendant reincorporates its answers in full from above to Plaintiff's paragraphs 
1 through 23. 
25. Defendant denies paragraph 25. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES 
26. Defendant denies that attorney fees should be awarded in this action. 
II. DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
27. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; 
28. Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at 
law through the administrative process, without the requirement of the injunctive relief sought; 
29. Plaintiffhas failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; 
30. This court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims; 
31. At all times, relevant to this cause, Defendant's actions were reasonable and proper 
under the laws of the United States and the state of Idaho; 
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31. At all times relevant to this cause, Defendants' actions were reasonable and proper 
under the laws of the United States and the State of Idaho; 
32. Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive or equitable relief to the extent that they have not 
suffered, and will not suffer, irreparable harm or injury; 
34. Retroactive application of a rule clarifying procedure is allowable against the 
Plaintiffs application, when no privileges have yet been granted by the agency; 
35. No contract rights exist between the agency and the applicant; 
36. Plaintiff's claim is barred by unclean hands; 
37. Plaintiffs claim is barred by waiver, estoppel or laches; 
38. Venue is improper; 
39. Defendant incorporates by reference any additional affirmative defenses that 
may be uncovered or made known during the investigation and discovery in this case, as well 
as those now made or those that might be added by amendment by any other defendant. 
Defendant specitically reserves the right to amend this answer to include any such affirmative 
defenses. 
IV. DEFENDANT'S PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows: 
1. That the Court deny Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. 
2. That Defendant has been required to retain the services of the Office of the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho to defend them in this action and that Defendant should be 
awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12~ 117 and 
other applicable Idaho laws; and 
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
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CHERYL ~EADE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Counsel for Defendants 
CERTIfICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ABC's RESPONSE TO 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF was served on the 
following on this _Ji)_ day of September 2009 by the following method: 
Brian Donelsey 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box419 
Boise, ID 83701-0419 
Lt. Robert Clements 
Bureau Manger 
Alcohol Beverage Control 
P. O. Box 700 
Meridian, Idaho 83680-0700 
(208) 884-7060 
LJ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
I~ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
~j Electronic Mail 
U U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L_] U.S, Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
U Federal Express 
b-'.:l Hand Delivery 
r~ Facsimile 
[_] Electronic Mail 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
CHERYL E. MEADE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Dr. 
Meridian. 10 83642 
Telephone: (208) 884-7050 
Fax No. (208) 884-7228 
Cheryl.meade@isp.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for DefendantlRespondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF IDAHO STATE POLICE, Bureau of 
Alcohol Beverage Control, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV 09-4185 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION 
) TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
) ANDSTIPULATIONTO 
) CONSOLIDATE CASES 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant, by and through its attorney of record, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney 
General, and hereby objects to Plaintiffs Motion for Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction. These objections are based upon the grounds and reasons set forth herein, and those 
reasons found in ABC's previous Response to Plaintiff's Petition for Judicial Review. See also 
Affidavit of Robert Clements, attached to Defendant's ("ABC") previous Response in Twin Falls 
County Court Case Number, CV-09-3914. 
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1. FACTS. 
The facts relevant to the law that applies to this case appear to be undisputed and are set 
forth in full in ABC's Response to Fuch's Petition for Judicial Review, Civil Case Number, 
CV2009-3914 and are incorporated in full herein. 
II. ANALYSIS. 
"[T]he selling of intoxicating liquor is a proper subject for control and regulation under 
the police power. It is likewise universally accepted that no one has an inherent or constitutional 
right to engage in a business of selling or dealing in intoxicating liquors. (citations omitted)." 
Crazy Horse, 98 Idaho 762, 764-765,572 P.2d 864,867-868 (1977), citing Gartlandv. Talbott, 
72 Idaho 125, 131, 237 P .2d 1067 (1951). A liquor license does not create a contract between 
the state and the licensee; it is permission only, subject at all times to the control of the state, and 
may be revoked and terminated without the state in any way being obligated to the licensee for 
any damages that may result by reason of the state's action. In other words, a person has no 
vested right to sell liquor and a liquor license confers no property right when the state acts to 
annul or set aside such license. The mere fact that the person holds a liquor license does not vest 
him with any property right that would entitle him to any damages by reason of the revocation or 
cancellation of such license. Nims v. Gilmore, 171daho 609,107 P. 79, 81(1910). See also, 
O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 44, 202 P.2d 401, 405 (1949) (a license to operate a 
beer parlor does not confer any vested property right, yet if the city makes such businesses 
lawful by a permit or license, it cannot arbitrarily, capriciously, or llilIeasonably impair, interfere 
with, or eradicate the same); State v. Meyers, 85 Idaho 129,376 P.2d 710, 711-712 (1962) (a 
license to sell beer is a privilege, not a property right, which the legislature may grant or 
withhold at its pleasure and according to standards and requisites laid down by the legislature); 
Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 792 (1963), citing Nampa Lodge No. 1389, etc. v. 
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Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P .2d 991 (1961 ) (as between the State and the licensee, a liquor 
license is simply a grant or permission under governmental authority to the licensee to engage in 
the business of selling liquor; such a license is a temporary permit to do that which would 
otherwise be unlawful; it is a privilege rather than a natural right and is personal to the licensee; 
it is neither a right of property nor a contract, or a contract right). 
Under Idaho law, the legislature has vested the Director of the Idaho State Police 
("Director") with the authority to regulate liquor licensing and promulgate rules under the 
Director's supervision for the supervision and control of the sale of liquor by persons licensed to 
do so. Idaho Code § 23-901. The Director has delegated his authority to the Alcohol Beverage 
Control Bureau ofthe Idaho State Police ("ABC"). Therefore, all applications and inquiries 
concerning alcoholic beverage licenses must be directed to the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau 
at P.O. Box 700, Meridian, Idaho 83680. IDAPA 11.05.01.011.02. 
The Idaho legislature established a quota system for issuance of incorporated city 
liquor licenses. "No license shall be issued for the sale of liquor on any premises outside the 
incorporated limits of any city except as provided in this chapter and the number of licenses so 
issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for each one thousand five hundred 
(1,500) of population of said city or fraction thereof ... " I.e. § 23-903. Only Fuchs' mere 
applications are at issue in this case, as no licenses have been approved for him for these 
applications. 
The Idaho legislature obviously anticipated that there would be no rights associated 
with a retail-liquor-by-the drink-license because it further provided that "The director of the 
Idaho State police is hereby empowered, authorized, and directed to issue licenses to qualified 
applicants ... but only in accordance with the rules promulgated by the director ... " LC. §23-903. 
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As for entry of a preliminary injunction, the standard for such remedy is established by 
Rule 65(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or 
continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance 
of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the 
plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is 
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiffs 
rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 
(4) When it appears, by affidavit, that the defendant during the pendency of the action, 
threatens, or is about to remove, or to dispose of the defendant's property with intent to 
defraud the plaintiff, an injunction order may be granted to restrain the removal or 
disposition. 
Under paragraph (5) of Rule 64( e), a preliminary injunction may also be granted on the 
motion of the defendant upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of 
the grounds mentioned above in this section, subject to the same rules and provisions provided 
for the issuance of injunctions on behalf ofthe plaintiff. 
As the Court will determine from the limited agency record before it, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to the reliefhe seeks, i.e. the reinstatement of his position on a priority list. Furthermore, 
he will not suffer the irreparable injury. 
On the one hand, Fuchs has been refunded the portion ofthe application fee he 
submitted to be placed on the priority list(s), so he has not lost those funds. Any further claim by 
Fuchs' of irreparable loss is without merit. The additional losses Fuchs alludes to are too 
tenuous. One must assume that Fuchs would even qualify to hold the additional licenses he 
seeks; that he would find suitable premises for the 15 plus additional licenses; that he would also 
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implement the use of each of those licenses in accordance with all liquor laws; that he would no.t 
succumb to any future penalty of suspension or revocation against any of those licenses; and all 
for a period of two years before he could realize any potential earnings on his investment. 
Fuchs argument that he is the holder of a threatened legal right to a place on a list, 
through a mere application is without merit. Idaho's courts have continually held that a liquor 
licensee has no property right in liquor licenses as between the licensee and the state. This 
appears to beg the question then, if a liquor licensee has no property right, surely an applicant 
has even less standing in this area oflaw. See, Nims v. Gilmore, 17 Idaho 609, 107 P. 79, 
81(1910); O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 44,202 P.2d 401,405 (1949); State v. 
Meyers, 85 Idaho 129,376 P.2d 710, 711-712 (1962); Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 
792 (1963), citing Nampa Lodge No. 1389, etc. v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212,229 P.2d 991 (1961). 
Finally, the limited record before this Court clearly indicates that no issue of fraud 
exists on the part of ABC. The IDAPA rule in question was manifestly promulgated and 
approved, according to the laws of the State ofIdaho. See, Agency Record 21, copy ofthe Twin 
Falls Times News Publication, publishing the Notice of Rulemaking. Attached and incorporated 
herein. While Idaho does not appear to have any case law on point on the retroactive application 
of an administrative rule, there is case law that speaks to the retroactive application of a statute in 
such a manner. 
Accordingly, Idaho courts have consistently ruled that "a statute that is procedural or 
remedial and does not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights is 
generally held not to be a retroactive statute, even though it was enacted a subsequent to the 
events to which it operates." See, Wheeler v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 
P. 3d 988,993 (Idaho 2009). 
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Idaho further follows the legal principle that administrative rules and regulations are 
traditionally afforded the same effect of law as statutes. See, Huyett v. Idaho State University, 
140 Idaho 904, 908, 104 P. 3d 946,950 (Idaho 2004). 
Had Fuchs disagreed with the rule as it was written, he had plenty of opportunity either 
by himself, or through his counsel to object or to seek and amendment to the rule at the time. 
According to the testimony presented by the agency before the legislature, at the time the rule 
was under consideration, the rule was being passed in order to deal with an overcrowding on the 
priority lists by investors and speculators who were not properly placing these licenses into the 
use intended by the legislature. 
III. STIPULATION TO CONSOLIDATE CASES. 
ABC hereby stipulates to consolidate the two cases, CV-09-3914 and CV-09-4185. 
IV. UNAVAILABLE DATES FOR COUNSEL .. 
Unavailable dates tor counsel for hearing are as foHows: 
September 17-24,2009. 
October 12-31,2009. 
Counsel respectfully requests that she be allowed to appear telephonically for this 
hearing. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Fuchs cannot substantially prevail on the merits of this action because he has no 
property right to a place on a priority list. ABC substantially complied with an IDAP A 
procedural rule stating that an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each 
incorporated city priority list. If this Court were to rule in such a manner, the clear intent of the 
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Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs Motion for 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this _+I-=i_) __ day of September 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of September 2009, 1 caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RESTRAINlNG ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION by the U.S. 
Mail, first-class postage as follows to: 
Brian Donesley, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
PO Box 419 
Boise, ID 83701-0419 
U.S. Mail 
_Hand Delivery 
_Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
_Overnight Mail 
_Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Statehouse Mail 
)lElectronic Delivery 
AD 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Idaho Newspaper Association Inc. 
PMB 203 5120 W. Overland Rd. Boise. 83704 PH 208 375-0733 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affidavit of Publication 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
COUNTY OF ADA) 
Bob C. Hall, being tirst duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is the Executive Director and the principal clerk of the 
Idaho Newspaper Associatiol} Inc., an Idaho corporation, and that, he is the duly authorized agr.nt and repre~en tative 
of each of the newspapers hereinafter referred to and that he has completed the following publication assigl1n:1ent: 
That upon the direction of the Ofiice of Administrative Rules, Department of Administration of the State of Idaho, 
he caused the advertisement(s), copies of which are hereto attached and made partofthis affidavit, to be placed during 
the weeks beginning .--Mond~Y...Q~tober 2.1. ___ ._ 2006 in each newspaper on the attached list which is also a part 
of this affidavit; 
That all listed publications were in the format and readable appearance as shown by the attached sample advertisement 
. and that all publications meet all requirements of Idaho Code and of the contract between Idaho Ne\vspaper 
Association Inc. and the OtTtce of Administrative Rules, Department of Administration, State of Idaho. 
Signed: 
Bob . Hall, Principal Clerk 
Idaho Newspaper Association Inc. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me thi s _ ... ~~. ___ day Of_._~_, 2006. 
Summary List of pers Used &Ad Space 0 
For October 2006 Notice of Idaho Administrative Rules 
City NEWSPAPER NAME COUNTY(S) Ad Size 
COVERED 
AmericanFalis Power County Press Power 157.5 Col. Inches 
Arco Arco Advertiser Butte 157.5 Col. Inches 
Bonners Ferry Bonners Ferry Herald Boundary 157.5 Col. Inches 
Challis Challis Messenger Custer 157.5 Col. Inches 
Council Council Record Adams 157.5 Col. Inches 
Driggs Teton Valley News TElton 157.5 Col. Inches 
Emmett Messenger-Index Gem 157.5 Col. Inches 
Gooding Gooding Co.Leader Camas, Gooding 157.5 Col. Inches 
Grangeville Idaho CO.FreePress Idaho 157.5 Col. Inches 
Homedale Owyhee Avalanche Owyhee 157.5 Col. Inches 
Idaho City Idaho World Boise 157.5 Col. Inches 
Jerome North Side News Jerome 157.5 Col. Inches 
Ketchum Mountain Express Blaine 157.5 Col. Inches 
Malad Idaho Enterprise Oneida 157.5 Col. Inches 
McCall C.ldaho Star/News Valley 157.5 Col. Inches 
Montpelier News-Examiner Bear lake 157.5 Col-Inches 
Mt. Home Mountain Home News Elmore 157.5 Col. Inches 
Nez Perce Clearwater Progress Lewis 157.5 Col. Inches 
Orofino ClearwaterTribune Clearwater 157.5 Col. Inches 
Payette Independent-Enterprise Payette 157.5 Col. Inches 
Preston The Citizen Franklin 157.5 Col. Inches 
Rexburg Standard Journal Madison 157.5 Col. Inches 
St. Anthony Fremont Chronicle Fremont 157.5 Col. Inches 
Rigby Jefferson Star Jefferson 157.5 Col. Inches 
Rupert Minidoka County News Minidoka 157.5 Col. Inches 
Sf. Maries Gazette/Record Benewah 157.5 Col. Inches 
Salmon The Recorder-Herald Lemhi 157.5 Col. Inches 
Shoshone Lincoln Co. Journal Uncoln 157.5 Col. Inches 
SodaSprings Caribou County Sun Caribou 157.5 Col. Inches 
Weiser Weiser Signal-American Washington 157.5 Col. Inches 
Boise The Idaho Statesman Ada 157.5 Col. Inches 
Burley South Idaho Press Cassia 157.5 Col. Inches 
CoeurdAlene Coeur D'Alene Press Kootenai 157.5 Col. Inches 
Idaho Falls Post-Register Bonneville, Clark 157.5 Col. Inches 
Kellogg Shoshone News/Press Shoshone 157.5 Col. Inches 
lewiston Lewiston Tribune Nez Perce 157.5 Col. Inches 
Moscow Daily News latah 157.5 Col. Inches 
Nampa The Press-Tribune Canyon 157.5 Col. Inches 
Pocatello Idaho State Journal Bannock 157.5 Col. Inches 
Sandpoint Sandpoint Daily Bee Bonner 157.5 Col. Inches 
Twin Falls The Times-News Twin Falls 157.5 Col. Inches 
Blackfoot The Morning News Bingham 157.5 Col. Inches 
State of Idaho 
Department of Administration 
Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator 
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 650 West State Street 
Governor P.O. Box 83720 
MIKE GWARTNEY Boise, lD 83720·0306 
Director Telephone (208) 332·! 820 
DENNIS STEVENSON FAX (208) 332·1896 
Rules Coordinator http://adtn.idaho.gov/adminrules/ 
CERTIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) SS. 
DENNIS R. STEVENSON, being tirst duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the Administrative Rules Coordinator for the State of Idaho in the Department 
of Administration and he is the official custodian of the administrative rules of the State of Idaho, 
and that to the best of his knowledge, the attachments hereto are true and correct copies of the 
Affidavit of Publication and the Surmnary List of Newspapers Used and Ad Space Ordered for 
October 2006 Notice of Administrative Rules as received from the Idaho Newspaper Association 
Inc., and as published pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code. 
/ 
. s R. Stevenson, 
Administrative Rules Coordinator 
Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator 
Department of Administration 
State of Idaho 
Subscribed and sworn before me on t is 10th day of September, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Expires: 9-4 -( 5 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t.~ ______________ ) 
DANIEL FUCHS, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______ ~D~e=fu=n=d=an=V~R=e=sp=o=n=de=n=t. _________ ) 
SUPREME COURT 37652-2010 
DISTRICT COURT NO. CV 09-4185 
CV 09-3914 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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